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Pluralism,· as a sociological perspective to study multi-ethnic 
and multi-racial societies, is a popular and well-known approach. 
It is also an approach which has been repeatedly and effectively 
criticized. 
This study focuses upon pluralism and the problem of order in 
society. Hereby, a new pluralist perspective is developed 
which avoids the p_i tfalls of the traditional approach, on the 
one hand, and yet retains the valid emphasis on pluralism, 
on the other. 
By applying this new perspective, it is possible to analyze 
the changing relationships he tween t_he cultural (and racial) 
characteristics in the society, and its structural characte-
ristics. In this way, it is hoped·, more may be learnt about 
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The aim of this study is to develop a new pluralist theoretical 
perspective. This perspective can be used to analyze, socio-
logically, plural societies and, more generally, those societies 
which contain plural features. The central underlying theme 
of this theoretical perspective is the concept of social order 
in society. This concept, then, will be used to unify a number 
of divergent approaches to plural societies. Social order in 
society, in fact, has been a central (though generally implicit) 
concern of pluralists and other theorists alike. The new 
theoretical perspective developed in this study, begins wi t."1 
this common central concern. 
The terms, 'plural society' and 'pluralism' are currently used 
by a large and growing group of social scientists. The concep-
tions these terms represent, however, as used by this group, 
vary in meaning, refinement and complexity. 
In particular, the term 'pluralism' has been and is still being 
used in two quite independent and divergent senses: The first, 
which is commonly known as political pluralism, derives from 
the works of de Tocqueville and English pluralist philosophers. 
Today, in this sense, pluralism is used by such political 
scientists as Kornhauser and Dahl l). The second sense derives 
2) 
from the works of J.S. Furnivall and is today used by those 
pluralists about whose work this study will be concerned. 
For the time being, then, in order to avoid any ambiguity about 
these two quite independent traditions allied with pluralism, 
the term 'plural society' will be employed. Any social scientist 
who employs this term (or the allied term, pluralism) and who 
links his conception of it to the works of Furnivall, will be 
called, here, quite simply, a pluralist. 
1) The Politics of Mass Society, W. Kornhauser. 
Pluralist D~mocracy in the United States: Conflict and Consent, 
R.A. Dahl. 
2) Furnivall was the first person to use the term, 'plural 
society'. An extended discussion of his app_roach is presented 
in chapter Three. 
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Any review of the recent literature produced by this (latter) 
group of pluralists would undoubtedly show a wide difference 
of opinion about both the ~xact definitions of pluralism and 
the plural society, and their utility as analytic tools. 
The situation today seems identical to that in 1961 when 
R.T. Smith, a leading critic of the pluralist approach, could 
write: 'The term 'pluralism' is rapidly becoming one of those 
words, like 'institution', that everybody understands in a 
general sort of way but few people would care to define 
precisely 13 ). In fact, M.G. Smith, a leading pluralist, 
could write in 1969: ' •.. there does not now exist any agreed 
or systematic body of concepts and analytic propositions which 
could pass muster as a theory of pluralism or of the plural 
society. ' 4 ) 
Consequently, the development of a new pluralist perspective 
requires, in the first place, an identification of those 
ideas and concerns which pluralists share. The very first, 
obviously, is that certain societies can be grouped together 
under the label, plural and that all societies in this group 
manifest features which are sociologically relevant. Furnivall 
was the first person to do this and present-day pluralists' link 
with him, therefore, stems basically from this labelling of 
certain societies as plural. 
The basic underlying idea of this label can be found in the very 
term, 'plural society' itself. In fact, a 'society', at the 
. ' 
very least, must refer to a relatively stable and persisting 
network of social bonds between its members. What types of 
relationships these bonds represents, vary f;rom society to 
society. In a plural society, this same principle of a 
relatively stable and persisting network of social bonds between 
members, must hold within each separate 'plural' population 
group of .the society. The critical question which is posed 
by pluralists, is: Under what conditions will the networks 
of social bonds within the plural units contribute: towards 
3) 'Review of Social and Cultural Pluralism in the Caribbean,' R.T. 
Smith, p. 155. 
4) 'Some Developments in the Analytic Framework of Pluralism', 
M.G. Smith, p. 415. 
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the persistence of the more comprehensive societal network; under 
what conditions will they change this societal network; and in 
what manner wiil they change it?. 
As J.C. Mitchell puts it: 
,! 
The term 'plural society' itself is a contradiction since 
the idea of 'society' in terms of the usual sociological 
definition implies 'unity' - the antithesis of plurality. 
The problem of plural societies, then, lies in this 
contradiction - in what way can these societies be both 
'plural' and 'societies' - indeed, if they are 'plural' 
can they be 'societies'? 5) 
There are other concerns shared by pluralists for which a new 
pluralist perspective must account. In particular, 
attention needs to be paid to the nature of the plural units 
in a plural society; and to theoretical differences in approach 
which divide certain pluralists from other similar sociological 
theories. 
"There are many societies that do not readily conform to 
expectations derived from much of contemporary sociolo-
gical theory. They are societies possessed of a 
minimum of common values. They appear to be maintained 
more by coercion than by consensus. They are divided 
by sharp and persistent cleavages, which threaten their 
dissolution .• ,• The terms (pluralism and .the plural 
society) refer to (such) societies with sharp cleavages 
between different population groups brought together 
within the same political unit ...•• " 6) 
" •••.. those that accept a pluralist position are not 
merely contending that societies or social situations. 
are often characterized by racial and ethnic divisions 
but that these divisions are important in understanding 
other behavioural patterns. Clearly there are few 
who would be prepared to dispute that assertion and the 
critical point comes when it is suggested that it is this 
so-called plural structure which, under some circum-
stances, is the major determining factor in social 
organization ....• " 7) 
5) _Tribalism and the Plural Socie·ty,.J.C.. Mitchell, p. 25. 
6) _Pluralism in Africa, L. Kuper & M.G. Smith (eds.), p. 3. 
7) 'Introduction', M. Cross, Race, XII, 4, 1971, p. vii. 
Emphasis in the original.~~ 
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A plural society, then, contains 'racial and ethnic' groups and 
is characterized by 'a minimum of common values' and by 'sharp 
c.leavages. between (these) different population groups brought 
' 
together within the same political unit'. These societies, 
moreover, 'do not readily conform to expectations derived from 
much'of contemporary sociological theory' because the 'plural 
; 
structure (of such societies) .• , under some circumstances, 
is the major determining factor in social organization'. 
It seems reasonable to conclude this from the two above statements 
since both are taken from general critical reviews of the plural 
society conception. The first statement was written by the editors 
in the introduction to one major recent publication issued by 
pluralists: Pluralism in Africa. The second was written by the 
editor in the introduction to a special issue of the journal, 
Race which attempted to evaluate their approach. S) 
In sum, then, a new pl~ralist perspective must pay attention to 
the following concerns which pluralists share: Pluralists agree 
that their basic unit of analysis is a society. ·This society, 
which they label as plural, is linked with Furnivall's conception 
·of a plural society. In general, this society which contains 
plural ~nits (differentiated in terms of ethnicity and race), is 
characterized by a minimum of common values and sharp, persisting 
cleavages between these plural groups. For this reason, classical 
and contemporary theories of order and change in society do not 
adequately explain order and change in plural societies (because 
they do not cover the 'plural' features of these societies 
adequately) . 
Finally, and of most import to this study, a last common concern 9 > 
has been identified. Pluralists agree that the problem of social 
order in plural societies is basic to their approach. How, in 
fact, can a society with a plural structure, persist over time? 
8} Three major assessments of the plural society approach have been 
made. Apart from the two mentioned, the following is also impor-
tant: Volume 83 of Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 
1960, V. Rubin (ed.) 
9) A further common concern (though not directly relevant here) is 
the conviction that plural societies are unjust social arrange-
ments. The author shares this conviction. 
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It is.this last concern which has been 'chosen as the underlying 
theme of the new theoretical perspective. This theme, moreover, 
is holistic in that its main focus is upon societies, and it is 
structural in that the problem of order is conceptualized in terms 
of relatively permanent networks of social bonds (structures) in 
a society. 
The.first step in the development of a new theoretical perspective 
of pluralism, therefore, will be to discuss what is meant by social 
order in society withinan holistic and structural framework. 
The second step will .be to incorporate the idea of a plural 
society into this framework and to show what implications this 
has for conceptions of social order in a society. The third 
step will be to analyze the works of major pluralists from this 
perspective of social order in plural societies. 
Finally, the new theoretical perspective of social order in 
·plural societies will be developed. This development will be 
based upon the discussion of social order in society and upon 
the works of the major pluralists which will have been discussed. 
In addition, this perspective will be within an holistic and 
structural framework .. 
In Chapter One, social order in society will be discussed in terms 
of the two dominant sociological traditions which analyze it 
holistically and structurally: normative functionalism and 
coercion theory. 
In Chapter Two, the idea of a plural society will be introduced 
and incorporated into the framework within which social order in 
society was analyzed. This will be done in tb:ree steps. :First, 
some theoretical issues dividing certain pluralists from normative 
functionalists; and dividing certain pluralists from Marxists, 
will be identified. Second, some theoretical issues which are 
accepted as important by pluralists, normative functionalists and 
coercion theorists alike, will be identified. Third, a 
preliminary conceptual scheme for the study of social order in 
-6-
plural societies will be formulated. 
In Chapt~rs Three, Four, Five and Six, this preliminary cqnceptual 
, 
scheme will be used to analyze the works of four major pluralists: 
J.S. Furnivall, M.G. Smith, Leo Kuper and Pierre van den Berghe. 
These four social scientists are, in the opinion of this author'· 
th~ best-known and most.representative pluralists. They have 
used a definite conception of pluralism consistently in their 
works, over the years. 
In Chapter Seven, the works of a number of other pluralists will 
be analyzed in the same way. 
In Chapter Eight, the concluding chapter of this study, the 
new theoretical perspective will be developed. This perspective 
will develop out of the preliminary conceptual scheme discussed 
in Chapter Two. It will be based upon the preceding five 
substantive chapters. This theoretical perspective will be 
discussed in three steps. The first step focuses upon the origin 
of a plural society. The second upon. the conditions under 
which order in such a society can be maintained. The third step 
will' focus upon· the forces of change and possible directions of 
change in plural societies. 
• 
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, : CHAPTER ONE 
SOCIAL ORDER: CONSENSUS AND COERCION VIEWS 
In the introduction it was argued that the central perspective of 
the plural society approach in so?iology is the problem of social 
order in a plural society. This perspective, moreover, is 
defined within an holistic and structural framework. In other 
words, pluralists discuss the problem of order in societies 
(the main unit of analysis) and their level of analysis remains, 
for the most part, that of groups (usually of racial, cultural 
or ethnic nature) rather than individuals. ' Their framework, 
consequently, may be called holistic. In addition, pluralists 
are chiefly interested in these groups in terms of their per-
sisting patterns of behaviour (especially as _resulting from 
common institutions within themselves) rather than in the 
uninstitutionalized aspects of their behaviour. 
reason, their framework may be called structural. 
For this 
The aim of this chapter, then, is to introduce the problem of 
social order within a framework which is both ho'listic and 
structural. It is generally accepted that there are two 
dominant approaches in so~iology today which theorize about 
social order in society within puch ~ framework. 1 ) These are, 
a ' i 
first, the consensus approach (otherwise known as normative 
functionalism) and,second,the coercion approach (known, 
in a more specific sense, as Marxism). 
This chapter, therefore, will state the main arguments relevant to 
the problem of social order, made by each approach. These 
arguments will be used to iden'tify and compare the underlying 
assumptions of the two approaches. In this fashion, a nu.!fiber 
1) A review of recent literature on 'social order would show this. 
For example, see: Orthodox Consensus and Radical Alternative, 
D. Atkinson; Modern Social Theory., P .S. Cohen; ~ia1 Q.~der, 
_Reform and Revolution,,.B .. Jessop; The Sociological Imagination, 
C.W. Mills. Exchange theory which also deals with the problem 
of order, is usually openly opposed to frameworks which are 
holistic and structural. 
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of definitions and assumptions will be'obtained - some which are 
shared by both approaches; others which highlight differences 
between them - which will clarify what is meant by order and how 
it may be explained. Thes·e definitions and assumptions will 
be used in the second chapter to develop a conceptual scheme. 
This scheme will be used to identify and analyze the pluralist 
approach to.the problem of order (in plural societies). 
At this stage, a possible objection to this study needs comment. 
There is a group of contemporary sociologists who argue that a 
concern with social order in society reflects a conservative 
bias on the part of those social scientists who have this 
concern. 2> The first part of this chapter, then, will be 
a short discussion about what is meant, in general, by social 
order.and the possible .ideological effects of this point df view. 
The second and third parts wlll be discussions of social order 
/ 
as set out.by normative functionalists and coercion theorists. 
Finally,.a comparison of these two approaches will be made in the 
fourth and final par~ of this chapter. 
(a) Social Order 
Most men desire some kind of order in their and others' lives most 
of the time. They will not, in general, accept any order for its 
own sake but they do have a stake in what is sometimes called the 
status g:uo. 
In a society, moreover, men in groups, or alone, conceive of this 
status quo in'differerit ways. In addition, there are some, and 
. perhaps, under certain conditions many, who ·desire a change in 
the status guo. .The fact, thus, that there exists peaceful 
coexistence between these people and the groups they belong to 
2) A good representative argument can be found in The 
"com_ing: Crisis in Western Sociology, A. Gouldner-.-
r . ' 
- f'""' " 
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in a society at any one time, requires sociological explanation. 
I 
.. This, in short, can be called the problem of order. 
Peaceful coexistence of persons in a society can be explained in 
terms of the persisting patterns of these persons' behaviour in 
different situations. In such terms, the problem of social 
order becomes: Under what conditions can peaceful coexistence 
be expected in the operation of social institutions? 3 > 
An ideological dimension is introduced ,into this argument when 
a desire to maintain order is assigned to those theorists who 
place the problem of order in the front ranks of their theorizing: 
If you begin by posing the problem of order (which you do -
because you wish to preserve that ordep), the argument goes, then 
you inevitably counterpoise order with chaos; harmony and 
co-operation with force, fraud and conflict; and structure with 
process. 
' \ 
Therefore, in Gouldner~s words: 
Underlying the formal conception of 'social order in 
general' is a tacit, ,concrete image of a specific order 
with its fixed distribution of life chances. The quest 
for order is thus an ideology; it congenially resonates 
sentiments that favor the .preservation of privilege. 4) 
First; since there is no one accepted way of posing, or of 
solving the problem of social order, it is fallacious to argue 
that those who.place this problem in the .forefront of their 
theories are_necessarily.going tci be politically conservative. 
J Theorists~ reasons for giving this problem priority are so 
3) 
4) 
Parsons and Shils write: 'Order - peaceful coexistence under 
.conditions of scarcity - is one of the very first functional 
imperatives of social systems' . .•J:essop writes: 'Social order 
exists to the extent that there is peaceful coexistence in 
the operation of social institutions'. At this stage of 
this study, a more definitive description of societal order 
does not seem necessary. .'I'oward a General Theory of Action, 
T. Parsons & E. Shils, p. 180; Social Order, Reform and-
Revolution, B. Jessop, p. 14. 
- ' 




divergent S), in fact, that any attempt to point to a community 
of interests amongst them for this reason (or for any other) 
is bound to fail. Cohen's· reasons, for instance, are far-
ranging: 
first, order is itself positive and its opposites are only 
conceivable in terms of it; second, the very idea of 
human society presupposes order; third, the existence 
of social order is problematic and cannot be' taken for 
granted; and fourth, the investigation of the problem 
of order illuminates the nature of disorder in its · 
various aspects. 6) 
Second, if Gouldner's statement that those with 'a quest for 
order' are people who have 'sentiments that favor the preservation 
of privilege' is accepted as an empirical generalization, then it 
still remains to be tested in a whole series of individual cases. 
It remains true, of course, that a particular social scientist's 
views can, and often do, affect his work. In addition, the 
particular way in which he poses the problem of order is extremely 
important to the outcome of the study. Both a scientist's 
value commitments (where available) and his methods of posing 
certain problems will be considered relevant to this study. 
It.is necessary, here, then, for the author to state that the 
way of posing the problem of order in this study will be strictly 
. in accordance with sociological rather than normative criteria. 
These sociological criteria will be made explicit during ~~e 
development of the conceptual scheme. Value commitments will, 
so far as possible, be excluded from this study. 7 > 
. . 
5) See, inter alia, the following works: 
Orthodox Consensus and Radical Alternative, D. Atkinson; 
Modern Social Theory, P. S. Cohe_n; 
~The Hobbesian Problem 6f Order', D.P. Ellis; 
·Social Order, Reform and Revolution, B. Jessop; 
'iffie Sociological Imagination, c.w. Mills; 
Sociological Analysis and Politics, w.c. Mitchell; 
'The Two Problems of Order in Parsons 1 Theory' , E. Schwanenbe:tg; 
Introducing: Sociology_,_ P. Worsley (ed.) 
6) Modern Social Theo~ P.S. Cohen, p. 18. 
7) .It may be relevant to add, at this point, that the author shares, 
with all the pluralists who will be discussed in this studv, a 
strong moral commitment to change those societies which are 
classified as 'plural'. This sentiment, however, is not relevant 
to the way in which this study is constructed. 
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(b) .The Consensus View of the Problem of Order 
The representative of the consensus school chosen here is Talcott 
Parsons. He.is undoubtedly the most influential theorist of 
this approach which has also been called noxmative functionalism. 
Parsons' arguments relating t'o social order will be analyzed 
in two phases. The· first, found in his initial major work, 
. The Structure ·of S.ocial Action, B)will. show. that .the problem 
of order as posed by Hobbes is used by Parsons as a.point 
of departure in his attack upon the utilitarian and positivistic 
traditions in sociology~ This first phase will finish with 
a discussion of the theory which Parsons constructs to cope 
with the problem of ·order in society. This theory is called 
the voluntaristic theory of action and contains three new 
concepts which are crucial in explaining how social. order 
is possible: 'system', 'organism', and the idea of corcunon 
ultimate ends. 
T~e second phase will attempt to analyze some of Parsons' work 
done in the 1960s. He is here concerned with general systems 
theory and holistic or societal analysis. It will be shown, 
however, that explanations for societal order do not differ 
basically from those Parsons gave in his origina~ works. 
In fact, the three concepts identified in phase one remain 
present in the explanations though they are called differently 
and are much elaborated upon. This second phase, however, 
shows that Parsons is more concerned with theories of societal 
change and with another type of possible break-down of order 
., 
in society. These points, nevertheless, do not refute any of 
the arguments presented in his earlier works. 9 ) 
The main conclusion of this section will be that Parsons concept-
ualizes and discusses the problem of order in an holistic and 
structural framework. The three crucial new concepts which he 
~) This book was first published in 1937·. Henceforth, it will be 
referred to as §.§11. 
9) There is much disagreement as to how continuously Parsons' 
thought has developed from 1937. to the present. 'rhese arg·uments 
are not relevant here. See: 
Orthodox Consensus and Radical Alternative, D. Atkinson. 
'The Changing Foundations of the Parsonian Action Scheme' ,F.Scott. 
'Toward a Dynamic Conception of Order', D. Moodie. 
'Introduction to the Paperback Edition', SSA, T. Parsons • 
. 'The TWo Problems of Order in Parsons' Theory''· E.Schwanenberg. 
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introduced in .1937 will show this. Later, as he became 
interested in developed societies, he elaborated his holistic 
and structural framework by introducing the four subsystems 
of a society. It will be shown, here, then, how and why this 
framework developed. 
Phase one concerns itself with a discussion of The·Structure 
of Social Action. This book, in fact, can be seen as the founding 
work of the voluntaristic theory of action which emerged from an 
'immanent' convergence within the works of a number of noted social 
scientists : Alfred Marshall, Vilfredo Pareto, Emile Durkheim and 
Max Weber especially. This convergence, moreover, is seen most 
clearly against the backdrop of utilitarianism and positivism. 
Further, Parsons argues that these ·four theorists rejected the 
two abovementioned systems of thought mainly because the systems 
could not solve the problem of societal order within an accep-
table methodology.lo) 
The problem as posed by Hobbes in its pure utilitarian form, 
highlights the weaknesses of this system of thought and lead 
Parsons to reject the basic tenets of utilitarianism completely. 
' 11) . 
Hobbes set ·out his dilemma.as follows : Men in society are 
basically hedonistic. Each one of them, that is, tries to 
realize his own passions or desires as ends in themselves. 
They act rationally insofar as they.use the most efficient means 
'to try to realize these ends. Now one of the most efficient 
means for anyone in a group is power over his fellowmen. This 
power (which Hobbes conceives of in a zero-sum sense) 12 )is a 
'scarce resource in society and must, therefore, necessarily have 
a divisive influence by setting man against man in each one of 
10) "This problem (of order), in the sense in which Hobbes posed 
it, constitutes the most fundamental empirical difficulty of 
utilitarian thought." SSA, p. 91. 
11). See: Orthodox ConsE;,nsus and Radicar Alternative, D. Atkinson. 
'The Hobbesian Problem of Order', D.P. Ellis. SSA, Ch.III, 
.T. Parsons. Key Problems of §ociological Theory~ J. Rex. 
'The Two Problems of Order in Parsons' Thought', E.Schwan~nberg. 
12) For an explanation of this concept, see 'On the Concept of 
Politica+ Power', T. Parsons. 
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their individual hedonistic pursuits. In fact, it is through 
the application of force and fraud, the most efficient immediate 
means for obtaining power and one's 'desires', that this 
divisiveness becomes most apparent. The dilemma - the Hobbesian 
problem of order - now becomes clear: Given that all men are 
hedonistic, that they will pursue their passions by the most 
efficient means possible, that power, and force and fraud 
' especially, are among these most efficient means, then the 
state of society must necessar~ly dissolve into anarchy -
a war of all against all - in which a man's life, in Hobbes' 
famous words, must be .'.s.olitary, poor, nasty, brutish and 
short'. But this state, of course, will not allow a man 
.to pursue his passions in an efficient and satisfactory way. 
Herein, then, lies the dilemma. 13 ) 
It is important to note here that Parsons who considers Hobbes 
a pure utilitarian, 'almost entirely devoid of normative thinking•~ 4 ) 
insists that the dilemma can only be solved by exchanging this 
entire system of thought for another, quite different one. 
This utilitarian system of thought can be clarified by way of 
the unit act. The unit act - an analytical tool Parsons uses to 
discuss all th~ theorists in his book - consists of an actor, 
an end, a situation containing elements over which the actor has 
no control· - conditions - and eleme,rs over which he does have 
control - means - and, fourth, a relationship between these three 
components, the normative orientabon o'f the actor. 15 ) 
I 
Utilitarians, when using the unit act to explain social action, 
make four important (implicit) assumptions: 16 ) 
13) "A purely utilitarian society is chaotic and unstable, because 
in the absence of limitations on the use of means, particu-
larly force and fraud, it must, in the nature of the case, 
resolve itself into an unlimited struggle for power; and in 
the struggle for the immediate end, power, all prospect of 
attainment of the ultimate, of what Hobbes called the diverse 
passions, is irreparably lost." SSA, pp. 93,94. 
14) SSA, p • 8 9 • 
. 15) SSA, p. 44ff. 
16) SSA, Ch.II. 
F . -~ 
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First, unit acts are treated separately, as objects of inquiry 
in themselves. Any possible interdependence between them is 
ignored. Further, when wanting to explain action at higher 
levels, such as the societal level, utilitarians generalize 
directly from these conceptually isolated unit acts. Hobbes' 
view of individuals each pursuing their own selfish ends, 
i 
and his view of society as composed solely of a conglomeration 
of such individuals, can serve as examples. 
Second, utilitarians consider the overriding (subjective) 
relationship between means and ends in a unit act to be based 
upon rationality. Hobbes' assumption about the use of the 
most efficient means to realize the hedonistic end, is a case 
in point. 
Third, Parsons argues, utilitarians use empiricist arguments. 
This system of thought, which Parsons rejects on methodolo-
gical grounds, claims to be able to explain fully everything 
scientific.ally relevant about the empirical phenomena it analyzes, 
17) by using its system of analysis alone. 
Finally, ends are seen as statistically random in the sense 
that there can be no logical relationship of ends to one another. 18 ) 
This is clearly seen in the case of Hobbes' posited passions. 
These four assumptions, atomism, rationality, empiricism, 
and the randomness of ends, tie utilitarians to Hobbes' dilemma. 
To escape this dilemma, some assumptions must be relaxed. 
Parsons proceeds to show ·why Hobbes' own attempt and that of 
17) An empiricist, therefore, equates logical closure with empi-
rical closure. This is closely related to the fallacy of 
misplaced concreteness. 
18)" - Parsons wrltes: "If the concrete system be considered 
analyzable exclusively into r.ational unit acts it follows 
that though the conception of action as consisting in the 
pursuit of ends is fundamental, there is nothing in the 
theory dealing with the relation of ends to each other, 
but only with the character of the means-end relationship." SSA, 
p. 59. 
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both positivists and idealists 19 )are not successful in avoiding 
this dilemma. He himself, then, by using the unit-act concept, 
proposes ~he following framework: 
The unit act ·- embedded in a space-time context - contains 
an actor, ends, means, conditions, and a normative orientation. 
This normative orientation comprises norms which, in turn, can 
be described as 'desirable' relations between ends, means and 
conditions. Further, action is considered purposive in the 
sense that ends, means and norms are studied from the 
subjective view-point of the actor. 
With this scheme and from a position which he calls 'analytical 
realism•, 20 > Parsons rejects empiricism (and the related fallacy 
of misplaced concreteness); atomism (and the related danger of 
reifying the parts of wholes); rationality as the only cognitive 
relation the actor can have with external reality; and the 
assl.imption about the randomness of ends. In addition, he 
rejects the assumptions of the idealist school that cultural 
phenomena are unique and consequently inherently not amenable 
to scientific analysis. Instead, he introduces three new elements 
into his conceptual scheme: the concept, system;· the organic 
analogy; and the conception of common ultimate ends. 
The ·elements of the unit act, and a number of unit acts seen 
as elements of a larger area of social action, are considered to 
form systems (and systems within systems) • This view stresses the 
interdependence within and between unit acts of the relevant 
components. Further, no element can be torn from its position 
or context ~ithin an organismic system without a subsequent loss 
of meaning. Parsons writes: 
precisely in so far as the whole is organic its parts or 
units are not real entities but abstractions. Hence their 
19) See SSA, pp. 60ff and Ch.XIII. 
io) SSA, p. 730. This epistemological position assumes (i) that the 
actor acts purposively, (ii) that this action is amenable to 
analysis, and (iii) that action must be embedded in a situation. 
Further, (iv) it allows for certain analytic elements in the 
theory which can be considered attributes of phenomena and 
are not, as such, necessarily operationalizable. 
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use requires a particular high degree of caution to 
avoid the kind of reification which creeps in when 
this is forgotten and these units are treated as constant 
real parts through complicated processes of change ••. 21) 
Analysis itself, then, of any organismic system becomes problematic. 
Finally, relations between ends themselves and between ends 
and means, both within a unit act and.in larger syste~ of social 
action, are largely defined by the system of common ultimate 
ends (the value system) and by intermediate systems of norms 
(the ins ti tut.ional structure) • 
The Hobbesian problem of order is solved by pointing to the 
interconnectedness of action units and the common norms and values 
according to which actors orient their actions. These norms 
and values are meaningful only insofar as they are understood 
organically, as .being desirable 22 )in general rather than being 
desire~ by one actor in a particular unit act. Actors' ends, 
then, and the means they choose to try to achieve them are 
conditioned by and mediated through the common value system 
and intermediate institutional structure. Men do not and will 
' 
not stoop to force and fraud in their pursuit to satisfaction, 
,says Parsons, because they share a common value system. There 
exists consensus, that is, among them about what the ultimate 
ends of their actions should be. Further, there are in society 
accepted norms which specify how these ultimate ends are to be 
realized. 
This theory of action is 'voluntaristic' insofar as an actor 
is subjectively aware of these norms and ultimate ends (or values). 
21) 
22) 
SSA, pp. 747, 748. 
SSA, p. 75. Later, Parsons is to define values as '(c)ommit-
ments to conceptions of a good type of society'. See 'Order 
as a Sociological Problem', T. Parsons, p. 376. 
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An actor does not choose between a number of possible norms and 
values but rather integrates and internalizes rules and beliefs 
and thereby transforms them into norms and values. Contrary to 
positivism, it is possible to differentiate between the rational 
and non-rational components of his action. 
It is extremely important to observe that Parsons solves Hobbes' 
problem of order both holistically and structuz:ally. In contra-
distinction to the inter-related assumptions of atomism, 
! 
rationality, empiricism and the randomness of ends, Parsons 
explicitly introduces the idea of an organismic system (ultimately 
representing a society), and'argues, further, that its structure 
must be understood in terms of those common ultimate ends 
{and related norms) which condition action into repetitive and 
persisting forms of behaviour. It is quite clear that Parsons 
is saying_that social order must be seen within a larger 
societal context, and in terms of persisting patterns of 
behaviour, for it to be analyzed meaningfully. 
On the other hand, action must be seen 'voluntaristically; and 
! 
not as mere reaction to a static set of values and norms. The 
question of social order is still posed in its Hobbesian form 
(Why not a war of all against all?). Parsons' answer is in 
terms of values and norms, but the antipode of social order -
the result if the value~system, for some reason, does not mediate 
and condition action adequately - is chaos. Here, anomie and 
normlessness point to the same Hobbesian world of nastine_ss, 
brutishness and brevity. 
Phase two of this discussion of normative functionalism is l 
concerned with Parsons' interest in general systems theory, 
societal analysis and, in particular, analysis of what he calls 
developed societies. It will be shown that the way in which 
social order is conceptualized as well as the way in which its 
existence is explained remain essentially the same as those of phase 
one. In addition, a new type of problem which relates particu-
larly to developed societies, is defined. These 'imbalances' 
-18-
in society will also_be discussed. 
The ini tia.l point of departure remains the same for Parsons. 
Why is there not a war of all against all in society? The initial 
answer was given by way of the unit act and the three ideas 
discussed in phase one: system, organism, and a conunon value 
system. In phase two, Parsons elaborates upon these ideas. 
First, his new use of the concept, system will be discussed. 
Then both his conception of the four functional subsystems and 
the system of values in particular will be analyzed. The 
elaborated scheme, though obviously more complex than the first, 
serves basically the same function in explaining order. 
The basic unit of analysis is the action system. Action is, as 
before, purposive behaviour. 23 ) Parsons, however, is particular-
ly interested in analysis at high levels of generality: in 
macro-analysis. To cope with different levels of analysis, 
th~n, he introduces, as a principle of systems theory, an 
'essential parallelism in theoretical structure between .•. 
conceptual schemes ••• ' 24 ) This parallelism or homology 
between and within systems can be understood by conceiving 
of, on different levels of generality, a nested sequence of systems, 
each of which contains and, in turn, is contained by, others. 
Each of these systems must have the same theoretical structure. 
The simile, here, of nested Chinese boxes, one within the next, 
is apt. 
At a very high level of generality, one finds living systems. 
Action systems in which sociologists are interested, are 
subsystems of living systems. Moreover 1 action systems have 
a definite type of theoretical structure. Any action system 
must satisfactorily cope with four basic functional imperatives 
to persist as a system. These four functions define four 
23) The actor, however, is no longer within the system as was the 
case with the unit act. Now, the elements of the system are 
of the order of normative patterns of behaviour. 
24) 'On the Concept of Political Power', T. Parsons, p. 354. 
See also: Politics and the Social Structure, T. Parsons; 
'Some Problems of General Theory', T. Parsons. 
For other general works consulted, see Bibliography. 
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analytically differentiable action subsystems of the original 
system. (And, by homology, each of these subsystems can be 
analyzed in the same fashion} • 
The first functional imperative is called the pattern-maintenance 
function. It is concerned with patterns of system-control. 
The second, the integrative function, is concerned with the 
internal components of the system. The third, the goal-
attainment function, is concerned with goals linking the system 
with its environment. The fourth, the adaptive function, is 
concerned with the conditions of the system's environment. 
If human behaviour is being analyzed and the point of departure 
is a living system, the following four action subsystems of 
this living system will be defined by the four functions listed 
above: The cultural system fulfilling the pattern-maintenance 
function; the social system the integrative function; the 
personality the goal-attainment function; and the organismic 
system the adaptive function. 
Each of these subsystems are action systems and manifest the 
same theoretical struct"ure. In addition, though they are 
obviously all empirically interpenetrating, analytically 
any three are considered to form the environment of the fourth. 
At this level of analysis it is the social system and its 
allied integrative function ·which are central to normative 
functionalism. The integrative function serves to integrate 
complexes of social relationships into a'system of normatively 
patterned interaction. This system is the social system. There 
are two reasons why this system of action is central to 
Parsons. First, he insists that it is in interaction between 
persons - rather than in beliefs, cultural traits or abilities; 
eventually environment and heredity -.where sociology must begin 
its stu?Y· Second, he feels that the problem of social order 
is posed and regulated in this system. 
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He writes: 
Though intimately intertwined with the personalities of the 
·interacting individuals and the patterns of the cultural 
systems, the process of social interaction forms a fourth 
system that is analytically independent of both personal 
and cultural systems, as well as of the organism. This 
independence becomes most evident in regard to the 
requirements for integration that impinge upon systems 
of social relationships because of their inherent potential 
for conflict and disorganization. This is sometimes known 
as the problem of order in society, posed in classic form 
by Thomas Hobbes. The system of interaction constitutes 
the social system •. 25) 
Parsons is particularly interested in one kind of social system 
which he calls a society. 26 ) This society, then, by applying the 
principle of the parallelism, contains four homologous sub-
systems. The first is called ·the fiduciary (pattern-maintenance); 
the second the societal community (integration), the third the 
polity (goal-attainment), and the fourth is called the economy 
(adaption) • 
By homology once again, the societal community is the critical 
subsystem within the social system. The function it serves in 
integrating the·society, too, is relevant to the order problem. 
Parsons writes: 
The core of a society, as a system, is the patterned 
normative order through which the life of a population 
is collectively organized. As an order, it contains 
values and differentiated and particularized norms 
and rules, all of which require cultural references in 
order to be meaningful and legitimate. As a collectivity, 
it displays a patterned conception of membership which 
distinguishes between those .individuals who do and do 
not belong •..•• We will call this one entity of the 27) 
·society, in its collective aspect, the societal community ..• 
25) Politics and the Social Structure, _T. Parsons, pp. 7,8. 
26) "We define society as the type of social system characterized 
by the highest level of self-sufficiency relative to its environ-
ments, including other social systems." The System of Modern 
Societies, T. Parsons , p. 8. 
27) Politics and the Social Structure, T. Parsons, p. 11. 
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It is clear that the societal community, 'the core of a society', 
is the key regulator of social order. In fact, if it is 
functioning properly, then the values, norms and rules, referred 
to by Parsons above, will be 'meani~gful and legitimate'. 
Under these conditions, peaceful coexistence in the society 
seems assured. It is important to note, however, that 
'cultural references' are needed for this situation to obtain, 
and these references are obtained from the fiduciary. It 
becomes important to inquire, ;then, into the relations between 
the four subsystems of a society, 
First, Parsons argues, there exists a cybernetic hierarchy of 
control among these subsystems. "The fundamental proposition 
here is that systems which are low in ene~gy but high in 
information can control systems which are higher, much higher, 
in energy and lower in information". 28 ) The latter systems 
can be conceived of as setting the conditions within which 
the total comprehensive system operates and changes. Starting 
from high information and control, the hierarchy in a society 
is as follows: first, the fiduciary, next the $Ocietal 
community, then the polity and finally the economy. 29 ) 
The societal community, then, is largely controlled by the 
fiduciary. 
A second way in which Parsons conceptualizes the relations between 
the four subsystems is by defining each as a production unit . 
. There are then inputs into, and outputs from each system from 
its environment. This environment is, none other than the other 
three subsystems. This paradigm has, of course, been developed 
and refined by economists for the economy. By extending 
this basic economic paradigm by homology to the other three 
. . 
28) 'Order as a Sociological Problem', T~ Parsons, p. 380. 
Parsons gives the following example: "a programed (sic) 
sequence of mechanical operations (e.g., in a washing machine) 
can be controlled by a timing switch using very little energy 
.compared with the energy actually operating the machine's 
moving parts or heating the water".·Politics and the Social 
Structure, p.10. For a further discussion of the use of 
cybernetics in socioJ:ogy, See: Sociology and Modern Systems 
Theory, W. Buckley. · 
29) A similar control hierarchy exists at the social system level: 
culture system; social system; personality system and organis-
mic system. 
. . r ·-
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subsystems, Parsons contructs a complicated model of interchanges 
in the social system. 30 > This interchange process is controlled 
by and filtered through fou_r generalized media of exchange, one 
for each subsystem. Each medium regulates the production 
function of each subsystem. These generalized media, moreover, 
are symbolic and largely dependent, therefore, on the normative 
order which, as was seen earlier, constitutes the core of the 
society. Each medium, however, ·can also be seen as a 
constraining device and, as such, is related to a specific 
type of sanction. This sanction base, too, falls within the 
normative order insofar as the societal community is functioning 
adequately. As an example of these exchanges and forces of 
constraint between subsystems, the economy/polity interchange 
and interface will be briefly discussed. 31 ) 
The basic function of the economy in the society is production; 
that of the polity i~ effective collective action so as to attain 
collective goals. 32 ) The symbolic medium of the economy is 
. 33) 
money; that of the polity power. The output from the 
polity which becomes capital as one of the inputs (factors of 
production) into the economy, is what Parsons calls 
'opportunities for effectiveness'. The output from the economy 
is a commitment of services to the col~ectivity which becomes 
30) 'Some Problems of General Theory', T. Parsons, pp. 37 - 43. 
31) This discussion is largely based on Parsons' first 'media' paper: 
'On the Concept of Political Power', Ch.14 in Politics and the 
Social Structure. · 
32) The function of the. fiduciary is to maintain and reinforce the 
basic values of the society; that of the societal community is 
to allocate rewards, privileges and facilities to maintain 
normatively integrated interaction in society. 
33) Money is defined as: "The unit's capacity, through market channels 
under given rules of procedure, to command goods and services 
in exchange, which for its own reason it (the acting unit) 
desires." quoted in Jessop, op. cit., p. 22. "Power ••. is 
.generalized capacity to secure the performance of binding ob-
ligations by units in a system of collective organization when 
the obligations are legitimized with reference to their bearing 
on collective goals and where in the case of recalcitrance there 
is a presumption of ~nforcement by negative situational 
sanctions - whatever the actual agency of that enforcement." 
Politics and the Social Structure, p. 361. 
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control of productivity when seen as an_ input into the polity. 
Seen as constraining media, money is founded upon positive 
situational sanctions or inducement; power on negative 
situational sanctions or coercion. 34 ) In turn, inducements are 
grounded upon gold; coercion upon physical force. It is impor-
tant to note, however, that money and power, as symbolic media 
of exchange, are dependent upon confidence in the economy, and 
legitimacy in the polity, respectively. Without confidence and 
~egitimacy, the media money and (for Parsons) power are useless 
symbols. This is clear in the relationship_between money and 
property as an institution, in a sphere of confidence, on the 
one hand; and power and authority as a status position (from 
which power may be used), in a sphere of legitimacy, on the other. 
The following diagrammatic presentation serves as a summary: 
SEE TABLE I 
34) Parsons generates a four-type sanction scheme by differentiating 
between positive and negative, situational and intentional 
sanctions. See TABLE II, CHAPTER II. 
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In s~, then, relations between the four subsystems of a society 
depend upon a whole series of factors. In particular, these 
subsystems are closely interdependent in the sense that each 
must depend upon three·crucial inputs from its environment and 
must, in return, produce three outputs, one for each subsystem 
in its environment. The cybernetic control hierarchy and the 
symbolic nature of the generalized exchange media, however, 
point to the priority that the normative o~der enjoys in this 
scheme. Eventually, the fiduciary - concerned with the main-
tenance and reinforcement of the values of the society - controls 
the other systems. Order in society is explained, in large part, 
by the efficient functioning of this subsystem of a society. 
These relations between subsystems of society, moreover, become 
critical in a type of society in which Parsons became interested 
in his second phase. He calls them 'developed' societies. 35 > 
The social structure of such societies tends to become differen-
tiated about the four subsystems. In other words, more 
'~ystemness' 36 ) develops within the economy, polity, societal 
community and fiduciary than between them. New roles and 
p.ositions created by the increasing division of labour tend to 
c_luster within these su?systems r'ather __ than to cut across their 
boundaries. The shedding by the family of its economic 
role and the concomitant specialization' of occupational roles in 
the economy, can serve_ as a general example. In short, the four 
analytic subsystems of a society, though empirically interpene-
, trating, tend to 'cryst~llize out' in a developed society. 
One important consequence of this process of crystallization is 
that relations between subsystems in a developed society become much 
35) See, for example, 'On the Concept of Political Power', p. 380.· 
These societies can be typified by the process of increasing 
division of labour. Parsons, of course, is also interested 
in the evolutionary aspects of such development. In this 
. process, value generalization, inclusion and adaptive up-
grading are considered as important as structural differentia-
tion. This is not relevant to the discussion here. See: 
Societies: Evolutionary and Comparative Perspectives, Ch. 2. 
36) See: Explorations in Social Change, G.K. Zollschan & W. Hirsh, 
'Section Two' . 
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more important. The cyb~rnetic control hierarchy becomes 
explicit, as do the generalized media of exchange 37 >and the 
required _i_np_~ts and outputs in the social system. In short, 
societal order, in a developed society, requires another 
dimension: that of the peaceful coexistence of the people 
and that of the smooth functioning of the subsystems. 
Jessop puts it this way: 
The differentiation of.the social system creates new 
problems for the system integration and the maintenance 
of social order. Each of the differentiated subsystems 
requires certain factor inputs if it is to perform its 
own function adequately and each must dispose of its 
product if the.other subsystems are to function in turn. 
It is inherent in the interchange process that an 
imbalance may emerge in the acquisition of inputs and the 
disposition of outputs and so create social strains.· 
An additional complication is introduced by the dependence 
· of highly differentiated societies upon generalized 
media o.f exchange for the adequate functioning of the 
interchanges between subsystems ••• ~. 38) 
The three elements that Parsons introduced in 1937 to solve 
Hobbes' problem: system, organism and a shared value system, 
remain central to normative functionalist theory. The 
concept of a qyb~rnetic hierarchy of control has replaced 
the organismic analogy but it is clear that the assumptions 
underlying the former are the same. 39 ) Further, instead of 
·· ~ simple shared value system, this control hierarchy allied 
with the idea of homologous action systems, and interchanges 
betwee·n them, is used to construct a much more complex conceptual 
scheme. The assumptions about what integrates interaction into 
' 40) 
ordered syste~s, as has been shown, however, remains the same. 
The problem of order is, again, solved holistically and struc-
turally. 
37) Money, as a symbolic medium of exchange, in fact, can be con-
ceived of as a characteristic of a certain level of development. 
38) Social Order, Reform and Revolution, B. Jessop, p. 22. 
39) See: 'Some Problems of General Theory', T. Parsons, p. 59. 
Sociology and Modern Systems Theory,· w. Buckley, Ch.2. 
'Order as a Sociological Problem', T. Parsons, p. 380. 
40) Parsons writes: "The most fundamental ground of order in socie-
ties is the internalization of the normative culture and the 
institutionalization of that in the normative culture of the 
society." and "At the top of the hierarchy of normative 
components I would place values." See: 'Order as a Socio-
logical Problem', T. Parsons, PP• 379,376. 
-26-
There is, on the other hand, an important difference. It is now 
much clearer where and how order can break down. It is clearer 
in what areas of society social strain can accumulate and under 
what conditions this m~y take place. 41 )In fact, in developed 
societies (which seem increasingly to monopolize the attention 
of consensu~ theorist~) strain is seen to be inherent in the 
process.of structural differentiation. This can cause serious 
'imbalances' between the four functional subsystems. An 
42) 
example of this is the conception of power deflation where 
the legitimacy allocated to power-wielding decreaS~$ which, 
in turn, necessitates the overt use of' coercion and, eventually; 
force. This down-ward spiral may lead to a break-down of 
societal order. 
In conclusion, societal order is.still conceptualized in Hobbes' 
question: Why not a war of all against all? Parsons' answer 
I 
is found in the normative core of a society. Men share common 
values and norms. If this core should fail, if the critical 
ordering mech-anisms malfunction, then a state of Hobbesian 
chaos descends: a normless world of anomie and .of war of each 
against the other. In both phases, for Parsons, social order 
and chaos are antipodes of ea~h other. 
(c} The Coercion View of L~e Problem of Order 
It is not possible to trace, here, the development of the 
thought of an eminently representative theorist over ~ period of 
, . forty years. This is essential_ly what was done in the last 
41) The terminology is Smelser's who is perhaps the foremost 
normative functionalist to tackle the problems of conflict 
and change, See: Social Change and the Industrial Revo-
lution, N. Smelser; Theory of Collective Behavior, N. Smelser; 
Essays in Sociological Explanation, N. Smelser. 
42) 'See 'On the Concept of Political Power', T. Parsons. The 
analogy with the economy is again being made. 
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section. Instead, Marx's 43 }and Dahrendorf's 44 )approaches to 
the order problem will be discussed. It should be noted, more-
over, that similarities rather than differences between their 
two theories will be stressed. 
~or Marx, a man expresses himself and thereby his humanity 
through his labour. ' (T}he whole of what is called world history 
is nothing but the creation of man by human labour •• • 45 > It is 
not surprising, then, to note that in the 'beginning' and at 
the 'end' of world hist~ry, the primitive and future communist 
societies are basically consensual: structural conflict is 
absent. Man, if not strait-jacketed in an alienating mode 
of production, is basically co-operative. It is this mode of 
production - the organizing of labour, capital, machines and 
men to produce goods and services - and its concomitant societal 
structure, both of which are conceived of as being 'outside'. the 
individual, which disrupt man's essentially harmonious relations 
with his fellow-men. In particular, it is the capitalist 
mode of production which Marx analyzes and which poses the problem 
of order. 
43) Apart from Marx's own works (in Feuer(ed.} & Jordan(ed. }) ,the 
following studies have been used: 
.Main Currents in Sociological Thought, I, R. Aron;. 
Orthodox Consensus and Radical Alternative, D. Atkinson; 
Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society, R. Dahrendorf; 
Capitalism and Mod~rn So~ial Theory, A. Giddens; 
Social Order, Reform and Revolution, B. Jessop; 
.Karl Marx, z .A. Jordan (ed.) , 'Introductory Essay' ; 
The Sociology of Marx, H. Lefebvre. 
Also see: Marx and Engels, L. Feuer (ed.). 
44} See Atkinson (op. cit.); Jessop (op. cit.}; Dahrendorf (op.cit) 
'Toward a Theory of Social Conflict', R. Dahrendorf; Key 
Problems in Sociological Theory, J. Rex. 
45) Marx, quoted in Capitalism and Modern Social Theory, A. Giddens, 
p. 19. It follows from this that Marx's sociology focuses 
upon human action. Jordan, in fact, writes: 11 •• the social 
world (for Marx) is created by interacting individuals. 
As Marx himself puts it, society is not an aggregate of 
individuals but 'the product of men's reciprocal action' .. 11 
Z.A. Jordan, op. cit., p. 11. 
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Marx believed that capitalist society would be destroyed by 
.endogenous causes. These are the internal contradictions 46 ) 
which deepen as capitalism develops. The' problem of order 
cannot be couched in Hobbesian terms if it is to relate to this 
conception. It will, on the other hand, still be couched 
in an holistic ,and structural framework. The question of 
order, here, is: Given·the ~act that capitalism contains the 
seeds of its own destruction, how is it possible that men can, 
at a particular time, co~exist peacefully in a capitalist 
·' . society? 
To answer this question, the theory of the development of 
capitalism must be reviewed •. First, the development of the forces 
of production, and, second, of the relations of production will 
be analyzed. These will then be related to the development 
of class-consciousness. Finally, the relationship between 
the state and the production process will be analyzed. After 
this analysis, an answer to the problem of order as stated 
above will be found. 
Marx's analysis of capitalism is wholly predicated upon 
the postulated connection between the expansion of the 
• division o~ labour .•• on the one hand, and the emergence 
.of a polarised class structure, on the other •... 
Capitalism is thus, in its essence, a class society; 
the existence of a bourgeois class E£esupposes a 
subordinate class of propertyless workers, and vice 
versa ...• 47) ~-
The development of capitalism can be analyzed in two phases. The 
first focuses up~n the expansion of the divis~on of labour and 
the .second upon the polarization of classes in the society. The 
first element in this process of ·development to be looked at is 
I ' 
.:the ~or.ces of production: These comprise scientific and tech-
. nological knowledge, and the organization of collective labour. 
46) It is difficult. to use Marx's idea of contradictions in a 
sociological framework. Here, the con'cept of conflict 
· will be used instead. 
47) Capitalism and Modern Social Theory, A. Giddens, p. 239. 
Emphasis in the original. 
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Early capitalist society starts with three groups: the landowners 
owing land, the capitalists owning capital, and the proletariat 
who sell their labour for a wage. In this early stage, the 
forces of production will function in favour of the landowners 
and capitalists. The rent and profits these two groups receive, 
in fact, can be ploughed back into the production process and 
will contribute, along with the forces of production, toward 
capitalist development, toward the expansion of the division 
of labour. These profits, moreover, are called surplus value 
in that they represent the difference between what members 
of the proletariat produce and what they receive in wages. 
In this early stage, then, it is possible that capitalist 
development is not materially detrimental to the proletariat. 
This situation, however, changes. In the infrastructure of 
a society - what can be called its economic base - the capitalists 
are forced by competition and through the rising demands of 
technology, to extract more surplus value from the proletariat. 48 ) 
The log_ic of the capitalist process of development, hence, 
demands that the capitalist refines the exploitative process. 
This, in turn, brings about a drop in the life standards of 
the proletariat and inexorably involves those still outside 
this capitalist economic system (peasants and petty bourgeoisie, 
for example) in this process. These exigencies caused by 
the forces of production force all members of the society 
into one of two large classes: the bourgeoisie and the 
proletariat. Class membership is defined by a person's 
relationship to property institutions and the distribution 
of capital, to the ownership and control of the means of 
production. The bourgeoisie monopolize these means; the 
. proletariat exchange their labour {or, more strictly, their 
48) For an exposition of the assumptions underlying these 
propositions, see Main Currents in Sociological Thought, 
I,·R. Aron, pp. 125ff. In these terms, exploitation 
refers to the fact that members of the proletariat who 
produce the surplus value through their labour, have 




labour-potential) for a wage. 
The social relationships which arise from this process are called 
the relations of production. In the long run, these relation-
ships are dependent upon the 'objective• 49 >relation the person 
and his class has to the means of production. Nonetheless, 
men may be forced to work longer hours for less wages, be 
further exploited at work and at home, without realizing 
along with their fellow-workers, that their common class 
position is the true cause of this hardship. I:p.sofar 
as they are members of a class without being conscious of this 
membership nor of the collective action this implies, they form 
a class-in-itself. This gap between being a member of the 
proletariat and becoming conscious of the true role the 
proletariat and its members are to play, is a measure of 
what Marx called the false consciousness of the.proletariat. 
The proletariat matures and becomes a class-for-itself when its 
members, brought into overt opposition with the bourgeoisie, 
·revolt against the established order and attempt violently 
to dismantle the capitalist structure and institute a 
classless communist society. Given that the.forces of 
production have reached an advanced stage in the capitalist 
society, the success of this revolution will depend upon the 
scope of class consciousness present and upon the effectiveness 
of the coercive means which the bourgeoisie can bring to bear. 
Likewise, the measure of social order in such a society will 
depend upon the scope of false consciousness present amongst the 
proletariat; the effectiveness of the bourgeois monopoly of 
political power; and the effectiveness of the dominant ideology 
in the society. In short, it will depend upon the quality of the 
superstructure. 
49) The economic base does not.orily include objective factors but 
property institutions as well: i.e. normative factors . 
. See Social Reform, Order and Revolution, B. Jessop, p. 33 & 
Orthodox Consensus and Radical Alternative, D. Atkinson, p. 41. 
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Theoretically, property relations in the infrastructure define 
what the dominant ideology of the society is to be(an embodiment 
of the vested interests of the ruling class); who is to 
monopolize the state institution$ and wield _the political power 
'(the bourgeoisie as ruling class) ; and, in the case of unrest, 
I . 
·against whom this coercive power is to be applied (the 
1 proletariat). In effect, the superstructure which comprises 
these non-economic institutions and the ideologies of the society, 
is treated as an epiphenomenon. In practice, however, Marx's 
empirical works point to a much more complex set of relations 
between these institutions and ideologies, on the one hand, 
and the. infrastructure, on the other. As an example, 
Marx's conception of the state will be discussed briefly. 
Marx believed that if man sheds the constraints of the capitalist 
mode of production, he will be able to create a consensual 
,society. Further, he believed that man is 'essentially' a 
social rather than (as Hegel SO)believed) a political being. 
In fact, in the long run, at least, a man's life chances 
are dependent upon the social relationships he forms, 
especially those concerned with the ownership and control 
of land, machines and labour, rather than upon his citizenship 
and his relationship with the state. The distinctions, then, 
between the private domain (in which a man is unconstrained) 
and the public domain where the business of the state is 
conducted; and between civil society in which man's social . 
• relationships with his fellows are most important, and the 
political sphere, are both crucial for an understanding of 
the· state. 
In the public.domain, the argument goes, a man's de jure 
civil rights (to vote or to comp~te for public office, for example) 
are fictitious. His true position in society is defined, in 
f(lct, by his 'social rights which are ultimately reducible to his 
I 
50) See Social Science and Political Theory, w. Runcirnan, Chapter II. 
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rela~ionship to the means of pr~~uction. The state, then,is 
nothing more than a tool used by the bourgeoisie to further 
their own interests in civil society. "Political power, 
1 
properly so called, is merely the organized power of one class 
for oppressing another".Sl) Political power, founded upon 
state institutions, is applied coercively to_secure the 
bourgeois monopoly of the means of production and to squeeze a 
larger surplus from organized labour. The attempt to maintain 
. -
the false consciousness and passivity of the proletariat rests 
upon this power and its concomitant ideology. This ideology; 
moreover, is couched in exactly .those terms which Marx rejects: 
a man's political, de jure rights; his citizenship, his right 
to be served by the state, and so on. The extent to which 
this ideology is accepted by the proletariat, serves as a 
measure of the scope of legitimacy 
enjoy in their control of the state. 
This situation, too, however, changes. 
which the bourgeoisie 
After the two classes 
have confronted each other in overt conflict, the state as an 
appendage of the ruling class will no longer be necessary. The 
private domain of the individual in which his social rights 
' 
are realized, will coincide with the new communist society. 
The'relationship, in practice, however, between the infrastructure 
and the state is neither one-to-one nor one of-complete dependence. 
Two examples. will show this. First, Marx left open the 
possibility that change could occur by way of the ballot-box. 52 ) 
This implies that under certain peculiar conditions, action in 
the public domain can have independent causal significance. 
Second, though the state disappears along with the capitalist 
.. mode of production, its institutions and their derived power 
are necessary for the overthrow of the capitalist order. 
The dictatorship of the proletariat, in fact, is an interim 
phase during which the state is used, in effect, to bring about 
its own downfall. 
51) Marx, .Marx and Engels, L. Feuer {ed.), p. 51. 
52) Social Order, Reform and Revolution, B. Jessop, p. 28. 
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Social order is conceptualized within a capitalist society. 
This order varies inversely with the depth of contradictions in 
that society. These contradictions are a measure of the lack of 
fit between the forces of production and the relations of 
production. Since the forces of production inexorably cause 
deeper and deeper contradictions as capitalism develops, 
\ 
social order, in the first place,:dissolves as capitalism 
reaches its mature stage. In the second place, however, 
social order varies directly with the scope of false conscious-
ness amongst the proletariat. This, in turn, is dependent 
upon the effectiveness of the dominant ideology of the state 
; and the ruling class. In the third place, social order varies 
directly with the effectiveness of the coercive power of the 
state. In short, social order depends upon the influence 
which the superstructure (the ideology of the ruling class 
and the, power of the state) has upon the relations of production 
in the infrastructure. 53 > When this supers_tructure becomes 
completely dependent upon the infrastructure and classes become 
conscious of their true positions in the society, overt class 
conflict ensues and social order is shattered. Direct dependence 
relations between the superstructure and this economic base are 
skewed, however, by the cultural lag of false consciousness, 
the need for state power to conclude the revolution, and by 
certain other peculiar empirical conditions. 
Order - peaceful coexistence of institutions in a capitalist 
society - is, Marx argues, inherently unstable. Insofar as 
it exists, it is explicable along three dimensions: the 
ideological order (of the bourgeoisie); the coercive order 
·~ 
(of the state); and the exploitative constraints (of the 
economic base). As capitalism develops, as the superstructure 
fits better into its position of dependence upon the economic 
53) This can only occur, of course, in the short-run. In the long 
run, conflict based in the infrastructure, especially between 
the forces and relations of production, will gain precedence 
over the ruling social order, and will bring about class-
conflict. Social order, for Marx, can only be conceived 
of in the short-run if the society fa].ls within a capitalist 
mode of production. 
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base, as the contradictions in this base deepen, so the societal 
order dissolves. 
open class war. 
The antipodes,for Marx, are social order and 
Dahrendorf tries to loosen Marx's theory from its capitalist 
context. He rejects the Marxist assumptions that the ownership 
and control of the means of production are the ultimate source of 
conflict, that structural change is only possible through violent 
. 54) 
revolution, and that private property relations are the only 
sources of classes. In other words, Dahrendorf attempts to 
generalize Marxist theory. 
His basic unit of analysis is an imperatively co-ordinated 
. t . 5 5 ) t t d . h . h th . t associa ion , a s rue ure group in w ic ere exis s a 
differential distribution of authority positions. Such an 
I 
association can always be divided into two quasi-groups, the 
members of each of which share the same relationship to the 
authority structure of their association. There is, then, 
_in every such association, a superordinate quasi-group which 
~onopolizes autho:i:-ity-positions, and a subordinate quasi-group 
which is excluded from authority-positions. An authority-
position, of course, carries the advantage of sharing control 
over others with other such positions. This control is backed 
by sanctions. Insofar as the members of a quasi-group become 
conscious of their position vis a vis the authority structure, 
~hey form an interest group. Each interest group, Dahrendorf 
argues, will be in basic opposition to its counterpart in the 
association. 56 ) 
54) This is, in the author's opinion, an accepted Marxist assumption, 
though Marx wrote of exceptions. 
55) The term is Weber's. Dahrendorf, in fact, uses much of Weber's 
conceptual apparatus in his theory. See Class and Class 
Conflict in Industrial Society .. 
56)' Dahrendorf uses the terms, latent and manifest interests to 
refer to unconscious and conscious role expectations relating 
to the authority structure of an imperatively co-ordinated 
association. It is obviously unclear how the existence, 
in empirical terms, of latent interests can be ascertained. 
Their existence, then, must be regarded as an assumption. 
-35-
A society will contain a large number of imperatively co-ordinated 
associations. In a society, furthermore, a social class consists 
of a number of individuals who, by virtue of their common member-
ship in similar quasi-groups - all either superordinate or 
subordinate - share similar role expectations. Finally class 
conflict is conceived of as being any group conflict which is 
reducible to these relations of superordination and subor-
dination. 
It is clear, then, that Dahrendorf, in broadening Marx's 
axiomatic base, sees conflict as ubiquitous and social order, 
consequently, as inherently unstable. The problem of social 
order, _consequently, though not linked with a capitalist 
society, must be considered an empirical problem: Given that 
conflict is always potentially present in the above sense, 
under what conditions will social order obtain? 
To regulate, rather than resolve this conflict, and thereby 
maintain social order, at least three conditions are required: 
First, opposing groups must recognize and accept their opponents' 
cause. Second, these opposing groups must have a semblance 
-
of organization so that they are visible as entities to their 
opponents. Third, both groups must agree to "certain formal 
rules of the game". 57 ) Cross-cutting membership in 
superordinate and subordinate quasi-groups on both sides of the 
conflict situation, too, is seen as conducive to conflict 
requlation. Dahrendorf insists, however, that these conditions 
must be seen as necessary but not sufficient. 
Though not anchored to any economic base, this theory of class 
conflict has obvious similarities with Marxist theory. In 
particular, it explains social order in terms of (i) the 
repressive sanctions wielded by the superordinate group in an 
association over those without authority positions, and (ii) the 
57) Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society, R. 
Dahrendorf, p. 226. 
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, common normative order embedded in organized groups' recognition 
and acceptance of their opponents' causes and in the common 
rules of the game. Dahrendorf requires, then, that a number 
of rules and norms be shared by opposing classes for conflict 
regulation to be possible. 58 ) 
Social order, finally, is again an empirical problem and 
exists to the extent that class conflict can be regulated. 
As with Marx, social order and overt class conflict are 
antipodes. 
(d) Similarities and Differences in the Two Views 
The aim of this section is to compare the two differing conceptions 
of social order, which have been discussed in the preceding 
sections. To make such a comparison requires some minimal 
common ground covered by both approaches. Quite clearly, this 
is represented by a common concern with social order in society. 
On the other hand, there is a clear difference .in the scope of 
Parsons' theory, on the one hand, and Marx' theory, on the other. 
Parsons is interested in systems of action in genera1, 59 )whereas 
Marx focuses, for the most part, on societies within the 
capitalist mode of production. Furthermore, for Parsons, the 
alternative to societal order is Hobbesian chaos, for Marx 
and Dahrendorf, order is a variable with societal order grounded 
upon the ruling ideology at one end of the continuum and full-
scale class-conflict at the other. 
To explain these differences in theoretical scope and explanations 
for social order, certain underlying assumptions. of the two views 
58) .. ·This does not necessarily' imply the· existence of a sh area value 
system. In fact, a successful ideological order, for Marx, 
also implies that some rules and norms are accepted by both 
bourgeoisie and proletariat. 
59) Parsons writes: "so fundamental is the problem of order that 
the structure of systems of human social action •.. , consists of 
internalized and institutionalized normative patterns of culture 
- rules, values and other normative components." 'Order as a 
Sociological Problem', T. Parsons, p. 375, my emphasis. It is 
therefore in the nature of the structure of all action systems 
to maintain order. 
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will be mentioned. 
For normative functionalism, man 'in a state of nature 160 >is a 
selfish, dishonest and antagonistic being. It is 'society' 
and its value system which civilize him. For Marxism, on the 
other hand, man 'in a state of nature', is co-operative. 
Conflict and confrontation derive from the mode of production 
within which he and his fellows must work. It is to be 
expected, then, that normative functionalists will approach 
social order in society universally, whereas Marxists will 
focus upon a particular mode of production; societies within 
that mode; and attempts, by men, to do away with that mode. 
Ithas been shown, however, that Parsons became interested in 
:.'developed'·. societies and their particular order problems; and 
that Marx and, especially, Dahrend9rf, diverged from the strict 
theoretical boundaries of the capita list mode of production. 
For the.sake of the comparison to be made here, this shared 
interest in developing and developed societies will be considered 
as additional common ground covered by both approaches. 61 ) 
Both approaches, then, .attempt to explain the maintenance of 
social order in developing and developed societies. It will 
first be shown that the following are basic similarities 
in the two approaches: 
(a) Both approaches conceptualize social order within an holistic 
and structural framework. 
(b) Both approaches explain the maintenance of order in terms of 
action. 
(c) Both conceive of order and problems relating to it, in terms 
of four analytically separable sectors of a society. 
60) See, T. Parsons, op cit., p. 373. 
61). It would, of course, also be possible to compare the two 
universally, i.e. in terms of their conceptions of social 
order in all societies. Dahrendorf, in effect, attempts 
to deal with social order in societies in general. 
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(d) Both consider a minimal consensus and a minimal degree of 
effective wielding of power, prerequisites for the maintenance 
of order. 
Second, it will be shown that the two approaches differ in certain 
arguments. 
(a) Priority in the explanations of order, is given to different 
sectors of a society. 
(b) Therefore, power is conceptualized quite differently by the 
two approaches. 
(c) The two approaches differ radically in their expectations for 
the directions of change in developing and developed societies. 
The foundation of Parsonian order is one of normative consensus. 
Men will not act selfishly, dishonestly and antagonistically 
because they share a commitment to certain shared ultimate ends 
or values, and to norms that lay down the ways to achieve them. 
Thus men in society will, in general, act peaceable - within 
62) 
institutions - in terms of a societal value-system. 
Order exists for Marx (and, analogously, for Dahrendorf) to the 
extent that the binding effects of the dominant ideology and the 
coercive instrU.ments of power outweigh the divisive effects of the 
basic duality in society. For Marx, the bourgeoisie and the 
proletariat in a capitalist society form this duality; for 
Dahrendorf, the superordinate and subordinate quasi-groups in any 
imperatively co-ordinated association. Social order obtains 
in .a given situation to the extent that conflict between these 
two groups is regulated or avoided by way of the dominant ideology 
and the coercive (political) power of the ruling group. 
Parsons explicitly introduces 'action' into his theory, as was 
.shown earlier. Marx and Dahrendorf feel that man, in his labour 
or his actions in associations,produces the basic duality in any 
society through his actions. Neither approach can be typified 
as 'static' or 'cultural'. 
62) Parsons, in fact, defined values as '(c)ommitments to concep-
tions of a good type of soci·ety 1 , 'Order as a Sociological 
Problem', p. 376. Emphasis added. 
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The.basic framework of analysis, for normative functionalism, 
consists of societies and their four subsystems of action: 
the fiduciary, the social system, the polity and the economy. 
For Marx, the basic framework consists of the infrastructure 
and the superstructure. The latter, as was shown, can be 
analytically differentiated into the public domain (including 
the state), civil society, and the dominant (ruling) ideology. 
These coincide, in terms of their functions, with the four 
I . . 
subsystems of actio'n. Iri fact, the infrastructure can be 
called the economic sector; the public domain the political 
sector; civil society the social sector; and the ideology 
makes up the cultural sector (the fiduciary). Both approaches 
use these four sectors as an underlying framework of analysis. 
In addition, both agree that some degree of consensus and some 
degree of power-wielding is necessary for the maintenance of social 
order. For Marx, the former can be measured by the false 
consciousness of the proletariat and the concomitant ruling 
ideology. 63 ) For, Parsons, especi·ally in developed societies, 
power, as a generalized medium of exchange, is necessary to 
maintain functional interdependence between the subsystems of a 
society. 
On the other hand, priority in theorizing is attributed to 
different sectors by Marxists and normative functionalists. 
Ma~x, as has been shown, gives priority to the infrastructure 
to show how change takes place and, therefore, how social 
order is maintained. . Though elements of the superstructure 
(the three other sectors) are important, they themselves are 
eventually explicable in terms of the lack of fit between 
the forces and the relations of production. 
rooted in the economic sector. 
'l'hese are 
Parsons, on the other hand, gives priority to values in the 
cuitural sector. This is true both in terms of the cybernetic 
63) There must be some consensus. This both approaches agree 
upon. This consensus, however, need obviously not be 
value-consensus. The very ideas of false consciousness 
and an ideology of the ruling class show this. 
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. , 
prin?iple of control as well as in terms of the different 
functions the four sectors fulfill in the encompassing society. 
Power, then, derives, for Parsons, from this normative consensus 
and disappears without it. Power, in fact, rests upon coercion -
negative situational sanctions - which are accepted as legitimate 
by J:;>oth. the power-wielders and subjects. 64 ) 
On the other hand, power, for Marx, is rooted in the bourgeoisie's 
monopoly of the means of production (a~d, consequently, the 
state-institutions). Authority 65 ), for Dahrendorf, is rooted 
in the superordinate ·group's monopoly of authority positions. 
For both, this monopoly is maintained coercively (without any 
dimension of legitimacy). Quite clearly, there is a difference 
in theoretical approach to power. 
Finally, structural differentiation, for normative functionalists 
is· a major source of endogenous change. This process affects, 
in an inherently ,disequilibrating way, the four sectors of a 
society~ The result is sttain66 ): problems of socialization 
and, hence, internalizatio!l; and problems of role-clashes and, 
hencej institutionalization. Though sue~ strains are considered 
ubiquitous, the direction of change is that of 'development': 
increasing structural differentiation and functional integration. 67 ) 
Stasis or break-down into chaos exhaust alternative directions. 
Structural differentiation - the expansion of the division of 
labour - is, for the coercion theorists, also relevant to the 
explanation of imbalances in society. For Marx, the lack of 
fit.between the forces and the relations of production in the 
economic sector; and the skew dependence relations of the 
~uperstructure with this economic sector, are both deepened and 
64) Likewise, money and inducements - positive situational sanctions -
in the economic sector are considered. legitimate. 
··65) The important point, here, is that authority is structural. 
Power, for Dahrendorf (who uses the Weberian definition) is not. 
66) For a discussion of this, see the works of N. Smelser listed 
in the bibliography. 
67) Amongst 6ther things. See Societies: Evolutionary and 
comparative PersP.ecti ves, T-:-P'arsons". 
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cla~ified by the increasing division of labour. This differen-
tiation in structure, however, is not seen as causal: Imbalances 
and conflict are treated as ubiquitous. 
l ·.· 
For Marx, capitalist society moves, in the long run, inevitably 
toward open class war. The possibility that capitalist society 
is capable itself of containing a change in its mode of production 68 ) 
is a possible alternative. 
In sum, then, though both approaches express an interest in 
societies characterized by an increasing dif ferentiati_on in 
structure (i.e. 'developing' societies), the expected directions of 
this change differ. In essence, normative functionalists expect 
evolutionary change, Marxists revolutionary change. 
6$) See One Dimensional Man, H. Marcuse, 'Introduction'. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
A PRELIMINARY CONCEPTUAL SCHEME TO STUDY SOCIAL ORDER 
In the previous chapter, social order was discussed within the 
frameworks of the two major main-stream sociological traditions· 
which analyze it holistically and structurally. In this chapter, 
a preliminary conceptual scheme will be developed. This scheme 
will_ be used to analyze explanations of social order, made by 
pluralists. It will, further, be used to construct a 
theoretical scheme which will incorporate those major insights 
and arguments made by pluralists, normative functionalists 
and coercion theorists alike, which are of relevance to the 
maintenance of social order in plural societies. 
The preliminary scheme to be developed here, then, aims to 
translate differing terminologies used by pluralists and others 
into a common language. It aims to avoid a number of old and 
relatively fruitless debates between representatives of the 
different approaches about social order. Rather, it aims to 
ascertain the common'theme underlying explanations given for 
social order. Finally, it aims to highlight the central 
difference between pluralists and others; and to offer a frame-
work! within which social order, particularly in plural societies, 
may be analyzed. In 'this way, a theory of plural societies 
may be begun. The roots of this theory, therefore, will lie 
firmly in three traditions: pluralism, normative functionalism 
and coercion theory. 
\ 
' The first section of this chapter will analyze some major 
1· - . . 
differences dividing certain pluralists from the normative 
functionalist approach; and dividing certain pluralists from 
the coercion approach. The second section will identify the 
main common issues underlying the three traditions. It will 
then be possible, after these two sections are completed, to 
·1 
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identify the major difference between pluralists and others 
·' 
in their approach to social order. 
Finally, in the third section, the preliminary conceptual scheme 
will be developed. This development will be guided by the frame-
works discussed in the previous chapter; by the major difference 
between these approaches and pluralism (which refers particu-
larly to plural societies), and by the nature of a plural 
society itself. This preliminary scheme, then, will include 
a number of explicit assumptions, a number of new inter-related 
concepts, and a number of general hypotheses relating to plural 
societies. 
(a) ~asic Differences in Approach 
There exists no commonly-accepted plural society or pluralist 
approach in sociology -~oday .. This section, then, aims to 
identify a number of controversial issues which have divided 
both normative functionalists and coercion theorists from 
certain pluralists, and which have led to a number of confusing 
generalizations being made about 'pluralism' in.general. 
This is obviously not the place to spell out, in detail, 
what these differences are. That is the aim of the later 
substantive chapters. It is possible, however, to discuss 
differences in the meta-theories 1 ) of certain pluralists and 
those of. the other approaches. 
Adherents of normative functionalism in sociology feel that the 
assumptions underlying pluralism are quite unacceptable. Their 
criticism is aimed at Furnivall- and, in particular, M.G. Smith. 
First, they fee.l Furnivall to be at error when he writes that 
plural societies do not manifest a 'social will' and Smith to 
be at error when he writes that such societies are characterized 
by a complete l_ack of value consensus. Braithwaite, who is a 
good representative of this group of critics, writes: _________________ ........... . 
1) Cohen defines a meta-:-theory as follows: " •• theories, at the 
highest level of abstraction, which provide a set of ideas 
in which the more concrete speculations are carried out." 
Modern Social Theory, P.S. Cohen, p. 10. 
-- r·· 
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The concentration (on} the phenomenon of the lack of 
social will of which Furnivall speaks obscures the 
really important fact that no society can exist without 
a minimum sharing of.common values, without a certain 
amount of "social will" •.•••.• i 2) 
Second, criticism is aimed at M.G. Smith for another reason. As 
an anthropologist of the Malinowskian school, Smith ~ses a 
particular institutional approach to define. pluralism. This 
approach, it is argued, results in.the reification of insti-
tutions within the different cultural groups of a society. 
The core of this approach, then, reduces to an entimeration 
of simi.lar and different cultural traits within groups of a 
plural society. Any possible explanations of behaviour, 
consequently, must be founded upon a theory of cultural 
determinism. Braithwaite writes: 
The problem of a plural society is indeed a problem 
of social structure posed by the existence of marked 
differences of culture, but a society or social system 
cannot be defined by merely observing the presence 
or absence of cultural traits; it must be done in terms 
of social action, that is, the interaction of social 
roles... (Otherwise), sociology becomes reduced to 
cultural anthropology.. 3) 
The.se ·two criticisms certainly point to different basic assumptions 
made by the. people involved. In particular, the differences 
seem to focus upon the role a value-system plays in a societal 
system,. on the one hand, and the underlying meaning of social 
!behaviour, on the other. Both points will be covered in the 
\ 
conceptual scheme. 
The ciaim of some proponents .of the concept of the plural 
society that this idea represents a radical innovation 
in dominant sociological theory is only true with respect 
to that body of thought which attributes overriding 
2) Social Stratification and Cultural Pluralism', L. Braithwaite, 
p ~ 819. 
3) Braithwaite, op. cit., p. 823. Also see: 'Review of Social 
and Cultural Pluralism in the Caribbean', R.T. Smith. 
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importance to the function of common values for social 
integration ••• 4) 
It is clear that Lockwood, arguing in this vein, represents 
another group of critics who share little with the first group 
discussed above. Lockwood feels that from another perspective -
Marxism - the pluralist approach is a little too simple and, 
at times, confusing. He writes: 
From this (Marxist) point of view, the concept of the 
plural society is less of a novel contribution to social 
theory, and, in several respects, it poses less fundamental 
issues of sociological analysis. This is mainly because 
the cultural pluralism of ethnically, racially, or 
linguistically divided societies originates exogenously 
through the physical movement into the indigenous society 
.of one or more culturally distinct groups, whose 
presence then results in a juxtaposition of separate 
blocks. On the other hand, the Marxist idea of a 
revolutionary society refers to a process of internal 
change. . • . • 5.) 
Pluralists' point of departure, it is argued, is defined by 
differences in race, culture and ethnicity in a single society. 
Their subsequent theorizing, therefore, tends to be over-simple -
a one factor theory of behaviour - and static. In fact, 
pluralists do not relate race, culture and ethnicity,, 
theoretically, to any dynamic theory of social stratification. 
Empirically, however, these factors are related to stratification 
patterns in plural societies. Moreover, these societies do 
not conform to the expectations of normative functionalist theory. 
If priority is to be given to race, culture and ethnicity, then, 
the empiric~l links between these factors, on the one hand, and 
class, status and power, on the other, must be explained in terms 
of a theory of the origin and development of the plural society. 
4) . 'Race, Conflict and the Plural Society-', D. Lockwood, p. 62 
) 
5) Op. cit., p. 64. 
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Pluralists, it is further argued, do not possess such a theory. 
What they do, consequently, is to present ad hoc historical 
analyses of the (exogenous) origins of particular plural 
societies, on the one hand, and static analyses of the 
structural a·spects of pluralism present in these societies, 
on the other. The result, in Cox's words, is that 
The commonplaces ·of race relations together with their 
distortions are •. couched in the abstract, imprecise 
terminology of 'pluralism'. 6) 
These criticisms, too, point to different basic assumptions made 
by the people involved. The basic point at issue, moreover, 
seems to be the distribution of racial, cultural and ethnic 
characteristics in a society, and the relations between 
these and other variables which are conceived of within 
the four sectors of a society: the cultural, social, 
political and economic. This point will be covered in the 
conceptual scheme. 
In conclusion, three differences between certain pluralists and 
those who use the two meta-theories discussed in the previous 
chapter have been identified. The first concerned the role 
which the value-system played in a society. This value system 
is closely linked with the 'cultural' sector introduced 
in the previous chapter. The second concerned social 
behaviour as such. This point is relevant to this study 
in the sense that a sociological.assessment.of a plural society 
is to be made. Third, the link between race, culture and 
ethnicity, on the one hand, and the cultural, social, political 
.. and economic sectors of a society, on the other ,needs to be 
specified. 
(b} The Basic Commo~ Perspective: Social Order in Society 
The central problem posed by the plural society approach is that 
6) 'The Question of Pluralism', O. Cox, p. 395. 
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of the peaceful functioning of the institutions of a plural society. 
These institu~ions, in large part, are rooted in separate 
'plural' sectors of the socie~y. These plural sectors, moreover, 
are usually of racial, cultural or ethnic nature. How, then, 
pluralists ask, does the society cope with these 'centrifugal' 
plural forces within itself? The answers which are offered, 
are usually in terms of power and coercion, common economic 
concerns and a monopoly by one sector of the power-structure. 
Quite clearly, pluralists pose the question of social order in 
an holistic and structural context. The cpntext is holistic 
in that the prime unit of.analysis is a society. The problem 
of social order, therefore, focuses upon explanations given 
for the peaceful persistence, over time,, of a plural society 
in terms of behaviour within plural sectors. The level 
of analysis remains, for_the most part, that of racial, cultural 
and ethnic groups within a society. The context is also struc-
tural in the sense that behaviour within these groups is 
considered to be, again for the most part, institutionalized 
behaviour. The problem of social order is conceived of in 
terms of conflict and consensus arising from these differing 
institutional systems - in terms of, that is, these differing 
structures contained within a society. 
J.'S. Furnivall who may be called the first pluralist, conceived of 
a plural society as a developing colony. 7) Though there is deep 
disagreement about the colonial status of a plural society, 
pluralists generally agree that such a society is one with a 
relatively developed economic and relatively modern political 
- 8) system. In general, then, they assume that there is an 
ongoing, relatively developed, process of structural differen-
tiation present in the society. 
Pluralists also agree that race and ethnicity are not, in them-
selves, differentially distributed in a s?ciety. It becomes 
I . 
7) More exactly, Furnivall wrote of a colonial dependency in the 
tropics. This will be dealt with at length in Chapter Three. 
8) M.G. Smith attempts to generalize the class of plural societies 
by including within it, undeveloped societies. This exception 
will be dealt with at length in Chapter Four. 
,,_ .... - ·~~. 
I 
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necessary, therefore, for them to analy_ze this distribution and 
its effects upon social or~er _in a plural society in terms 
of other. variables. These variables can be identified and 
analyzed within the context of the cultural, the social, the 
political and the economic sectors of a society. 
In conclusion, then, ·the following points of common concern amongst 
pluralists have been.stated: 
(a) Their central concern is that of the maintenance of societal 
order. 
(b) This concern is.rooted in an holistic and structural 
framework. 
(c) The plural society is conceptualized as a developing or 
relatively developed society. 
(d) Societal order is explained in terms of relationships between 
two sets of variables. On the one hand, race, culture and 
ethnicity form one set. On the other, variables based 
upon the cultural, social, political and economic sectors 
of a society. 
The arguments developed in the previous chapter showed that 
normative functionalists and coercion theorists share these 
concerns. First, social order in society is basic to their 
theory-building. Second, their theories are also holistic 
and structural. Third, both pay most attention to developing 
and developed societies. Fourth, relations between the four 
sectors of a society (the cultural, social, political and 
economic) present the major fra~ework in which social order is 
discussed. 
The meta-theory pluralists use, differs from those of normative 
• 
functionalists and coercion theorists at one point./'Pluralists 
claim that the variables of race, culture .and 1 ethnicity can, 
under certain circumstances, be of critical sociological impor-
tance for the maintenance of social order in plural societies. 
This claim represents the crux of the pluralist argument. The 
conceptual scheme which is being developed here will be used 
to·analyze and test arguments supporting this claim. 
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(c) The Conceptual Scheme 
Race, culture and ethnicity are concepts which are central to the 
pluralist approach. In this study, an ethnic group is under-
1 
stood to ref er to a population which 
(1) is largely biologically self-perpetuating; 
(2) share$ fundamental cultural values; 
(3) makes up a field of communication and interaction; 
(4) has a membership which identifies itself, and is identified 
by. others, as cons ti tu ting a category distinguishable. from 
other categories of the same order. 9 > 
. I 
A race is understood to refer to an ethnic group which is, in part, 
distinguished and identified in terms of (purported) physical 
differences of its members.lo) 
It is imperative, however, to stress the sociological nature of 
this study. Ultimately, an explanation for social order in 
I 
plural societies is sought in terms of the interaction of the 
members of those societies. This explanation, consequently, 
must relate cultural, ethnic and racial variables to variables 
embedded in the actions of persons and groups. It has been 
shown that these variables must be of the same type as the 
three classical variables of stratification: class, status and 
party. Since the critical question posed by pluralists is 
that concerning social order, however, these stratification 
variables will not be chosen. Rather, variables will be chosen 
which will be embedded in the four sectors of a society: the 
cultural, social, political and economic sectors. 
· A plural society contains identifiable ethnic and racial groups. 
This accounts for its plural nature. On the other hand, as a 
9) See Ethnic Groups and Boundaries, F. Barth (ed.), 'Introduction'. 
10) It is certainly true that this double identification (by the 
group itself and by others) boils down to a cultural definition 
of a racial group, as Cross argues.' The important point is 
that these physical criteria remain extrinsic referents, as 
Kuper points out. See: 'Book Review of Race and Racism', 
M. Cross, p. 302. For Kuper's argument, see Chapter Five . 
.. - r ., 
" 
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developing or relatively developed society, it contains a corcunon 
economy and a state which is separate from the structures within 
the plural groups. Social order in such a society can be 
analyzed from two quite different perspectives. 
Social order can be considered problematic at th.e level of the 
actors in a given situation. · This has been called Hobbes' 
perspective. On the other hand, the problem of social order 
can be posed at .the level of the society viewed as a social 
' 
system. This second perspective focuses rather on the sectors 
of a society. It was shown .in the previous chapter that 
Parsons began with the former perspective and paid increasing 
attention to the latter as he became more interested in what 
he called developed societies. The focus of coercion 
theorists remained upon the latter perspective. 
David Lockwood has assigned terms to these two levels of analysis. 
The terms he uses are social, integration and sxstem integration . 
.. Whereas the problem of social integration focuses 
attention upon the orderly or conflictful .relationships 
between actors, the problem of system integration focuses 
on the orderly or conf lictful relationship between the 
parts, of a social system. 11) 
In addition, Lockwood argues that social integration refers to 
consensus among these actors. He does not specify, moreover, 
whether this consensus is based upon a system of common 
ultimate ends shared by these actors, or whether it is based 
upon compliance to the exigencies of the actors' ,situation. 
In short, then, social integration may include value consensus, 
but not necessarily. It is, for this reason, applicable to 
both variants of the explanation given for social order: 
normative functionalism and coercion theory. 
11) 'Social Integration and System Integration', D. Lockwood, 
p. 245. Emphasis in the original. 
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' 
System integration, Lockwood argues, points to 'functional 
interdependence' 12 ) : to the absence of what was earlier called 
skewness or imbalances between the sectors of a society. In 
developing or developed societies, such imbalances are constantly 
present (as was shown in the last chapter) • Problem of system 
integration are endemic, therefore, in such societies. 
In a plural society, little social integration is to be expected. 
The different plural groups in this society each form areas of 
social integration within themselves. The existence of .consensus\ 
(and especially value-consensus) at the societal level becomes 
highly problematic. In a developing plural society, on the 
other hand, system integration is imperative for the maintenance 
of social order. It is important, thus, to inquire into the 
goals which are set and pursued in the four sectors of a plural 
society. It is also important to ascertain who sets these· 
collective goals and whether these goalg clash with one 
another (producing system integration problems). 
It is .for these reasons that the variables chos.en will each be 
based upon one of the four sectors of a society. It is for these 
reasons, moreover, that each variable will be defined in terms 
of power. In fact, system integration can be analyzed in terms 
of the collective goals set and pursued in the different 
sectors of a society; in terms of the relations between 
these goals; and in terms of opposition to them. 
Most generally, power can be defined, in Dahl's words, as referring 
.to 11 subsets of relations among social uni ts such that the behaviors 
of one or more units (the responsive units, R) depend in some 
circumstances on the behavior of other units (the controlling 
. C) 
0
1113 > .. uni ts, 
12) Modern Social TheoryL P.S. Cohen, p. 170. 
13) 'Power', R. Dahl, p. 407. 
I 
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This general statement must be specified to become useful to 
this study. Specification is directed (i) by the need for 
a conception of power at the holistic or societal level and 
(ii) by the need for a conception of power based upon the 
four sectors of a society. 
Both controlling units (C, the power-wielders) and responsive 
units (R, the power-subjects} can be superindividual entities 
such as groups or systems. 14 } Power, moreover, is assumed 
to be relational (rather than a property of a unit}; im-
positional (to ensure that R responds even against its 'will'}; 
intentio~al (referring to goals set by C for R amongst others}; 
and, fourth, potential rather than episodic (in the sense 
that power. is considered an ability or capacity}. 15 ) 
The definition used here, then, will be Lehman's: 
Power refers to the capacity of some unit (C} acting as 
an agent of the system to overcome the resistance of 
system members (R) in setting, pursuing and implementing 
~ollective goals: (16) 
It is .assumed that c, the power-wielder, has access to sanctions 
to overcome the resistance of R, the power-subject. Parsons' 
four-type sanction scheme will be used. Any one of these 
four types, then, can be used to overcome this possible 
resistance of R. Each sanction type, moreover, corresponds 
to 'one of the four sectors of a society. 
At this point, Jessop's model is followed quite closely: 
"We thus distinguish between four main types of power -
economic, military or political, social and cultural. 
Within this general framework we may say that the 
ultimate basis of economic power is control over the 
means of production, distribution and exchange of 
goods and services; that of political power is control 
14} For an analysis of macro-analysis and macro-power, see 
Toward a Theory of Minort~y-Group Relations, H.M. Blalock; 
"'Toward a Macrosociology of Power'. E.W. Lehman. 
15) There is a voluminous literature on this; 
Discontent, W. Gamson; Lehman (op.cit.); 
in Defining Social Power', D. Wrong. 
16} Lehman, op. cit., pp. 455, 456. 
see Power and 
'Some Problems 
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over the means of coercion; that of social power is 
control over the means of status attribution; and that 
of cultural power is .control over the means of value 
creation, interpretation and maintenance". 17} 
SEE TABLE II 
These four analytical types of power are assumed to vary inde-
pendently of one another. Hence skewness and imbalances 
between the four sectors can occur and will be related to 
the types of power in each sector, .and to the effectiveness 
of the wielding of that power. 
Problems of system integration can be analyzed in terms of 
the power which is wielded i~ each of the four sectors; in 
clashing collective goals set and pursued within these four 
sectors; and in .the amount of· control over the power-bases 
in these sectors. 
Social integration depends upon the effectiveness of cultural and 
social power, which, in turn, depends upon the scope of the two 
power-bases. The first, control over societal values, and the 
second, control over the means of status attribution, are 
problematic in a plural society. It is to be expected, 
therefore, that little effective intentional sanctions can be 
used, at a societal level, over members of a plural society. 
The most effective sanc~ions (and, consequently, the most 
effective power-wielding} in such a society, will probably be 
situational: coercion and inducement. 
For normative functionalism,. power (i.e. political power) derives 
.from legitimation and depends, ultimately, on control over societal 
values. For Marxists, (political) power is rooted in certain 
relations to the means of production and, hence, to control 
over the production process. 
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Situational column: c has control over R's situation. 
C can therefore change it to R's advantage {Positive); 
or to R's disadvantage (Negative). 
Intentional Column: C has control over· R's intentions. 
C can therefore change these to R's advantage {Positive); 
or to R's disadvantage {Negative). 
(For a further discussion of these four types of sanctions, see 
'On the concept of Political Power', T. Parsons). 




In this study, power has been defined more generally as being 
analytically differentiable in terms of the four sectors of a 
society. Moreover, no theoretical dependence is assumed 
between these power-types. In contradistinction to normative 
functionalism, the possibility must be kept open, in Giddens' 
words, that "power (i.e. political power) extends as deeply 
into the roots of social life as do values and norms". (lS) 
In contradistinction to coercion theorists, power is assumed 
to be dependent upon neither the production process nor 
'authority' relations in an association. 
In a plural society, then, social order, at both social and 
system integration levels, can be analyzed in power terms. 
Since the plural groups within such a society are ethnic 
or racial by nature, it is to be expected that goals set 
and pursued within the four sectors of the society, will 
create tensions and imbalances because they are set for 
all members of the society. It becomes important, therefore, 
to inquire into which persons and gr_oups are in power-
wielding positions, and which persons and groups have gained 
control over the bases of power as they had been defined. 
Those who have gained control over such bases are in a 
position to apply effective sanctions when wielding power. 
To analyze this problem, the idea of centre and periphery 
is introduced. 
Society has a centre. There is a central zone in 
the structure of society ..•. The centre ••. , is 
a phenomenon of the realm of values and beliefs. 
It is the centre of the order of symbols, of values 
and beliefs, which govern society •.• The centre is 
also a phenomenon of the realm of action. It is a 
18) '"Power" in the Recent Writings of Talcott Parsons', 
A. Giddens, p. 268. 
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structure of activities, of roles and persons, within 
the network of institutions .•• 19) 
Center-periphery problems start from the center; that is, 
the center (if it is a center in any meaningful way) 
has control over the periphery. This seems obvious, 
yet it is crucial in the matter. Much of what we 
think about as conflict in politics can be restated 
in terms of the ways in which the center exercises 
its control over the periphery ••. 20) 
The concept has been criticized for attempting to incorporate 
both a value-sphere and an action-sphere simultaneously (see 
first quotation), and for being defined in a circular fashion 
(see second quotatidn) 21 >. Here, following Jessop, 'centre 
refers to the structural aspect of power and comprises those 
organisations, groups and individuals who exercise most 'power' 
• • • 1 t I 22) in a given socia sys em • 
Two dimensions of the concept need clarification. First, the 
question of the boundaries of the centre is obviously important. 
Units in the periphery, in fact, consists of 'organisations' 
and 'groups' which wield ·little power: those, in other words, 
not positioned in the centre. Methods of boundary delineation 
vary, of course, from society to society. Second, the 
·relationship between the centre and th~ periphery can also 
vary. Lerner, for example, mentions three modes: that of 
disinterest in which those in the periphery are ignored by 
those in the centre; that of difference promotion; and that 
of dissidence reduction. 23 ) The latter two are treated 
as ways in which those in the centre attempt to maintain 
both their positions and order in a society. Difference 






'Centre and Periph~ry', E. Shils, p. 117. 
·'Some Comments on Center-periphery Relations', n. Lerner, 
_p. 259. 
Social Order, Reform and Revolution, B. Jessop, p. 54. 
op. cit., p. 55, 
'Some Comments on Center-periphery Relations', D. Lerner, 
passim. 
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(newly formed) centres in the society; 24 ) .whilst dissidence 
reduction refers to the lessening of the unequal distribution 
of power within a society with one (main) centre. 
The centre, here, refers to the coincidence, in the four sectors 
of a society, of power-wielding positions. A leading politican 
who is also a leading businessman and church-elder, may 
serve as an example. Each position this person fills, taken 
separately, defines a position of power within one sector. 
The strength of a centre is measured, first, in terms of the 
amount of control such positions have over the bases and 
sanctions allied with the power-types. Second, a centre is 
strong insofar as the capacity to wield all four types of power 
compatibly, coincidesin such positions. 
From this it follows that the centre is a structural concept -
rather than one of action25 )of value - and that it is defined, 
basically, in terms of the amount of overlap and scope of overlap 
between the four types of power. As such, the concept is not 
circular for the periph~ry is defined negatively, in power terms. 
Centre-periphery relations have been discussed by a number of 
sociologists 26 )in the context of developing countries. Whereas 
in traditional societies units in the centre could ignore those 
in the periphery for the periphery was, as Shils 27 >puts it,. 
24) Nonetheless, 'the area of political control as such must not 
come into question. When the political control of the center 
is either divided or disputed, or even, douhted, then the mode 
of difference promotion becomes unstable and disruptive.' op. 
cit., p. 261. Emphasis in the original. 
25) Power was defined as a 'capacity' rather than the actual wielding 
during an 'episode'. 
26) See 'Centre and Periphery', E. Shils; 'Continuities and Changes 
in Systems of Stratification', S.N. Eisenstadt; Political 
.Sociology, S.N. Eisenstadt (ed.), pp. 14ff.; 'Prestige, 
Participation and Strata Formation', S.N. Eisenstadt; 'Some 
Comments on Center-periphery Relations', D. Lerner. For 
applications of the concept, see Social Order, Reform and 
Revolution, B. Jessop; A Theory of Political Exchange, 
R.L. Curry & L.L. Wade; Party Systems and Voter Alignment, 
Lipset, S.M. & Rokkan, S. (eds.); Political Mobilization, 
J. P. Nettl; International Systems and the Modernization of 
Societies, Nettl, J.P. Robertson, P.; 'The Mobilization of the 
·Periphery' , S. Rokkan & H. Valen 
27) 'C~ntre and Periphery', E. Shils, p. 127. 
-·r--
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outside 'society'; in developed societies, relations 
become inherently strained between the two. Whether it be 
through the growing common value system28 )or through the 
revolutionary and secularizing orientations of the masses 2 ~) ,it 
seems accepted that.what Weber called 'traditional authority' 
has disappeared. Both relations between the centre and the 
periphery and relations between the four sectors of a society 
are assumed to become troubled by an increase .in the structural 
differentiation irt that society. 
Broadly speaking, then, the critical decision-making and goal-
setting positions in each of the four sectors tend to overlap. 
The units30)filling these coincident positions control a broad 
base from which collective (societal) goals can be set, 
pursued and implemented. 
The positions such units occupy, constitute the centre of that 
society. Such units attempt, by using these positions of power, 
to maintain peaceful co-operation between the institutions of 
that society. 
Units in the centre are faced with two critical and recurrent 
problems. Both are brought about to a large extent by the 
process of development in the society. First, developing 
out of the inherent problem of system integration (especially 
in developing societies), there is a constant possibility 
that collective goals set in institutions within the four 
sectors clash. Under such circumstances, the centre is liable 
to split into a number of competing centres (and elites) 31 ). 
28) loc. cit. 
29) 'Continuities and Changes in Systems of Stratification', 
S.N. Eisenstadt, p. 73. 
30) Ih accordance with the definitions of power and centre being 
used here, these units can be organizations, groups and 
individuals. 
31) It is, for these reasons, possible to speak of the development 
of more than one centre in a society. Different groups and 
organizations in one society may control different power-
bases. These groups and organizations, then, may create 
their own centres. This immediately poses serious problems 
for the maintenance of social order in the society. 
F -
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To avoid the formation of opposing centres, units turn to their 
control over the means of value creation, interpretation and 
maintenance, in othe~ words, cultural power. Social power 
may also be used. Consensus (or social integration) amongst 
the units in the centre is critical here. 
Second, units in the periphery are constantly attempting to gain 
a control over (especially) the reward structure of the society. 
Thus, they attempt to gain a greater control over the means of 
production, distribution and exchange of goods and services, 
in other words, economic power. Though other sanctions types 
are also used, those in the centre tend to apply coercion 
(or the threat of coercion) in this case. It is political 
power that is critical in the handling of centre-periphery 
relations. 
These problems concerning social order are interdependent. 
The gravity of the first problem - that of system integration -
depends upon the initial solidarity amongst units in the centre. 
It also depends upon the effectiveness of the centre's ideology 
(i.e. in how far units in the periphery accept the collective 
goals set in the cultural sector). This ideology is also 
important for the second problem: that of centre-periphery 
relations. In fact, if the units in the periphery accept 
political power as legitimate, peaceable relations with those 
in the centre can be maintained. In such a case, wide-
spread social integration can contribute towards social order. 
This, in essence, is the normative functionalist view of social 
order. 
Conversely, an effective monopoly of political power by units in 
the centre tends to increase their internal solidarity and to 
dissuade units in the periphery from making too great demands on 
the reward structure. In such a case, system integration 
(without wide-spread social integration) can contribute towards 
social order. This, in essence, is the coercion view of (short-
term) social order. 
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In this study, both problems will be considered and both 
explanations for social order in a society will be analyzed. 
Moreover, in-a plural society, the following arguments 
become.feasible. 
Little social integration (among the members of the plural 
society) is expected to be present. This is basically 
a result of the plural nature of the society. Moreover, 
as a result of the developing nature of the society, problems 
of system integration are expected. Consequently, it may 
be expected that positions in the centre tend to be monopolized 
by one ethnic or racial group. In this way, social integration 
in the centre can be maintained (in terms of the common 
ethnic and racial origin of its mernpers) and system integration 
can be maintained by the use of political power over the units 
in a periphery. In short, then, a monopoly of the bases 
of political and economic power by members of one ethnic 
qr racial group can be expected. 
SUMMARY 
In the previous section, a conceptual scheme was developed. 
This scheme c·ontains a number of implicit assumptions, a number 
of inter-related concepts and a number of general hypotheses 
(relating to plural societies). These will be reviewed briefly. 
The scheme was developed explicitly so that it could analyze 
social order in societies, in an holistic and structural 
fasion. The following are· its more important assumptions: 
(~) Social order is defined as peaceful co-existence in the 
operation of social institutions in a society. 
(b) Explanations for social order are sought in terms of 
the interaction of members of a society. The scheme, 
then, is explicitly sociological. 
(c) A_ society and its four sectors are considered to form 
systems. 
(d) Structural differentiation is assumed to be an ongoing 
process in a society. 
•• ~,. ...... <( 
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(e) A minimal normative order and a minimal degree of 
effective wielding of political power are necessary 
conditions for the maintenance of social order in such 
(developing) societies. 32 ) 
The conceptual scheme developed, to an extent, out of the 
discussion, in the previous chapter, of two other approaches 
to order. Three new concepts have been introduced. They 
are the social and system integration distinction; a con-
ception of power based upon the four sectors of a society; 
and the centr.e-periphery distinction. Though the first 
concept was originally defined by Lockwood, a coercion 
theorist, and the latter two by normative functionalists, it 
has been shown in this chapter where these concepts (as defined 
here) differ from their original definitions. 
In fact, social integration may (though not necessarily) refer 
to value consensus in a society. Second, power is defined 
in such a way that it does not necessarily refer to legitimation 
(nor to control over the means of production, for that matter). 
Third, the centre does not refer to a value-sphere but to 
structural aspects of power-wielding in a society. 
The critical difference between the pluralists' explanations 
of order in (plural) societies and those of normative functiona-
lists and coercion theorists is rooted in the priority which 
the variables of race, ethnicity and culture must, under 
certain circumstances, be given in such explanations. 
As a result of this difference, the following general hypotheses 
relating to plural societies, 33 )have been suggested: 
32) Numerous other assumptions, of course, have been made. 
They are not directly relevant to this particular scheme. 
See, for example, the assumptions discussed by Jessop 
in his study: Social Order, Reform and Revolution, p. 8lff. 
33) A plural society, to this point, is defined as a developing 
society which contains a number of well-defined ethnic 
and/or racial groups. 
·'!-
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(a) A plural society will develop a conunon economy and state-
structure. 
(b) Little cultural and social power which can be effectively 
wielded over most members of the society, is to be 
expected. 
(c) Consequently, system integration, rather than social 
integration, is expected to be the basis of social order. 
(d) One ethnic {or racial) group tends to gain a monopoly 
of the centre of the society. 
In the following chapters, this conceptual scheme will be 
applied to the works of a number of representative pluralists. 
In this way, their explanations of social order in plural 
societies will be discussed, the above hypoth.eses will be 
tested and refined, and pluralists' explanations for the 
origin and directions of change of plural societies will 
be introduced. 
In the concluding chapter, then, a theoretical scheme, based 
upon the scheme developed in this chapter and upon analyses 
of pluralists~ works, will be developed. In this theoretical 
scheme, particular attention will be paid to the origin of 
a plural society 34 )and to the probable directions of change 
in such societies. 35 ) In this way, the critical difference 
between the pluralists' meta-theory and that of normative 
functionalists and of coercion theorists can be assessed. 
34) .According to Lockwood, it was shown, .earlier in this chapter, 
that the question of origins was the main difference between 
Marxist and pluralist assumptions. 
35) It is here, of course, that expectations defined by normative 
functionalism and coercion theory, have failed when applied 
to plural societies. See quotation on page 3 of this study. 
r.- ~ 
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J.S. FURNIVALL, THE COLONIAL PLURAL SOCIETY AND THE PROBLEM 
OF ORDER 
The object of this chapter is, first, to introduce the term, 
plural society, with an analysis of the works of Furnivall 
who was the first person to conceptualise it; and, second, 
to apply the scheme generated in the second chapter to this 
conception. 
Furnivall was the first writer to refer to the 'plural society' 
as a distinctive class of societies sharing important charac-
teristics.1) He was Dutch-born, trained as an economist 
and had many years of administrative and academic experience 
in British and Dutch colonies in the Far East. 2 ), It is impor-
tant to keep in mind that Furnivall conceived of the plural 
society in the dying years of Dutch and British colonialism 
in the Far East: Netherlands India.and Colonial Policy 
and Practice, his most important works as far as the concept 
of the plural society is concerned, 3 ) were originally 
published in 1939 and 1948 respectively. Both· the descriptive 
and prescriptive aspects of his work, as well as labels such 
as 'liberal colonial theorists 14 >and 'naive.~.radical 1 , 5 > 
should be seen in this light. 
The Plural Society: Its Origin and Development 
It is quite.clear that Furnivall restri~ted_plural societies to 
'tiopical dependencies' or colonies. It is just as clear that 
1) 'Enkele interpretasies van het begrip 'plurale maatschappij'!, 
O.D. van den Muijzenberg, p. 69. 
2) For further biographical notes, see his own Colonial Policy 
and Practice, 'Preface 1 , and The Plural Society in Africa, 
M. Fortes, passim. 
3) For other works consulted, see Bibliography. 
4) !he Plural Society in Africa, M. Fortes, p. 10. 
5) 'Social Stratification and Cultural Pluralism', L. Braithwaite, 
P• 817. 
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Furnivall explained the origin of these plural societies 
directly in terms of the deliberate economic expansion of 
the western metropolitan ~ountries into the tropics: "It 
is, indeed, generally true that colonisation has arisen 
out of commerce, and not commerce out of. colonisation: the 
doctrine that. trade follows the f;J.ag is quite modern, and 
in history the flag has followed trade 11 • 6 ) 
Before the European explorers, fortune-hunters and colonisers 
arrived, Furnivall argued, Oriental society was dominated by 
strict custom, personal authority and traditional religion. 
Social welfare took precedence over individual welfare. 
This conception is essentially similar to the Durkheimian 
segmental society characterized by mechanical solidarit_y and 
repressive law. As is seen from the following quotations, 
Furnivall saw pre-colonial tropical. society as custom-bound, 
economically repressive and integrated about a common set 
of religious values: 
In all social life there is a conflict between indivi-
dual and eocial welfare ... But social organization is 
so weak that for the survival of the society individual 
activities must be limited by customary restraints, 
and custom is strongest when enforced by a religious 
sanction .•. Hence we find religious and military in-
terests dominant in Oriental societies; economic 7 ) freedom would be incompatible with their survival .•. 
(Before colonisation), a typiGal village in Upper Burrr.a 
was rather like a large family, with its life centring 
round the Buddhist monastery and the soil ... Social 
and economic life were regulated by village custom and 
soci~l demand prevailed over individual demand. The 
general pattern of social life was snramarized in a proverb, 
"Cultivation gives place to houses, and houses to the 
monastery"; religion came first, man second, and money 
last. 8) · 
. 6) ·_Colonial Policy and Practice, p. 4 . 
. 7) 'Capitalism in Indonesia',• J .s. Furni.vall, p. 66. 
8) 'Some Problems of Tropical Economy', J.S. Furnivall, p. 165. 
Empha.sis in the original. 
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In the West, in Europe, on the other hand: 
Greece liberated reason from the restraint of custom; 
Rome substituted the stronger rule of law for the rule 
of custom; and Christianity furnished a moral prin-
ciple stronger than the rule of law for restraining 
rational activities within the bounds of social welfare. 
The happy fusion of these principles in the Renascence 
allowed. a high degree of freedom without disorganising 
society. 9) 
These distinctions created.two quite different types.of society. 
In both there is a common culture which contributes to the 
maintenance of order in that society. The former type·is 
characterized by traditional authority; in the latter, there 
is rational-legal authority. In both, moreover, economic 
activities are considered subordinate to the social welfare 
of persons in the society. The common value system and its 
corresponding set of nor.Jns - what Furni vall called 'social 
will' and 'social demand' - proscribe economic activity 
detrimental to the society. 
When expansionist capitalist economic forces start acting in 
new colonial socie.ties, however, they become loosened from 
their peculiar western rational-legal context. These new 
societies incorporating a number of traditional cultural 
groups, lack both a common value system and a ~orresponding 
set of norms. They are conse9uently qualitatively different 
from the two types of society discussed above. Furnivall 
called them plural societies. 
This plural society will now be discussed on three levels: the 
societal, the 'sectional' and the individual. First, though the 
origin of a plural society is found in the economic expansion 
of Europe, its actual creation is the work of the colonial 
9) 'Capitalism in.Indonesia', J.S. Furnivall, p. 67. 
! 
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power. It is, then, a political entity in the sense that it 
is created and run by a foreign colonial power. The reason 
for its creation is, as has been shown, to promote economic 
expansion. Equally, the effect of colonial rule is to promote 
this same expansion: "Ordinarily control has been established 
for the economic advantage of the colonial power, and the 
general result has been the domination of tropical society by 
economic forces". lO) 
The social consequences of the unleashing of these economic 
forces are explicable in terms of two fundamental economic 
principles. The first, 'the economic process of natural 
selection by the survival of the cheapest' ll)is considered 
to apply independent of human will. In short, this principle 
states that a person who can subsist at a 'cheaper' standard 
of living, has a better chance of survival in an economic 
system than his fellow-man - assuming that 'all other 
things are equal'. The second principle is 'the desire of 
gain, the economic motive of ·profit' 12 ), a rational .Principle 
which.Furnivall considered a fundamental part of 'human nature'. 
These two principles are, of course, operative in traditional 
'tropical' society and rational-legal western society. They 
are tempered and directed by the over-arching social will of 
both these societies, however. As has been seen, economic 
activity is subordinate to social welfare. 
case in a plural society. 
This is not the 
Men coming from different traditional societies, meet one another 
in the market-places of their new common plural society. 
Sharing no common cultural background, they interact solely 
in terms of these two economic principles: the survival of the 
10} 'Some Problems of Tropical Economy', J.S. Furnivall, p. 162. 
11} Colonial Policy and Practice, p. 290. This is a Social-
Darwinist assumption which would today be unacceptable 
methodologically in that it assumes that this principle 
hold§ in some 'natural' sense, all other things being 
equal. 
12} Colonial Policy and Practice, p. 291. 
. --· r· ... , 
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cheapest and the drive for profit. The only restraint placed 
upon them is the new western legal system which promotes 
laissez-faire capitalist·activity. Although these economic 
forces penetrate far into the rural areas, it is above all 
in the towns and cities that the characteristics of the pl~ral 
society are seen most clearly. 
One consequence of this atomistic, potentially chaotic picture 
of the market situation is, in Rex's words, "the 'Market problem 
of order', the problem of why life in the market-place is not 
poor, nasty, solitary, brutish and short, and, if not, why not 11 • 13 ) 
The wider society, Furnivall argued, must be held together 
not only through the common economic activity of its members, 
but also by western law backed up by coercive political means. 
The colonial power maintains a monopoly over the running of the 
state. 
A further consequence is that work categories tend to coincide 
with ethnic and cultural groups. In fact, though anyone is 
free to participate in economic activity in a market-place, 
colonial economic interest groups and the functioning of the 
two economic principles soon create an economic hierarchy 
broadly based on ethnicity: 
Everywhere ... , the working of economic forces makes 
for tension between groups with competing or conf lic-
ting interests; between town and country, industry 
and agriculture, capital and labour ... but in a plural 
society there ~s a corresponding cleavage along racial 
lines. The foreign elements live in the towns, the 
natives in the rural areas; commerce and industry 
are in foreign hands and the natives are mainly occupied 
in agriculture; foreign capital employs native labour 
or imported coolies ... 14) 
13) 'The Plural Society .in Sociological Theory', J. Rex, p. 115. 
14) Colonial Policv and Practice, p. 3~1. 
·- '1"-
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Ethnicity, race and a defined stratum in the economic hierarchy 
all tend to coincide in a plural society. 
These consequences, Furnivall insisted, are unintended and 
create long-term problems for the colonial power, the traditional 
leaders within the society and all its members. "The plural 
15) society _was not planned; it happened". This, of course, 
substantially complicates planned solutions to such problems. 
A traditional cultural group, when it becomes one of the 'sections' 
of a plural society, loses the economic role it played for its 
members. Indirectly, however, membership in this cultural 
section becomes equivalent to access to certain economic roles 
in the commercial economic systems of the larger society (and 
lack of access to others). Before colonization, Furnivall 
considered these cultural groups as comparable to large 
extended families. In their subordinate position within 
a plural society, he saw them as work-groups in a large factory: 
The fundamerital characteristic of the organization of a 
plural society as a whole is indeed the structure of a 
factory, organized for production ..• Organization of 
this type, for economic rather than for social ends, 
and the ~ccompanying lack of a social demand common 
to all sections have a vital effect on the internal 
structure of each section. 
One consequence of the emphasis on production rather than 
on social life, which is characteristic of a plural 
society, is a sectional division of labour; although 
the primary distinction between the groups may be race, 
.creed or colour, each section comes to have its own 
functions in production, and there is a tendency towards 
the grouping of several elements into distinct economic 
castes ..... 16) 
On the one ha,nd, then, traditional ways disappear as individuals 
compete with one another in common market-places. On the 
other hand, however, ethnic groupings re-emerge as work 
categories in this new 1 industrial 1 context. 
15) 1 Some Problems of Tropical Economy' , J. s. Furni vall, p. 16 9. 
16) Netherlands India, J.S. Furnivall, p. 450. 
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In social and cultural terms, too, the importance of the 
cultural section decreases. Its value system and correspon-
ding set of norms waver in the new economic climate and the 
resultant centralization and urbanization draw members of 
these sections away from their traditional areas. 
Finally, in political terms, the traditional authority 
structure of these sections is destroyed, first through in-
17} . 
direct rule . ~ then, overtly, by the monopoly of the state 
by the foreign group in the l~rger society. In the polity 
then, these sections come to play a minimal role if any: 
"nothing remains between the Government and twenty-three 
million individua1s 11 • 18 } 
17) See Colonial Policy and Practice, Ch. VIII for a discussion. 
Succinct~y, Furnivall writes: "In maintaining order the 
colonial'power must choose between the western principle of 
law and the tropical system of relying on personal authority, 
between direct and indirect rule". (op. cit., p. 8) 
18) op. cit., p. 298. It may be objected that this section 
over-emphasizes the weakening of traditional cultural 
solidarity. O.D. van den Muijzenberg goes so far as to 
write of a contradiction in Furnivall's conception at this 
point. It is true that, within the bounds of one chapter, 
Furnivall could write that, 'Each group holds by its own 
religion, its own culture and language, its own ideas and 
ways', and then point to the weakening of· these sectional 
ties in terms discussed above. The critical point, however, 
is not this seeming contradiction but the changing function 
which group ties played in the life of a member of a 
plural society. Culturally and socially, though relevant 
to such a member, his section becomes a 'crowd and not a 
community', and 'the sectional common social will is 
feeble'. In economic terms, 'the feebleness of social 
will is reflected in the weakness of social demand which 
is the economic aspect of social will'. Finally, in 
political terms though headmen still exist, 'public 
opinion embodied in the headman is no longer able to 
control (the desire of individual gain} in the public 
interest'. See 'Enkele interpretasies van het begrip 
· 1 plurale maatschappij'. O.D. van den Muijzenberg, pp. 77,78 
and Colonial Policy and Practice, pp. 304, 307, 308, 309, 298. 
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An individual in a plural society, finally, relates to his 
soci~~y, Furnivall would argue, in two important ways: first, 
subjected to the 'natural' law .of the survival of the cheapest 
and the instinctive human drive for profit, he buys and sells, 
selfishly and alone, in the market-places of the cities and 
towns. The only constraint placed upon these exchanges is 
that of western law which also creates the second relationship 
which orders an individual's world. As a subject in a plural 
society, he must conform to these laws and if he doesn't 
he will be sanctioned by the cOercive institutions of the state. 
Since the state is m?nopolized by the colonial power, and since 
there exists no common 'social will', or value system in the 
society as a who_le, this relationship is basically a coercive 
one between subject and state. 
The individual still retains ties with his traditional section, 
of course. The important point, however, is that his two 
1 t . h' f 'h · ' 19 >and of subJ'ect··-new re a ions ips o omo economicus 
in the larger society become more important to. him. By 
implication, then, his traditional culture no longer fulfills 
its tradi tion·a1 economic and political roles in his life. 
The values and norms it represents no longer cover his new 
political and economic realities. Finally, then, the complete 
lack of a· new cultural relationship with his new society must 
be seen as a third characteristic of the individual in a plural 
society. His 'social life is incomplete'• 20 > 
The critical question, now, refers to the maintenance of societal 
order in such a colonial set-up. Furnivall writes: . 
In a plural society the sections are not segregated; 
the members of several units are intermingled and meet 
as individuals; the union is not voluntary but is imposed 
19) The term is used by van den Muijzenberg, op. cit. p. 74ff. 
20) Colonial Policy and Practice, p. 306. 
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by the colonial power and by the force of economic 
circumstances; and the union cannot be dissolved without 
the whole society relapsing into anarchy. 21) 
To try to evaluat~ Furnivall's conception of a plural society, 
the model generated in th~ second chapter will now be applied 
to it. 
THE PLURAL SOCIETY AND THE PROBLEM OF ORDER 
Furnivall differentiated between three societal types: the 
traditional, the western rational-legal and the plural. The 
critical difference between the first two and the third was 
the lack·of a common value system in the plural society: 
'in the (plural) society as a whole there is no common social 
will', 22 ) This point seems equivalent to s~ying_that such 
a society exists without its members sharing a minimal 
consensus. This in turn can lead to a debate about whether 
societies need such a consensus to be able to exist. M.G. 
Smith's exchange with L. Braithwaite epitomizes this argument. 23 ) 
Here, instead, the scheme generated in the second chapter of 
this study will be applied to Furnivall's conception. 
The plural society is, in the first place, a political entity 
created by a colonial power. Expansionary western capitalist 
economic forces brought about its creation. The centre of a 
plural society, then, consists of positions of political control 
over state institutions and economic control over these forces. 
Positions in the centre are m~nopolized by a foreig_n colonial 
elite group. 
21) op. cit. p. 307. 
22) _Colonial Policy and Practice, p. 308. 
23) The Plural Society in the British West Indies, M.G. Smith, 
'Preface' and 'Social Stratification and Cultural Pluralism', 
L. Braithwai_te, passim. This argument was mentioned earlier, 
in Chapter Two, section One. 
·, 
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The strength of this foreign centre resides in two facts. First, 
the centre's political power, theoretically rooted in western 
law but backed up by the vast coercive sanctions of the 
colonial metropolitan power, is used to promote colonial 
economic interes.ts. Political power is used to secure a 
substantial amount of economic power. Second, the colonial 
elite group manifests an internal cultural homogeneity 
which lessens the likelihood of clashing collective goals 
being set and pursued within the centre. This group rules 
the colony basically for its own collective economic profit 
and in accordance with the colonial power's policy (and the 
two r~rely clash) . 24 ) 
The weakness of this centre resides in two other facts. 
First, it wields, in the society at large, no social or cultural 
power. It cannot manipulate common values or the means of 
status attribution to its own advantage for the simple reason 
that neither exist. In cases of recalcitrance among members 
of the peripheFy, the centre cannot fall back on shared 
commitments. It cannot use persuasion. It must use 
situational sanctions: inducement or coercion. Second, 
those in the centre cannot direct or control economic growth. 
Furnivall insisted that economic forces, once loosened from 
their western context, take on a life of their own. The 
two principles, one 'natural' and the other 'rational-
instinctive', dominate the society. The plural society 
'happened'. The centre does not possess enough economic 
power to direct growth. Structural differentiation is guided 
more by the principles of the survival of the cheapest and the 
profit motive (and their social consequences) than by the 
governing foreign elite group. 
24) Furnivall wrote: ' .• in colonial relations humanitarian 
ideas do not control but are controlled by economic 
circumstances .•. ', 'Some Problems in Tropical Economy', 
J.S. Furnivall, p. 164. 
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On~ such consequence, the creation in the economic sector of a 
caste-like group hierarchy which is based largely on ethnicity 
and race, seems to be the result_ of both the centre's wielding 
of power for the advantage of the colonial elite and the un-
intended workings of the economic forces in the society. 
This, however, is a late development in a plural society. 
In the earlier stages of development, when colonial government 
is mediated through indirect rule 25 ), natives of the area wel-
come this foreign political hegemony. 26 ) The periphery, here, 
contains important traditional centres of social and cultural 
power. In addition, economic rewards in the eyes of profit-
motivated individual members of the periphery seem greater 
than under their traditional governments. 
In time, however, the importance of these traditional centres 
diminishes and their role becomes one of placing a person in 
the periphery within a caste-like work-group out of which 
he cannot move. Power-centres move away from traditional 
areas to the cities and towns which contain the most important 
market-places. As individuals in the society, natives are 
involved in the greater economic and political sectors as 
homines economici and subjects. Possible centres of 
opposing power in the periphery are dissipate4 by these 
processes of atomization and individualization upon which 
Furnivall layed so much stress. In its colonial context, 
a plural society is a forced union which would relapse into 
anarchy without the centre's situational sanctions. 27 ) 
Seen as a factory, a plural society contains a culturally 
homogeneous foreign management motivated by profit to increase 
production. Employees are divided into cultural groups and 
assigned tasks accordingly. There is no binding belief am~:mgst 
all members apart from a basic individual profit drive. 
25) 'Some Problems of Tropical Economy', J.S. Furnivall, p. 162. 
26) Colonial Policy and Practice, pp. 292, 293. 
2 7 ) op • cit • , p • 3 0 7 . 
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Pr?duction itself, however, is not controlled by the management 
bu~ is driven by a logic all of its own. This logic is 
partially explicable in terms of the natural law of the 
survival of the cheapesti The social consequences of this 
increased production, then, are uncontrollable. The 
management maintains control, on the other hand, over 
employees through wages and, if necessary, coercion. Without 
these two sanctions, the economic logic of production and its 
ensuing consequences would soon reduce order and surplus to 
anarchy and stagnation. 
The factory brings about the gradual dissolution of traditional 
cultural life, the atomization of an individual's life, and 
yet locks him in his racial category to his economic dis-
advantage. For the apparent freedom of competition in the 
open market-place, a native is left with this racial and 
ethnic work-category and with an 'incomplete' social life. 
There is no consensus in the society except insofar as the 
rational-instinctive drive for profit can be considered an 
underlying value in any society. System integration -
functional interdependence between the four sectors of a 
society - on the other hand, is present to the extent that 
the foreign elite succeeds in direct~ng economic development 
in a way compatible with colonial policy. This, in turn, 
accords with the western cultural values of this elite group. 
Given the economic logic of a plural society, system integration 
is present to the e~tent that the centre maintains poli U.cal 
and economic power in the society and cultural and social· 
homogeneity within itself. So long as Furnivall's theory 
remains within this context: 'an holistic, comparative 
theory of, colonisation and its effects• 28 ), societal order 
28) 'On Conflict, Race Relations and the Theory of the 
Plural Society', M. Cross, p. 479. 
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will be maintained by the control wielded by the centre and by 
the workings of economic forces. 
Outside of this context, the picture changes substantially. 
Furnivall's suggested prescriptive solution to the inherent 
problems of a plural society shows this: 
It is quite clear that Furnivall considered plural societies 
unsatisfactory social arrangements and unhappy places. 
Prof it, progress and welfare, are all linked together 
on a single chain, and economic forces, unless con-
trolled by social will, corrode the chain that links 
them. Man is a social animal, but economic forces 
tend to convert human society into a business concern. 
In tropical dependencies the outward and visible 
sign 9f this is the evolution of a plural society ... 29) 
·The solution he conceived of, shortly, was the creation of a 
common value system, the creation of a cultural power base 
in the form of a nationalistic movement in the society 
as a whole. 
But nationalism, dangerous everywhere, has peculiar 
dangers in the plural society of the tropics. For 
it not only sharpens ·the edge of antagonism between 
groups, but sets the large native majority against 
the government representing the colonial power, 
weakening instead of strengthening society ... (The) 
dangers and difficulties are due chiefly to the fact 
that the interests of the colonial power are, or 
seem and are thought to be, closely identified with 
one group in the plural society, the group representing 
European capit~l interests. The solution lies in 
separating economic and political control •.•.. 29) 
Furnlvall desired a rational-legal society in the tropics in 
which enlightened western ideas could join with native cultural 
loyalties to create a social will strong enough to temper 
and channel the destructive free-wheeling capitalist economic 
forces of the plural society. 
He hoped for a new centre whose power would be based on the old 
29) Colonial Policv and Practice, p. 303. 
30) 'Some Problems of Tropical Economy', J.S. Furnivall, p. 172. 
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cultural centres and certain of the ·new imported western 
values. Persons in this centre would rely more on 
intentional sanctions - grounded ultimately in nationalism 
- than on inducement and· coercion. The periphery, then, 
would be drawn into this new independent society through 
activation of nationalistic commitments and through the 
influence of the new leaders. 
The danger of this approach can be high-lighted by looking 
at the centre. Once the inducement and coercion of the 
·foreign elite in the centre are taken aw~y, competing interest 
groups seek to control the means of production, the state 
institutions and the traditional cultural centres. The 
setting of clashing collective goals in the new centre may 
well shatter the order of the new society. 
CONCLUSION 
Social order - the peaceful co-existence of social institu-
tions - in a plural society is maintained within a colonial 
context. ·The ·foreign centre which remains compact and 
effective in its wielding of political and economic power, 
contributes towards this peaceful functioning. The 
existence of a universal prof it motivation freed from 
any restraining ideology, serves as another binding factor. 
The atomization of individuals who are drawn away from their 
traditional ways of thinking and living, inhibits any 
traditional opposition movements among the natives of the 
society. In this way, traditional cultural (and social) 
bases of power are eroded. The only common belief left 
in the society is that of individual profit-seeking within 
a laissez-faire colonial economy. 
Given inexorable capitalist economic development, order is 
maintained in a plural society basically because the centre is 
mbnopolized by a foreign elite group who wield effective 
political and economic power, and, second, because those in the 
periphery, as a possible opposition to those in the centre, are 
--~~ - r""'"' ..... ·.• 
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rendered harmless. Individuals, in fact, live incomplete 
atomistic lives with recourse to neither their traditional 
cultures nor to a new societal culture. 
NOTE 
It may be objected that the 'dualistic' theory 31 )of the Dutch 
economist, J .. H. Boeke, was as influential in the original 
creation of the plural society model as Furnivall's contri-
bution. This is claimed by a number of commentators. 32 ) 
There are however, important differences in the two 
approaches. 
It is certainly true that Furnivall was aware of and used 
Boeke's ideas in his own works. 33 ) Boeke conceived of a 
'dual' society as one characterized by two economies: 
the one modern, capital-intensive, and technologically 
developed; the other traditional involving peasant 
agriculture and village handicrafts. A feature of this 
second economy is its 'almost complete absence of profit 
seeking• 34 ). 
Clearly, then., though there are certain similarities between 
the twq theories, Boeke emphasized the different sectors of the 
economy to such an extent that Furnivall's two fundamental 
economic principles cannot function. This difference is seen 
most clearly when one looks at the different policy implications 
of the two approaches. Furnivall stressed the creation of 
common value-system in the society which could harness the 
common economic forces for the new nation's benefit. 
Nationalism was to be the answer. Boeke stressed the back-
w.ardness of the traditional economy and argued for an expansion 
of· the western economic system into these 'backward' areas. 
Boeke was a diffusionist. 
31) Economics and Economic Policies of Dual Societies, J.H.Boeke~ 
32) 'The Question of Pluralism', O.C. Cox; 'Discussion of the 
paper', S. Rottenberg in 'Social Stratification and Cultural 
Pluralism', L. Braithwaite. 
33) Netherlands India, Ch. 13; Colonial Policy and Practice, 
Ch. 8. -
34) Economic Development: Principles, Problems and Practices, 
B.H. Higgins, p. 228. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
M.G. SMITH AND THE PLURAL SOCIETY: AN APPROACH FROM CULTURAL 
ANTHROPOLOGY 
M.G. Smith is an anthropologist who has had field experience in 
West Africa and the West Indies. Intensely interested in 
Furnivall's conception of the plural society, he adapted this 
to his circumstances·. In so doing, he di verged quite sub-
stantially from the Furnivallian model on two points: First, 
the new conception was much more general in its application. 
Smith, in effect, loosened the model from its colonial (and 
'tropical') context and made it universal in application. 
Second, he changed priorities in his discussion of the 
plural society. Furnivall, as has been seen, laid great 
stress on economic forces in the origin of a plural society. 
Smith, on the other hand, defines a plural society, ultimately, 
in terms of cultural differences. This divergence must lessen 
the validity of any claim Smith makes as to continuity between 
Furnivall's and his works. In fact, he has been criticized 
by at least three writers for making this very claim. 1 ) 
The new model, then, will be different from its predecessor in 
certain crucial respects. Before turning to a study of it, 
moreover, it must be pointed out that Smith is a social anthro-
pologist and, as such, uses a technical language substantially 
different from most main-stream sociology .. For this reason, 
his model of a plural society will be discussed under the 
following subtitles: (a) Identification of the crucial analytic 
concepts; (b) The ways in which these concepts are used to 
build up the framework of analysis; (c) The methods used 
to differentiate between unitary, heterogeneous and plural 
societies; (d) The types 
study of plural societies. 
Chapter Two will be applied 
of spe~ific analysis 
Finally, the scheme 
to this model .. 
suggested for the 
generated in 
i) 'The Question of Pluralism', O.C. Cox, p. 393; 'The Plural 
Society: The South African Case', J. Rex, p. 403; 'On Conflict, 
Race Relations, and the Theory of the Plural Society', M. Cross, 
p. 4 80. 
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The development of M.G. Smith's model took place in two phases. 
These can be found in two publications: The Plural Society 
in the British West Indies which includes the seminal essay 
of phase one ('Social and Cultural Pluralism'); and Pluralism 
in Africa, edited by M.G. Smith and Leo Kuper, which forms 
· the main work of phase two. 
(a) Identification of crucial concepts 
In his definitions and discussions of the three terms, social 
structure, institution and corporate unit, Smith refers repeatedly 
to Malinowski, Radcliffe-Brown and Nadel.
2 ) It is these three 
concepts which form the centre of hi·s framework of analysis. 
Each will now be discussed. 
An institution consists of standardized modes of co-activity. 3 ) 
The family and marriage are two examples. Elsewhere Smith 
writes that 'institutions are collective modes of action, 
organization and orientation, both normative and cognitive 1 • 4 ) 
Social structure refers to the complex network of social rela-
tions. It is closely allied with the concept of institu-
tion and institutions, in fact, make up 'the matrix of 
social structure' . 5 > By quoting first Fortes and then Radcliffe-
Brown, Smith tries to further explicate this concept; 
I 
Social structure is 
entire culture of a 
frame of theory ... 
not an aspect of cultu!e, but the 
given people handled in a special 
6) 
2) lli!'alism in Africa, pp. 30ff & 437ff. References are made, 
inter alia, to Structure and Function in Primitive Society, 
·A.R. Radcliffe-Brown; The Foundations of Social Anthro2olog.YL. 
S.F. Nadel; A Scientific Theory of Culture and Other Essays, 
B. Malinowski. 
3) Nadel's definition quoted in The Plural Society in the British 
· West Indies, p. 7 8. 
4) Pluralism in Africa, p. 28. 
· 5) The Plural Society in the British West Indies, pp. 80, 163 . 
. 6) ~luralism in Africa, p. 91. 
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and 
Social institutions, in the sense of standardized modes 
of behavior, constitute the machinery by which a social 
structure, a network of social relations, maintains 
its existence and its continuity. 7) 
A corporate unit can be of two types: a corporate category 
or a corpor_a,te group. Corporate status is achieved if a 
group has the following characteristics: 'presumed perpetu-
ity, closure, determinate identity and membership' • 8 > This, 
in fact, defines a corporate category. 
If a corporate category contains 1 this inclusive organization, 
a set of distinctive common affairs and the procedures and 
autonomy necessary to regulate them•, 9 ) then it is called 
a corporate group. An acephalous society and a slave popu-
lation in a larger society are examples of corporate catego-
ries. A nation-state {with an explicit government) is an 
example of a corporate group. 
(b) Conceptual construction of the analytic framework 
Institutions are not isolated from one another in the sense 
o~ being independent 'standardized modes of co-activity'. 
Rather, they tend to cluster and form, hence, institutional 
subsystems and then an institutional system. This cluste-
ring takes place because 'the collective modes of action, 
organization and orientation' in different institutions are 
usually mutually supporting. In fact, institutions dealing 
with 'the same phases of life'lO)form institutional subsystems. 
In this complex, there tends to be a greater compactness 
and integration within than between subsystems within the institu-
tional system. For example, marriage, kinship and educa-
tion - at 'the same phases of life' - deal with social life 
7) op. cit. p. 437. 
8) op. cit. p. 31. 
9) loc. cit. 
10) The Plural Society in the British West Indies, p. 81. 
f.ir--· ... ~,, 
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centering around setting up a family and procreating,and 
social behaviour within this subsystem will portray parti-
cular patterns. 
All these institutional complexes prescribe an overall pat-
tern of social behavior or a network of social relations, 
i.e. the social structure. Further, given this cumulative 
clustering within and'· to a lesser degree, between subsystems, 
the institutional system tends towards an internal integra-
tion and some closure. In other words, Smith argues, the 
institutional system forms the skeleton of a corporate unit. 
Pluralism is the condition in which a number of different 
corporate'units and aggregates of persons form, together, 
one society. As Smith puts it: 
Pluralism is a condition in which members of a common 
society are internally distinguished by fundamental 
differences in their institutional practice .•. Such 
differences ... simultaneously identify institution-
ally distinct aggregates or groups, and establish 
deep social divisions between them. 11) 
A soc~et);', consequently., though usually defined as 1 a self-
sufficient, self-perpetuating and internally autonomous system 
of" social relations•, 12 ) has, in its plural sense, a specific 
political dimension. In fact, if a society is considered 
as a 'territorially distinct unit having (its) own governmental 
institutions• 13 ), it becomes clear that 'the essential pre-
condition114) for the·maintenance of order in a plural society 
is the monopoly of power and,. hence, the regulative system 
by one corporate group. This is so since decision-making 
powers shared by members of radically different institutional 
groupings is not considered possible. It follows, then, that 
11) Ylurali§m in Africa, p. 2j. 
12) op. cit. p. 29. 
13) The Plural Society in the British West Indies, p. 79. 
14) op. cit., p. 86. 
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the dominant corporate unit is, by definition, a corporate 
group whilst other aggregates and corporate units in the 
society lack the inclusive organization to institute 
effective political action, i.e. to become fully-fledged 
corporate groups and thereby challenge the organized dominant 
section which rules them. 
Ih such situations, the subordinate social sections often 
seek to regulate their own internal affairs independently 
of their superiors. By contraposing these two regulative 
systems, it follows that conflict is inherent in a plural 
society. 
Now clearly even the highest degree of institutional 
_integration and uniformity does not exclude conflict •.. 
But surely the conflicts that divide a people who share 
identical institutional organization and orientations 
differ radically from those that contrapose collecti-
v1ties differentiated also at the institutional and 
organizational levels ..• 15) 
There is hence a qualitative difference between certain types 
of conflict in plural societies compared with cpnflict in 
non-plural societies. This classification of societies -
into unitary, heterogeneous and plural - is dealt with in 
the next section. 
(c) Methods to classify societies 
There are two methods of classification which Smith discus-
ses.· The first, involving institutional analysis, requires 
classifying institutions.in three types: (i) compulsory 
(ii) alternative and (iii) exclusive. Compulsory or 'basic' 
institutions are those that are common to all societies or 
corporate units. 'This basic institutional system embraces 
kinship, education, religion, property and economy, recrea-
tion and certain sodalities' . 16 ) Alternative institutions 
are voluntary in the sense that they are neither compulsory 
15) Pluralism in Africa, p. 438. 
16) The Plural Society in the British West Indies, p. 82. 
' 
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nor specific to a socially recognized category. These are 
often called voluntary associations by other writers. Ex-
clusive institutions are those which are shared by indivi-
duals who belong to certain socially recognized categories 
(an occupational group, for instance) . 
A unitary (or culturally homogeneous) society is one in 
which the members share the same compulsory institutions. 
A heterogeneous society is one in which there is a dif fe-
rence in the basic institutional systems of different sec~ 
tions but since these differences are not too pronounced, 
they do not affect membership in the alternative or exclu-
sive institutions. Finally, a plural society is one in 
which, due to basic institutional divergencies, membership 
for some sections of the society in alternative or exclusive 
institutions is either disallowed or granted differentially. 
This first method of classification appears in one of 
Smith's early essays entitled Social and Cultural Pluralism. 
The second method of classification (which should be seen as 
a refinement and modification of the first) involves an analysis 
of three levels of pluralism: the structural, the social_and 
the cultural. 
Structural pluralism consists ... in the differential 
incorporation of specified collectivities within a given 
society •.. It institutes or presupposes social and 
cultural plural~sm together, by prescribing sectional 
differences of access to the common public domain, and 
by establishing differing contexts and conditions of 
sectional co-existence, segretation and suhordination.17) 
Further, Smith says, this structural pluralism can be insti-
tuted in one of two ways: 
(a) 'by the total exclusion of subordinate sections 
18) 
from the inclusive public domain'. 
17) Pluralism in Africa, p. 440. 
18) loc. cit. 
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(b) 'by instituting substantial and sufficient in-
equalities of sectional participation in and access 
to this sector of societal organization•. 19 ) 
This level, then, deals with the way in which one section of 
the dominant corporat~ group - through its monopoly of 
government-specifies the incorporation, into the society, 
of other sections. 
Social pluralism i~ the condition in which •.. institu-
tional differentiations coincide with the corporate 
division of a given society into a series of sharply 
demarcated and virtually closed social sections or 
segments. 20) 
Cultural pluralism consists, solely, of 'institutional dif-
ferences to which no corporate ?ifferences attach'. 21 ) 
The difference between these last two levels can be either 
analytic or concrete. Analytically, cultural pluralism 
involves a specification of institutional differentiation 
between sections without the concomitant social or corporate 
cleavages. Concretely, it is possible, in.a heterogeneous 
society, for cultural pluralism to obtain without correspon-
ding social pluralism. A plural society must manifest all 
three levels of pluralism whereas cultural pluralism may 
exist without social and structural pluralism. Analysis 
of these levels depends crucially upon two new concepts Smith 
introduces: the public domain and differential incorporation. 
Smith's distinction between the private (or 'familial') do-
main and public (or 'collective') domai.n of a corporate unit 
is a generalization of Meyer Fortes' distinction between kin-
h ' d 1 . . . 1 d . . f . . 1 . t . 
2 2 ) Th s ip an po itico-Jura omains o socia organiza ion. e 
19) loc. cit. 
20) loc. cit. 
21) loc. cit . 
. 2 2) Op• . Cit• t P • 3 8 • 
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public domain encompasses that area of social life which 
concerns corporate action: 'to exercise and protect corpo-
rate rights, to enforce corporate obligations and to allo-
cate corporate responsibilities and privileges•. 23 ) The pri-
vate domain encompasses other areas of social life. 
This Aristotelian distinction, of course, can be used to define 
what one means by political action in a community. Fortes uses 
his narrower distinction to show that institutions, in simple 
societies, may figure prominently in both the kinship and 
politico-jural domains. In such relatively undifferentiated 
societies, for example, the institution of kinship substantially 
?ffects the status of a person in the politico-jural domain. 
Smith's generalization of these domains can be applied 
analogously to a plural, highly differentiated society. 
Hence, in simple societies, such institutions as education 
and economy may fall primarily into the kinship domain 
whilst, in highly differentiated societies, it may be pos-
sible to study corporate structure with minimal· attention 
to the private domain. All societies, however, 'depend 
for their boundaries, organization and internal order 
on the scope and character of their corporate structure, 
which is explicitly centered in the public domain•. 24 ) 
In a plural society, there may be an almost total exclusion 
of subordinate sectors from the public domain.of the domi-
nant sector which,_ on one level, constitutes the area in 
which the explicit regulation of this corporate group takes 
place and, on another level, the area in which the regula-
tion or governing of the whole society takes place. On the 
other hand, through differential incorporation, partial or 
23) 'A Structural Approach to Comparative Politics', M.G. Smith, 
p. 119. 
24) Pluralism in Africa, p. 39. The distinction between public• and 
private domains has played an important part in the history 
of sociological thought: See The Human Condition, H. Arendt, 
Ch. 2; Social Science and Political Theor , W.G. Runciman, 
p. 37ff; Max Weber, D. Wrong (ed. , p. 40ff. 
....-----~- .... ..., 
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discriminatory access to the (then common) public domain may 
be instituted.so as to integrate the corporate units into 
the society diffe~entially and, at the same time, to main-
tain differences of institutional practice between sectors. 
It is clear that though these structural differentiations 
between sectors fall in the public domain, institutional 
differentiations in the separate private domains can be of 
equal importance. Here, it is necessary to look at the 
cultural level of pluralism and to focus on the form and 
origin of differential incorporation. In other words, 
it must be shown in how far original institutional ~iffe~ 
rences aided the process of differential incorporation and 
in how far thi~ process solidified cleavages or created new 
or modified forms of institutional differentiation and se-
gregation. For example, institutions of education, in 
one society, may vary widely in form and content and may be 
used, by the dominant group, to justify a process of diffe-. 
rential incorporation. This process, th~n, by a formal 
creation of explicit parallel educational institutions may 
create further and deeper institutional cleavages between 
corporate units and may, in fact, create new boundaries 
within the subordinate units. 
It is to this concept of differential incorporation, which 
has a clear historical dimension, that attention is now 
turned. 
M.G. Smith writes tha,t 'differential incorporation obtains 
when the structure of the inclusive collectivity prescribes 
differences in the modes of articulation of particular corpo-
rate components•. 25 ) In an essay entitled Pluralism in Pre-
colonial African Societies, 26 >smith isolates different modes 
of collective accommodation: societal segregation, symbio-
sis, consociation, assimilation and differential incorpora-
tion. The first two, societal segregation and symbiosis, 
represent varying complementary associations between sepa-
rate corporate groups. 
25) op. cit. , p. 9 3. 
26) -Chapter 4 in Pluralism in Africa. 
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Of much greater importance, here, however, are the last 
three modes: assimilation, consociation and differential 
incorporation, which correspond with unitary, heterogeneous 
and plural societies. 
Assimilation, usually preceded by minimal differentiations 
in the separate institutional systerrs, 'denotes the condi-
tion in which uniformities of internal organization and ex-
ternal articulation are sufficiently general and intense 
for a single corpus of law and custom to have equal vali-
dity for all types of social relation in all groups•. 27 > 
The 'ideal' nation-state springs to mind here as the typi-
cal example. 
Consociation, typified by ~ federation or confederation, 
obtains 'when two societies or segments thereof join together 
as equal and autonomous collectivities in a distinctive com-
mon polity that surpasses alliance in its scope, content 
and intensity, while preserving their internal distinctness' . 28 )' 
Though institutional differentiations between u·ni ts are 
clearly assumed, these should be contained in their respec-
tiv~ private domains so that group relations and practice 
in them become optional. In the public domain, there should 
be both formal and substantial.equality_of articulatio~ and 
access to government. The appearance or continuation of 
separate public domains paralleling the. common public domain 
highlight points of weakness in the consociation. Obvious-
ly such factors as linguistic differences and geographic dis-
tribution are also factors in the stability of a consocia-
tion but very sharp initial institutional differentiations 
seem to preclude the emergence of a consociation. 
Differential incorporation may arise from many situations: 
conquest, colonization, or resettlement and migration. It 
does not presuppose, but is usually found with initial sharp 
27) op. cit., p. 95. 
2 8) op. cit. , p • 9 4. 
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institutional differentiations between units. These insti-
tutional differentiations and th~ process of differential 
inc~rpo~ation vary directly with one another mo~ifying and 
increasing the cleavages between corporate uni t.s. Ideally 
the dominant unit - a corporate group - can be seen as re-
presenting a nation, in which the members are citizens, 
whereas the other units - corporate categories ~ fall 
within the inclusive society but its members are subjects 
rather than citizens. The state, the regulation and 
governing of which falls within the dominant corporate 
group, is extended beyond this unit's boundaries. Hence, 
in a plural society, neither culture and society nor nation 
and state are congruent. 
Access to the public domain of this dominant section is 
either forbidden or granted differentially to 'sub-
jects'. The extent to which separate public domains deve-
lop within the subordin~te sections indicates the potential 
of conflict in, plural societies. 
(d) The Plural Society: Different Levels of Analysis 
It is possible to isolate four main directions of analysis 
in Smith's framework. Though these directions are obvious-
ly interdependent, it is useful to differentiate between 
them~ 
(i) Institutional analysis, which isolates and compares in-
stitutions within and between units and indicates their 
importance in their respective public domains. Smith 
writes of a 'criterion of compatability' 29 )applied to the same 
basic institution in different sections. Different pairs 
of family institutions, for instance, may be found to be 
more or less compatible for intersectional activity and mo-
bility. 
(ii) Analysis of corporate units, which isolates and com-
pares different sections of the plural society. Special 
attention must be given to the dominant section since ana-
lysis, here, must take place on two levels. First, as an 
29) The Plural Society in the British West Indies, p. 85. 
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inclusive corporate group itself, this section is amenable 
to analysis an.d, second;ly, due to its monopoly of the ;-egu-
lati ve system, this section will have to evolve specialized 
regulative subsystems to deal with subordinate sections 
within the society. 
(iii) Political analysis, which delineates the scope and 
depth_of monopoly of the regulative system by the dominant 
group and th_e partial and differential access other uni ts 
have ~n this area. The definition, in fact, of a society 
as 'a territorially distinct unit with a government' gives 
priority to its polity and from this flows Smith's proposi-
tion that 'changes in the social structure presuppose po-
litical changes' . 30 > 
(iv) Historical analysis, which traces the process of 
differential incorporation and attempts to explain how, 
due to political changes, changes take place in the social 
structure. 
The Plural Society and the Problem of Order 
M.G. Smith initially defined a plural society in terms of its 
institutions. His focus here was on cultural pluralism. Later, 
when the two concepts of differential incorporation and the public 
domain took precendence over institutional analysis, the plural 
society became a politically (rather than a culturally)defined 
concept. Though a definite shift did take pla~e, his implicit 
solution to the order problem remained broadly the same. 
Nevertheless, where differences seemed possible, his ~econd 
and more recent approach has been used. The main point, however, 
is that cultural pluralism is an integral part of Smith's second 
conceptuali. zation of pluralism. As Kuper puts it: 
Smith's first paper ascribes a primary role to cultural 
incompatibilities in molding the plural structure of the 
society. His present contribution (in Pluralism in Africa) 
emphasizes rather the primary significance of differential 
30) op. cit., p. 91. 
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incorporation, but conceptually the differentially 
incorporated groups are still distinguished by cultural 
differences, whether antecedent to or consequent upon 
the differential incorporation. 31) 
This new conception of pluralism and the plural socie_ty is freed 
from any historical period and from any allied moral tag. The 
plural society, here, becomes one category in a typology of 
societies. As such, the problem of order in this category 
of societies must be analyzed theoretically in the same way as 
Parsons did it for societies in general. Further, there is 
no theory about the origin of such societies. Smith's model, 
then, is a 'static' or 'ahistorical' one. 
\ 
The plural society is, in the first place, a political entity in 
the sense that one corporate group in the society maintains control 
over corporate action in the public domain common to all members 
of the society. This implies that other corporate units are 
categories rather than gr_oups and that they are differentially 
incorporated into this common public domain. The dominant 
corporate group, thus, monopolizes positions in the centre of 
the society and the other corporate categories are positioned 
in the periphery of the society. Boundaries between the centre 
and the periphery coincide with those between this dominant group 
and the other categories. 
Structural pluralism, the presence of which can be considered a 
necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a plural 
socie~y, implies (a) cultural pluralism or clear differences in 
institutions; (b) social pluralism or the coinciding of these 
institutional differences with corporate units; and (c) the 
emergence of a dominant corporate unit incorporating others 
differentially in the society. This third and last element 
Smith calls structural pluralism. It is thus quite clear 
that the dominant corporate group is culturally homogeneous 
and internally organized to maintain this cultural homogeneity. 
31) 'Ethnic and Racial Pluralism,'L. Kuper, p. 46ff. 
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The centre, then, internally wields cultural power but over 
the society as a whole it has no such cultural power. In 
fact, Smith explicitly rejects the Parsonian (consensus) 
assumption that value consensus is the main bindtng force in 
any society. 32 ) Insofar as members of other corporate units 
in the society are given access to the common public doma~n, 
however, certain common beliefs and practices will emerge. 
It can be, in fact, argued that these positions in the common 
public domain point .to a minimal amount of social and cultural 
power which the centre may attempt to manipulate in granting 
certain other 'ethnics' positions in the centre. 
It is clear that units in the centre wield massive and 
effective political power. FormalJy, control of the common 
public domain means exactly this. Further, Smith feels 
that it is in the area of political power where conflict 
can be expected. Corporate categories, refused access 
to important positions in the centre, will attempt in their 
own public domains, to accumulate political power. At this 
point; the confrontation is measured in terms of a balance 
of coercive means and sanctions. An important insight 
is that units in the periphery usually consist of more 
than one corporate unit and consensus can be as minimal 
between these as in the society as a whole. 
The question of economic power creates problems. In his earlier 
works, Smith included the economy within the basic institutional 
system of a 'section'. This implies that a plural society 
33) 
does ·not possess a common economy. Later, however, he 
drops this form of classification and seems to regard the 
question of economic power as not relevant to the existence 
of a plural society, as such. 
32) 
33) 
'Preface', The Plural.Society in the British West Indies. 
'Introduction', Stratification in Grenada. 
Rex suggests reasons for why Smith introduced this 
'limitation'. These are not relevant here. 'The Plural 
Society: The South African Case', John Rex, p. 403. 
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In sum, if it is remembered that the public domain of the domi-
nant group is. both its own (exclusive) public domain and that 
of the whole society,, the power of those in the centre lies 
almost exclusively in the political and monopolizing aspect 
of their control over the common public domain of the society, 
on the one hand, and their cultural and ·social power over thei.r 
own members within the public domain of the.ir own corporate 
group, on the other. Negative situational sanctions are used 
over non-ethnics and intentional sanctions over members of 
the in-group. Positive situational sanctions are not 
considered relevant. to the distinction between a plural and 
any other type of society. 
In Lockwood's sense, then, Smith feels that the plural society 
manifests enough system integration to hold itself 
together. There exists no social integration whatsoever. 
Conclusion 
As he shows in his essay, 'Pluralism in Precolonial African 
Societies', Smith considers the plural society to be a type 
cutting across all levels of development or of structural 
differentiation. Further, race differences, as he shows 
in the same essay, are by no means a necessary factor in a 
plural society. 34 > Smith's typology, then, is at a very 
high level of gen~rality (and has, hence, even been called 
'over-simple') . 35 ) Not surprisingly, then, the formal solution 
to the problem of societal order which is obtained from his 
analyses, is also at a high level of generality. 
Societal order - the peaceful co-existence of social institutions 
is maintained by the political power of the dominant corporate 
group over the society as a whole and indirectly through the 
cultural homogeneity of each corporate category. Within the 
dominant group, persuasion and the activation of commitments 
are used to obtain conformity. Over members of the society 
34) See 'Political Change in Plural Societies', L.· Kuper, p. 597. 
35) 'On Conflict, Race Relations and the Theory of the Plural 
Society', M. Cross, p. 484. 
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at large, when their actions might harm societal order, 
coercion is used. Otherwise,· their actions conform to the 
cultural expectations of their individual corporate units. 
Those in the periphery, then, can challenge those in the centre 
by generating and attempting to use countervailing political 
power. Conflict in a plural society is political conflict 
par excellence. 
It is only through differential incorporation that any type of 
common values and means of status attribution - cultural and social 
power - may be generated. 
exists. 
Otherwise no type of value consensus 
The plural society, and the way in which order is maintained 
within it, are independent of any level of structural dif-
. ferentiation, any type of economy, and any composition of racial 
types. The relevant variables are (a) the institutional 
differences; (b) the organization into corporate units; 
and (c) the coincidence of these two with the cons.equent 
monopoly of political power by a culturally homogeneous 
corporate group. It is this group, ultimately, that-maintains 
order so long as opposition is not too serious. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
L. KUPER, RACE AND THE PLURAL SOCIETY. 
Leo Kuper is a sociologist who began his career in South Africa 
(at the University o.f Natal, Durban) and then moved to the 
U.S. in the mid-sixties. This geographical change corres-
ponds, broadly, with a change in emphasis in Kuper's socio-
logical interests. In his written works, this change is 
quite clearly discernible: Until 1965, the date of publi-
cation of An African Bourgeoisie, Kuper's published works all 
show almost total immersion in and deep concern with South 
Africa's peculiar plural structure; After the publication 
of this synthesizing statement on the South African dilemma, 
Kuper becomes more comparative, by turning to Algeria, 
Zanzibar, and Ruanda-Urundi to cite a few examples, and more 
.theoretical in that his works are much more self-critical 
and aware of their place i.n the major currents of sociological 
thought. 1 ) 
Within the context·of the theory of the plural society, then, 
interest remains focused on ethnic and racial pluralism, 
though Kuper admits that racial differences are not a pre-
requisite for the emergence of a plural society, 2 ) and much 
attention is paid to a certain type of plural society, 'white 
settler society'. 3 ) Moreover, even though societal change 
always remained one of Kuper's major preoccupations, his later 
works reflect a conscious attempt at constructing a general 
theory of social change in plural societies. Of importance 
here are factors militating .'for evolutionary and for revolu-
tionary change. It may be said, thus, in the rather ambiguous 
terminology of North American academic sociology, that 
1) For a list of the works which have been consulted, see 
Bibliography. 
2) 'Political Changes in White Settler Societies~ 
L. Kuper, p. 171 and 'Structural Discontinuities in African 
Towns: Some Aspects of Racial Pluralism', L. Kuper, p. 149, 
note 1. 
/ 
3) 'Political Change in White Settler Societies', L. Kuper, p. 170. 
--··~ l<'.v••·~-
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Kuper's major areas of professional interest are those of 
race relations and social change. 
The theory of the plural society, Kuper argues, differs in 
important if not fundamental ways from both the Marxist theory 
of class conflict and the Durkheimian theory of evolutionary 
change. Following the analytic scheme constructed by M.G. 
Smith 4>c1osely, Kuper writes: 
Theories of the plural society or of pluralism stress 
the cleavages, or discontinuities, between sections 
differentiated by race, ethnicity, religion or culture. 
These bases of differentiation are not conceived to be 
primordial: they are socially structured in the process 
of interaction. Racial difference has no iritrinsic 
social significance. It comes to have social signi-
ficance only as it is elaborated in systems of 
differential political incorporation, economic stra-
tification and racial segregation. Since the theory 
of plural societies is derived from the analysis of 
sharp and persistent cleavage, it tends to stress the 
enduring nature of plural divisions and the high 
probability of violence in the process of political 
change ..• 5) 
In this ch~pter, then, Kuper's analyses of the Marxist and 
Durkheimian theories of development and change will be 
reviewed. Important differences and similarities between 
these theories_and the theory of the plural society will be 
highlighted, with special attention being give~ to 
explanations for social change and to the role ideologies 
play in these processes. Hereby, a clearer understanding 
of what Kuper meant by racial pluralism will be obtained. 
Finally, the scheme generated in Chapter Two will be applied 
to this concept of racial pluralism. -\..• 
Racial Pluralism 
Both the Marxist and Durkheimian theories 'derive initially from 
the context of western industrial societies• 6 )which can be 
4) As discussed ;in Chapter Four. 
5) 'Political Change in Plural Societies: problems ·in racial 
pluralism', L. Kuper, p. 595. 
6) 'Continuities and Discontinuities in Race Relations: 
Evolutionary or Revolutionary_ Change'·, L. Kuper, p. 361. 
! -
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considered racially homogeneous. Their explanatory power 
decreases considerably when they are transplanted to plural 
societies. 
Racial pluralism stresses the deep cleavages which exist in 
multi-ethnic and multi-racial societies characterized by 
differential incorporation. It follows that recurrent con-
flict along these lines of cleavage is structurally built 
into the society. What is at issue, Kuper argues, is the 
underlying reasons for this conflict; the general direction 
(if any) in which this society is likely to change; and the 
ways in which this change can take place. On all three 
these critical issues, 'pluralists' and Marxists disagree. 
Marxists, Kuper writes, face grave problems when trying to 
handle these issues: 
·first, how to explain the persistende of pre-industrial 
relations in an industrial society; second, how to 
find a class basis for revolutionary struggle in a 
racially structured society; and third, how to 
reconcile the national liberation movement with the class 
struggle... 7) 
These problems will now be discussed. 
If the process of urbanization in plural societies is studied, 
it becomes clear that the primary basis for urban stratification 
is race rather than class S)though the two do tend to coincide. 
The primacy of race is shown by the existence of parallel and 
intercalary institutions in the towns; 9 )the persistence of 
tribal affiliations lO); the emergence of ethnic religious 
7) 'Class and Colour in South Africa, 1850-1950. Some Problems 
in Marxism and Pluralism', L. Kuper, p. 495. Though writing 
specifically about South Africa as a white settler society 
in this context, Kuper's remarks apply to a general dis-
cussion of pluralism. 
8) 'Structural Discontinuities in African Towns', L. Kuper, p.133. 
9) op. cit., pp. 133ff. 





)and, finally, the lack of complete coincidence 
between cultural groups and structural divisions in the 
. t 12) socie y. 
New towns should not be analyzed in terms of the antecedent 
cultures of the dominant ethnic and racial groups within 
them, though these cultures are clearly important. Rather, 
Kuper argues, these towns 'should be studied as structures 
in their own right 1 , 13 )in which racial pluralism looms as 
an all-important characteristic. 
Extreme social distance between and differential incorporation 
of ethnic and racial groupings, when coupled with a political 
power monopoly by one group, create a situation in which 
racial status tends to coincide with a certain economic 
position and a certain social status in the society. 
Nevertheless, '(r)ace is the primary basis for stratification 
in the society as a whole 1 • 14 ) The duplication of certain 
institutions, such as schools and churches, so as to serve 
different racial groups separately and probably unequally 
and consequently to maintain social distance between them, 
is one aspect of this primacy. Another is the existence of 
intercalary or 'brokerage• 15 )institutiqns which intervene 
or mediate between different racial groupings. They serve as 
a device to co-ordinate and yet keep separate in their assigned 
. .. 
places, these groupings. A tribal headmanship, when this 
position is filled by colonial government appointees, may serve 
as an example. 
In their attempts to explain the persistence of tribal affilia-
tions in towns, Marxists usually point to the material inte-
rests maintained by these structures. 16 ) Recent studies, however, 
11) 'Religion and Urbanization in Africa', L.Kuper, passim. 
12) 'Structural Discontinuities in African Towns', L. Kuper,p.139. 
13) 'Structural Discontinuities in African Towns', L. Kuper,p.127. 
14) op. cit . ; p . 13 3 . 
15) The expression is Despres': See Chapter Seven. 
16) 'Sociology - Some Aspects of Urban Plural Societies', L. Kuper, 
p. 120. 
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have shown that tribalism must be seen as situational rather 
than in terms of fixed relationships between people. Further, 
differences in tribal modes of behaviour in the same situation 
may be due to differences rooted in the trihal background 
rather than in material interests in the cities. Mayer's 
Red and School distinction is a case in point. 17 ) Again, 
tribal antagonisms, in certain situations, have occurred 
amongst both uneducated and educated Africans in South 
Africa, groups with differing material interests. 18 ) Thus, 
it would seem that priority cannot be granted exclusively to 
class or material interests: Both at work and while inter-
acting with Whites, Africans evolve new patterns of behaviour; 
whilst at home, they usually interact more in line with 
their tribal custom. Race and economic position cannot, 
in general, be directly and causally linked with each other. 
In general, economic.position, social status and racial status, 
though interdependent, do not coincide exactly. This, in 
itself, adds to the already existing tensions in the society 
for between those of low status in the dominant group and 
those of high status in a subordinate group, for instance, 
there is bound to be tension and resentment. In situations 
such as these, moreover, stratification follows the 
cleavage lines defined by the mode of differential incorporation. 
In other words, stratification accords primarily with the 
racial criterion. 
The main component in the Marxist theory of change is the 
dialectic in the eco~omic process, which brings about a 
polarization of classes, a violent confrontation between these 
classes, and, finally, a revolutionary transformation of the 
society. The crucial questions relating to plural societies 
are whether revolutionary change can take place and, if so, 
.whether the polarization will occur along class or race lines. 
1 7 ) op . cit. , p . 121 . 
18) An African Bourgeoisie, L. Kup~r, p. 88ff. 
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The first question which involves the possibility of evolutionary 
change ~nd hence, Durkheim's functional theory, will be 
discussed later. 
To answer the second question, Kuper analyzes revolutions in 
Zanzibar, Rwanda-Urundi 19 )and Algeria, and the absence of 
revolution in South Africa29) the role Communist Parties 
played in the latter two countries 2~hd the types of ideologies 
which developed there and in othe~ tension-ridden plural 
. t. 22) socie 1es. 
It is abundantly clear that 'the defining characteristic in the 
dialectic of conflict' in a plural society is the political 
structure, the distribution of power. Since ethnic and racial 
groups (rather than classes) are differentially incorporated 
into the polity, it follows that race rather than class 
will be the cleavage along which confrontation over power 
recources will take place - under the assumption that the two 
do not coincide exactly. In the revolutions which took 
place in Rwanda-Urundi and Zanzibar, the racial and economic 
stratification systems, though superimposed upon each other 
and clearly interdependent, did not coincide exactly. Kuper 
concludes: ' .• the racial divisions are the propelling force 
in the revolutions, the predisposing factors are those that 
affect racial status in any of its many social dimensions, 
d h d . 1 . f fl. . t. 11 . l' 
23 ) an t e 1a ectic o con ict is essen ia y racia . 
A study of the role.Communist Parties played in the recent history 
of Algeria and South Africa reinforces this conclusion. In 
19) 'Theories of Revolution and Race Relations', L. Kuper, passim. 
20) 'Race, Class and Power: Some Comments on Revolutionary 
Change', L. Kuper, passim. 
2~) op. cit., passim. 
22) 'Race Structure in the Social Consciousness', L. Kuper & 
'Some Aspects of Violent and Nonviolent Political Change 
in Plural Societies', L. Kuper & 'The Polj_tical Situation 
of Non-Whites in South Africa', L. Kuper. 
23) 'Theories of Revolution and Race Relations', L. Kuper, pp. 
105, 106. 
·-·· __ ,_...- ~-y 
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fact, a common relationship to the means of production 
created (if any at all) much less of a group consciousness 
than did common racial membership in societies where this 
latter status implied differential access to the available 
economic, prestige and power positions in the society. 
In addition, the Party which usually included many members of 
the dominant minority. racial group, seemed to lack dedication 
to the liberation of a nation oppressed by a colonial power. 
National movements, on the other hand, exclusivist in terms 
of the ethnicity and race of their members, diverged from and 
became suspicious of the internationalism and interracialism 
of the Communist ideology. Again, then, lines of cleavage 
formed by differential incorporation along race differences, 
(proved the deeper since national movements overshadowed 
class-based movements in all four countries discussed. 
In plural societies, then, with race and class lines 
blurring into one another, with conflict between racial 
groups promoting polarization, with the long-term direction 
of change indeterminate, it becomes important to inquire 
. . 
into the conceptions the members themselves hold of their 
societies - what are the ideologies commonly found in plural 
societies? 
These ideologies may be used as 'an index of the probability of 
24) violence', Kuper suggests. As before, the spectrum runs 
' 
from a belief in interracial co-operation, at the orie end, 
t·o racial confrontation and violence, at the other. What 
has been called the 'Jabavu School' in South Africa, which 
preached a 'colour-blind' policy of individual political 
participation, on the one hand, and Fanon with his call for 
curative racial violence, on the other, better represent this 
24) 'Conflict and the Plural Society: Ideologies of Violence 
among Subordinate Groups', L. Kuper, p. 161. 
_, 
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spectrum than either the Marxist or Durkheimian perspectives. 
In fact, the Marxist spectrum of false consciousness 
developing into class confrontation, and the Durkheimian 
consensus/anomie spectrum both assume interracial co-operation 
as a consequence of the increasing division of labour in society. 
The spectrum is not as simple as this, however. Kuper writes 
of unitary, two-category and multi-category conceptions where 
gradations in the envisaged racial structure take on any 
number of nuances. In addition, these gradations, such as 
African, Coloured, Asiatic and White in South Africa,. are 
then related to other hierarchical conceptions, producing 
a composite stratification system. 25 ) In concluding, 
Kuper differentiates between class-stratified and race-
stratified societies. He writes: 
Class societies ... may be viewed as arising directly 
out of the interaction of the members of the society .. . 
Race by contrast is ..• extrinsic to that interaction .. . 
This difference between race and class structure 
gives race a greater salience and persistence in the 
· conceptions of the social structure held ·by both 
·.dominant and subordinate racial groups and increase 
the likelihood of dichotomic and revolutionary 
perspectives in racially structured societies under 
conditions of social mobility and increasing social 
continuity.... 26) · 
Once again, racial rather than class conflict.is considered 
endemic in plural societies and ideologies present in the 
society ~an serve as a racial weather-vane. 
In order to evaluate the possibility of evolutionary change 
'from segmented to functionally differentiated societies, or 
from primordial attachments to civil politics' , 27 )Durkheim's 
theory will be discussed. This theory points to the 
increasing division of labour and concomitant functional 
25) 'Race Structure in the Social Consciousness', L. Kuper, 
passim. 
26) op. cit., p. 101.Emphasis in the original. 
27) 'Ethnic and Racial Pluralism', L. Kuper, p. 465. 
··-·.,,......·-··· 
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specia_liz_ation as the most important _impulses for progressive 
change. An.individual is loosened from his 'segmental' 
community and becomes involved in a common culture through his 
membership in institutions which cut across ethnic and 
other backgrounds. Achieved status now counts more than 
~scriped sta~us. Through structural differentiation and 
functional specialization, vertical segments blur and 
~nterdependent structures develop to create an institutionally 
integrated society . 
. When this approach is applied to plural societies, however, 
·immediate problems arise. First, ·nurkheim would argue that 
. interracial co-operation is a consequence of the progressive 
division of labour. In a plural society, by contrast, 
~oincident lines of cleavage and differential incorporation 
.militate against the development of such co-operation: 'the 
new relationships resulting from thei>rogressive division 
,of labour may be largely superimposed on the old divisions, 
'thereby elaborating, rather than changing, the plural structure 
' of the society'. 28 ) 
Second, then,-both cultural differences and cultural assimilation 
becom~ political issues and, as such, potential nuclei of 
conflict. In fact, the culture of the dominant minority 
group is usually carefully guarded. Access to it is limited. 
--The right to, and type of, education, consequently, becomes 
a contentious political issue. 
Third, if an elite member or group of a subordinate grouping 
does succeed in becoming upwardly mobile in the society, one 
of· two things happens. Either they will be lost to their 
racially or ethnically defined grouping and assimilated into 
the dominant minority culture, in which case cleavage lines 
and social distance between sections are maintained, if not 
28) 'Political Change in Plural Societies', L. Kuper, p. 602. 
- -... · ~-----
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reinforced. 'Trying for White', in South Africa, is a case 
in point. Or, as is more probable in cases of racial diffe-
rence, -status incongruity and upward partial mobility result. 
In. other words, expectations based on mobility in one sphere 
. 29) 
are frustrated in o~her spheres. This is so, Kuper argues, 
since race includes an important extrinsic referent which 
remains visible even when the type of interaction changes. 
The positions of African professionals and doctors in South 
30) Africa, are examples. This may bring about an increased 
emphasis on the part of the elite on racial exclusiveness 
with polarization along racial lines as a consequence. 
This, of course, is the very opposite of the expected result 
in terms of Durkheim's evolutionary theory. 
At the ideological level, Durkheim's approach promotes 
interracialism, as was seen above; underwrites a conception 
of peaceful progress; and corresponds to (American) liberalism. 
This ideology has obviou~ly much in common with the normative 
theory of political pluralism, as proposed by de Tocqueville, 
Laski and Shils. 31 ) The fact that many black political leaders 
in South Africa used to adhere to this philosophy, but have 
subsequently deviated from its tenets, is repeatedly documented 
by Kuper 32 )and serves to emphasize the lack of fit between 
theories based on Durkheim's perspectives and actual plural 
societies. 
29) For a discussion.of these ideas, see op.cit., passim & 
'Continuities and Discontinuities in Race Relations', L. 
Kuper, pp. 378, 379. 
30) See An African Bourgeoisie, L. Kuper, pp. 398ff. 
31) See 'Plural Societies: Perspectives and Problems', L. Kuper, 
passim. 
32) See, inter alia, An African Bourgeoisie, 'Nonviolence 
Revisited', and 'The Political Situation of Non-Whites in 
·South Africa'. In this last article, Kuper writes: 
'There is one important conception in African political 
thought which is held by leaders of very different political 
schools. This is the conception that the structure of 
white domination in South African society cannot be 
changed by nonviolent evolutionary means'. pp. 96, 97. 
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In a relatively early article, 33 >Kuper differentiates between 
two broad approaches to societal change: the conflict and the 
consensus, and places the plural society perspective.within 
the former. Later, however, he places this perspective outside 
the two classical approaches
34
)and argues that directions of 
change, at th~ present level of theoretical development, 
must remain more indeterminate in plural societies than 
in those to which the .classical theories usually apply. 
Explicitly, in viewing plural societies as a separate type of 
society· which is not amenable to classical analysis, Kuper 
states: 
In theories of the racially plural society •.. , there 
is no promise of progress to interracial solidarity 
or to racial equality. The perspectives are somewhat 
sombre and the theories lend themselves readily to 
ideological distortion .•.. 35) 
...• the processes of political change in plural 
societies should be seen as indeterminate .•.. 36) 
Since racial subordination constitutes a diffuse multi-
faceted status, almost any element may act as a catalyst 
of racial conflict and revolution ... There is no 
inexorable predetermination, by the initial differential 
incorporation, of the course of race relations ... 37) 
The critical difference between theories of classical Marxist and 
Durkheimian type and that of the plural society, is the existence 
33) 'Plural Societies: Perspectives and Problems', L. Kuper, passim. 
This paper, though included with others in Pluralism in Africa, 
was circulated beforehand to members participating in the 
colloquium. It should, therefore, be treated as of earlier 
origin than Kuper's other papers in the same volume. See 
'Introduction to Part I', p. 5, Pluralism in Africa. 
34) Kuper, in fact, pays more attention to, ·and becomes more critical 
of, Marxist theory in his later works. For example, he 
writes: 'Such is the power of early conditioning, that it 
is only after many years of reflection that I have come to 
question tl1e university of the class struggle (i.e. economic 
exploitation)'. In addition, after an extended analysis, he 
writes: 'the basic (Marxist) theory may be somewhat tau-
tologous'. 'Race, Class, and ·Power:· Some Comments on 
Revolutionary Change', L. Kuper, p. 400 & 'Theories of Revo-
lution and Race Relations', L. Kuper, p. · 88. 
35) 'Political Change in Plural Societies', L. Kuper, p. 596. 
36) op. cit., p. 604. 
37) 'Race, Class and Power: Some Comments on Revolutionary Change', 
L. Kuper, pp. 418, 420. 
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of relevant socially defined racial or ethnic lines of cleavage 
.in the structure of the plural society. Further, though this 
latter theory is considered 'loose' and does not specify any 
direction of societal development or change, it does specify 
factors allied to these cleavage-lines which promote either 
revolutionary or evolutionary change. .In the final section, 
here, then, factors favouring each type of change will 
be discussed. 
There a:r;e, to begin with, some theoretically obvious factors: 
a widespread ideology supporting interracialism promotes evo-
lutionary change. A racist ideology promotes the opposite. 
Moreover, these types of ideologies may reflect (rather than 
promote) such changes. A particular ideology can bring about, 
or be the result of a particular structure. Second, complete 
coincidence between structural and cultural divisions -
where, for example, class and ethnicity are perfectly super-
imposed, one upon the other - furthers both intense, violent 
group-conflict and coercive ~egulation of group-activities. 
On.the other hand, multiple affiliations producing cross-
cutting solidarities in institutions, promotes evoluti_on-
ary change in· the direction of a democratic pluralistic 
·structure. 
As has been shown, however, in a racially plural society, there 
exists a tendency for ideologies to shed their interracial 
components, and for individuals O!' groups in cross-·cutting 
institutional membership positions either to leave their ethnic 
or racial groups altogether or to stress their racial identity 
in these positions. In general, then1 in a situation 
characterized by such racial pluralism, the potential for 
inten.se violent racial conflict remains high. An ideology which 
seeks to create confrontation and violence succeeds with ease. 
Whether the group professing such an ideology_obtains· political 
power or not, becomes a purely technical.question concerning 
how effectively coercion can be used by opposing sides. 
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It is difficult to incorporate these two sets of opposing factors 
For this reason, adequately into a theory of racial pluralism. 
Kuper ~as called this theory dualistic. 38 ) By this, he means 
that, first, on a general conceptual level, plural analysis 
itself is dichotomous: thus, either all societies are classi-
fied as plural or non-plural; or pluralism can be viewed 
as a continuum so that societies can be more or less plural 
according to a number of specified dimensions. These two 
approaches have different theoretical consequences. Further, 
both an individual's status and his personality, in a plural 
society, can be viewed dualistically: the very concepts, 
status incongruity and upward partial mobility, are based 
on this view. In fact, a new position brings with it new 
expectations for the individual. These expectations are 
partially frustrated by th~ fixed racial or ethnic status the 
individual has in the plural society. This dual character 
of his status is reproduced, presumably by way of internalization, 
in his personality. 
, 
This dualism introduces a factor of indeterminacy into Kuper's 
theory. As a result, certain very important processes in 
plural societies can be regarded as reversible. An important 
example of this is the process of depluralization. 
In seeking for factors favouring evolutionary change, it is 
necessary to inquire into these processes of depluralization, 
that is, processes producing 'a diminishing salience of ethnic 
/and racial pluralism'. 39 > One such process, that of individuation, 
.. takes place, through interaction, by involving member!? from 
different ethnic and racial groupings in common institutional 
activities. Hereby, in the common public domain at least, 
·common goals or even a common culture are created. Thus, 
though cultural pluralism in the private domain may persist, 
38) 'Ethnic and Racial Pluralism', L. Kuper, p. 481. One reason for 
this dualism is to be found in the term, 'plural society' 
itself. 'Plural' refers to a number of ·distinct sections whilst 
'society' refers to an entity. 
39) L. Kuper, op. cit., p. 459. 
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differential incorporation in the public domain may lose its 
importance and the omnipresent political dimension in all 
societal and group affairs may lessen. 
On the other hand, dualistically, depluralization may take 
place 'through an intermediate phase of sectional aggression'.40) 
Here, the argument goes, ethnic and racial identity need to be 
asserted and be seen as equal to the dominant cultural identity 
before individuation and transcendance of sectional loyalties 
can take place. The theoretical usefulness of this argument to 
Kuper's plural approach is not important except insofar as it 
furnishes a clear example of what dualism produces in the 
theory. Sectional aggression, under certain circumstances, 
promotes the process of depluralization; under others, 
the process of polarization. Processes are 'reversible'. 
If change is indeterminate, processes reversible, and the very 
conceptual approach dualistic, one may well ask whether Kuper 
finishes with any theory at all. To conclude this section, 
then, a brief review will be given. 
Though not doing so consistently, Kuper does classify societies 
dichotomously into those that are 'racially plura1• 41 )and those 
that are not. The former he characterizes by their racial 
structure and the corresponding mode of differential incorpo-
ration into the polity. This class of plural societies 
manifests certain characteristic properties: social relations 
4 Q ) Op • Cit • I P • 4 8 5 • 
41) 'Race, Class and Power: Some Comments on Revolutionary 
Change', L. Kuper, p. 415. Earlier, however, Kuper writes 
of four dimensions of pluralism: particularism/universalism; 
segregation/assimilation; cultural diversity/homogeneity; 
and inequality/equality. Then, he writes: 'Plural 
societies may be viewed as sui generis, or as characterized 
in more extreme form, by phenomena of cleavage and dis-
continuity present in all societies~ From either per-
spective, the analysis of plural societies raises questions 
for the more generally accepted theories of political 
change'. Since these societies are not amenable to analysis 
by classical theories, however, they form a clear class of 
their own, 'plural societies'. In effect,· then, Kuper has 
opted for the dichotomous rather than the continuum approach. 
See 'Political Change in Plural Societies: Problems in 
Racial Pluralism', L. Kuper, pp. 598, 599. 
-107-
are elaborated along the lines of this structure; violent 
racial conflict is endemic; struggles between racial groupings 
are always political and related to the initial mode of 
differential incorpo~ation~ and class and status <livisions 
tend to coincide with racial cleavage-lines. 
The Plural Society and the Problem of Order 
The Marxist and Purkheimian theories of development and change 
derive from the development of capitalism in Western Europe 
during the nineteenth century. Both purport to offer 
explanations for why and in what direction societies 
characterized by an increasing division 6f labour, change. 
The allied explanations for why and how order is maintained 
in these societies1 have been discussed in chapter One. Kuper, 
however, finds both classical theories problematic when he 
applies them to plural societ1es. . . 
The main difficulty with the Marxist approach lies in the fact . 
that class and race boundaries do not coincide exactly in 
plural societies. Since race boundaries, defined by the 
initial differential incorporation of such sectors into the . 
society, indicate differences in access to political power, 
a lack of fit between class and race boundaries implies a 
lack of fit between class and power-political lines of cleavage. 
In other words, in a plural society, since political power is 
distributed differentially on the basis of racial criteria, 
and since these racial sectors do not cGinaide exactly but 
only partially with classes in the society, it follows that . 
• the Marxist theory of change is distorted by the primacy that 
~must be given, in the stratification system, to race (and, 
'thus, political power) over class. 
The main difficulty with the Durkheimian approach lies in the 
fact that increasing division of labour and specialization of 
function do not decrease the social relevance attached to racial 
differences in a plural society. In fact, due again to the 
...... :-
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initial differential incorporation of racial sectors into the 
society, functional specialization and institutional 
integration can maintain or even strengthen racial cleavages 
in the societal structure. For this reason, the Durkheimian 
theory of political pluralism is distorted by the persistence 
of socially relevant racial divisions which counteract 
processes of 'individuation' across the boundaries of racial 
sectors. 
Quite clearly, then, the plural society is, in the first place, 
a political entity: through differential incorporation, one 
racial sector succeeds in monopolizing positions in the 
centre of the society and maintains this monopoly primarily 
through wielding political power. Following from this 
fact, the dominant racial group tends to monopolize the bases 
of economic power and tends to manifest a strong internal 
consensus. Thus, in a plural society, a person's status 
and class.position tend to coincide with his racial classifi-
cation~ 
In attempting to construct a theory of change applicable to 
racially plural societies~ Kuper focuses on deviations from 
this ideal-type construct. Positions in the centre of a plural 
society are controlled by members of the dominant racial group, 
whites in white settler societies, for instance. The periphery 
. consis_ts, by ·and large, of members of the other racial groups, 
black unskilled labourers, for instance. It may well be, 
however, that there are members of the dominant racial g~oup 
who do not share the full privileges of those in the centre, 
the white working class, for instance. Furthermore, there 
may be members of the other racial categories who are economically 
privi~eged, the black bourgeoisie, for instance. By focusing 
on the interests, actions and ideologies of such ·atypical 
groups in a plural society, ~uper tries to find a general 
direction of change in.such societies. 
Kuper's main focus, with reference to South Af~ica at least~ 
on blacl.< groups, whether they are underprivileged and fully 
in the periphery or not. 42 ) In white settler societies, 
is 
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the white working class and other white groups not fully 
positioned in the centre are more or less fully co-opted 
by the ruling group. Those in the centre, then, wield very 
effective cultural power over the dominant group. The 
ideologies of these atypical groups within the dominant sector, 
on the other hand, are important in~ices _of the direction 
of change. ~uper considers racist ideologies indicators 
of potential racial violence. Hence the freedom allowed 
these groups to propagate racist beliefs to secure their 
positions, as well as the official ideQlogy of the centre, 
both point to the possibility of racial conflict in the society. 
The. more these white.groups articulate a racist ideology 
or the'more the official line is overtly racist, the more the 
centre will have to rely on unadulterated coercive sanctions 
and political power. 
Kuper, however, pays much more attention to groups in the 
other racial sectors of a plural society. He focuses 
especially on elite groups in these sectors. These elites, 
though not filling positions in the centre of the society, 
do nonetheless wield some cultural power over members in the 
periphery and represent, therefore, the nuclei of possible new 
centres. A measure of racial aggression and antagonism 
between these groups and the dominant sector's elite group 
is inevitable. As the society develops, moreover, this 
antagonism can spill over into racial violence which, in turn, 
may lead to a national revolution or to a more open coercive 
situation being forced upon the subordinate elites. On the 
other hand, this antagonism may herald the beginning of a period 
of individuation leading to a blurring of racial boundaries. 
Which of these three outcomes is to be expected depends on a number 
of factors: the ideologies of both the elites in the periphery 
as well as the ruling group; the extent to which these elites 
42) In one article at least, Kuper does focus on the dominant 
group in a plural society: 'Political Changes in White 
Settler Societies'. 
. _,. - -~~ ~··- .... ,.,. 
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control some economic or political power bases; the extent 
to which members of the dominant sector are prepared to admit 
members ·of the other sectors into the centre of the society; 
and, lastly, the level of economic development of the society 
itself. 
Conclusion 
Social order obviously varies from society to society within the 
plural society class. In this class, the mode of differential 
incorporation and subsequent political power monopoly is the 
primary factor. The ideologies in different sectors and areas 
of the society are measures of the amount of consensus which 
exists in the society as a whole. The processes of 
individuation which have been discussed represent the breadth 
and depth of this societal consensus. Social integration 
exists insofar as these processes continue. 
System integration - the goodness of fit between institutions 
in the society - is lacking at certain critical points: demands 
for skills in the economy are countered by ascriptive racial 
classifications; the resultant heightening of racial aggression 
is not defused by way of grants of _political power and authority 
to elites in the periphery; and the stratification system, 
based ultimately on race, meshes with difficulty into the 
demand structure of a modern develop~ng society. 
Of the three possible directions of change, individuation and 
depluralization leading to an open plural society43 ) ; increasing 
racial violence leading to a more coercive system; and in-
creasing racial violence leading to a 'national' revolution 
of the periphery against the dominant racial group, the last 
represent. a complete break.-down of social order for a time. 
This takes place when the coercive sanctions of the state and 
43) The term is used by A. du Toit: South Africa's Political Alter-
natives, P. Randall (ed.), Part Three. 
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ruling.group fail. In other words, this takes place when 
all effective intentional sanctions and inducements have 
failed. In fact, if ideologies take on a strident racist 
tone, if the economy no longer offers members of the 
periphery sufficient rewards, the centre is obliged to 
repeatedly use its coercive sanctions. 
On the other hand, if individuation takes place, increasing, 
then,the scope of effective intentional sanctions~ multiplying 
the cultural power bases, the gradual emergence of an open 
plural society is possible. 
Since racial aggression is inevitable to some extent during 
changes of any type, it follows that even for ,this third 
alternative, social control and thus political power must be 
maintained by those in the centre. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
DEMOCRATIC AND INVIDIOUS PLURALISM: PIERRE VAN DEN BERGHE'S 
APPROACH 
P. van den Berghe is a sociologist who lived and conducted 
research in a number of culturally.heterogeneous societies: 
' 
Zaire, Kenya, Nigeria, 
Africa amongst others. 
Guatamala, the United States and South 
He is an American citizen. 1 ) His 
works, throughout his career, reveal a strong commitment 
.to studying race relations and pluralism in c;omparative 
perspective. In addition, they reveal a strong commitment 
to what he has called 'anti-racism•~ 2 ) He writes: 
•• it seems to me that the only honest thing to do is 
to drop the positivist credo of'objectivity', to make 
our ideological position and our .value premises 
explicit, and, indeed, to subject ourselves to a kind 
of 'socioanalysis' ..• Is it not preferable to reach 
a state of conscious, disciplined, explicit subjec-
tivity than one of naive pseudo objectivity? 3) 
This explicit subjectivity is revealed in van den Berghe's 
'distress that Southern Africa seems no closer to liberation 
.than it was ten years ago; ••. anger that, in much of Africa, 
cultural and economic. nee-colonialism have made a farce of 
'independence'; .• and (distaste in) the parasitic and Euro-
centric behaviour of the new African ruling classes'. In 
fact, 1 (i)t was in constious reacti~n against the racist 
and ethnocentric approach to Africa that the pluralist 
. 4) 
approach was developed.' 
In this chapter, van den Berghe'• s pluralist approach will be 
discussed. Special attention will be given, first, to his 
conceptions of race, caste and ethnicity and how they fit into 
his approach. Second, the focus will be upon the distinction 
between cultural and social pluralism. Third, his distinction 
between paternalistic and competitive race relations will be . . 
1) Other biographical information can be found in his'Introduction', 
Race and Ethnicity and in 'Research in South Africa: The Story of 
My Experiences with Tyranny'. 
2) Race and Racism, p. 2. 
3) 'Introduction', Race and Ethnicity, p. 13. 
4) 'Pluralism and Conflict Situations in Africa: A Reply to B. 
Magubane'. pp. 688, 689. This article was published in June 1970. 
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analyzed. Finally, the problem of order will be analyzed by 
applying the model developed in chapter Two to van den Berghe's 
approach. 
Though van den Berghe. is a prolific writer and has published a 
large number o.f books and articles~) his major works on 
pluralism are Race and Racism (1967), a comparative study of 
race relations in four.countries, and Race and Ethnicity 
(1970), a collection of a number.of articles written in 
the fifties and early sixties. 
PLURALISM 
By a ~, is to be understood a group which is socially defined 
on the basis of (putative) physical criteria. An ethnic group, 
too, is a group socially defined but on the basis of cultural 
~riteria. 6 ) A caste, thirdly, is 'an endogamous group, 
hierarchically ranked in relation to other groups, and 
wherein me~ership is determined by birth and for life. 7 ) 
The three phenomena are clearly linked and overlap in many 
societies. Van den Berghe insis'ts, however, that the 
three concepts.be clearly separated, the one from the other, 
and that they should be kept separate in all analyses. In 
fact, he considers the existence of races and castes in any 
society, in~idious; whilst ethnicity 'is an absolutely 
fundamental and ineluctable aspect of social reality' .. s> The 
reason for this difference is succinctly stated in the 
following passage: 
Discrimination may be concomitant with ethnicity, 
but it is not its essence: the essence of ethnicity 
is a combination of a distinct way of life, set of values, 
language, religious beliefs, and so on. Conversely, 
cultural differences may be concomitants of race or 
caste, but the essence of these phenomena is a set of 
attitudes making for differential status, rights, access 
5) See bibliography for a partial list. 
6) See, for example, Race and Racism, p. 9 •. 
7) 'Race, Class and Ethnicity in South Africa', van den Berghe, 
p. 351. 
8). 'The Benign Quota: Panacea or Pandora's Box', van den Berghe, 
p. 41. 
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to power, and so on .•• 9 > 
It is now clear what is meant by a racist society: If, in a 
society which may contain a number of ethnic groups, socially 
significant characteristics are ascribed to a group on the 
basis of putative or real physical criteria, then the society 
is racist. In such cases, it is likely that this racism 
is perpetuated by a caste structure since first, by way of 
endogamy r castes will. tend to maintain the physical characte-
ristic within the 'race' and the group stratification system 
within the racist society;. and, second, through the principle 
of closed life-long membership, castes will confine individuals 
within themselves by disallowing mobility (upward or downward) 
outside of their boundaries. 
To interpret the phenomena of race and caste sociologically, 
to relate these phenomena to the functioning of entire 
societies, the concept of pluralism is introduced. "Societies 
are pluralistic insofar as they exhibit, to a greater or lesser 
degree; two basic features:· ( 1) segmentation .into corporate 
groups that frequently, though not necessarily, have different 
cultures or subcultures; and (2) a social structure comparte-
mentalized into analogous, parallel, noncomplementary but 
distinguishable sets of institutions". lO) 
A society manifesting a high degree of pluralism would be one, 
first, that contains two or more corporate groups. These could 
be ethnic groups, for instance. On the other hand, there need 
not be a significant cultural difference between these groups: 
they could be different races sharing the same culture. 
Coloureds in South Africa may serve as an example of a corporate 
group which is distinguished from the white (corporate} group, 
though both share the same general culture. 
9) op. cit., pp. 41, 42. 
10) 'Pluralism and the Polity', p. 67. 
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The second condition necessary for a high degree of pluralism 
is the duplication, in these separate groups, ethnic or racial 
or other, of sets of institutions: separate educational 
institutions even including, possibly, separate universities; 
separate religious institutions, and so on. It is important, 
here, that neither the polity nor the economy, in this plural 
society, are compartementalized or duplicated. In fact, 
the common polity is the necessary condition for the existence 
of a society as such; and van den Berghe claims that a common 
economy is another necessary condition for the ordered mainte-
nance of such a plural society {since coercion alone is, in 
the long run, ineffective) • 11 ) 
Plural societies, by this definition, must be differentiated 
both from societies manifesting continuing functional diffe-
rentiation, on the one hand, and societies with segmentary 
kinship.units, on the other. 
Functional differentiation, as was seen in chapter Two, develops 
out of the increasing division of labour and creates problems 
between the newly emerging institutions. Lockwood called 
this the problem of system integration. Such societies, 
clearly, need not contain a number of corporate groups. 
Institutional duplication, on the other hand, points to the 
existence within one society, of parallel sets of institutions 
fulfilling the same functions in semi-autonomous corporate 
groups. The two processes, functional differentiation and 
institutional duplication, are quite independent of each other. 
A segrnentary undifferentiated society, such as the post-Mfecane 
northern Nguni, contains a whole series of corporate groups 
' 
.11)· See South Africa: A Study in Conflict, p. 270. This problem 
~f-6rder will be returned to later in this chapter. 
--.. ·- ~-~-....... 
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(kinship units, clans and so on) but contains a homogeneous 
institutional structure. The institutional structure of a 
plural society is, clearly, quite different. 
Within plural societies, a number of characteristics related 
to this pluralism may be expected. First, as has been seen, 
cultural differences will contribute toward the emergence 
of separate corporate groups each containing different sets 
of institutions. This separation usually confines inter-
ac~ion between corporate groups to 'segmental, utilitarian, 
nonaffective, and functionally specific relationships' 12 ) 
whilst within the group, relationships will tend to be much 
broader (or, more specifically, the opposites of the above-
mentioned pattern-variables). As a result, there will 
probably be little consensus about values in the society 
as a whole and a high degree of group autonomy in certain 
areas. Finally, as was shown in the case of a racist society, 
the chances are that a caste system will develop, with one 
corporate group monopolizing the political system. Such a 
·situation, clearly, is one in which intergroup conflict 
is usually endemic. 
It is now quite clear that van den Berghe treats pluralism 
as a variable, 'a set of properties characterizing heterogeneous 
societies', 13 )rather than differentiating between plural and 
non-plural societies. In fact, in disagreeing with M.G. 
Smith and the latter .approach, 14 ) van den Berghe claims th~t 
his approach is more inclusive than that of Smith. Without 
a doubt, by viewing pluralism as a variable, van den Berghe 
_ can analyze a much larger set of societies than those which 
Smith would call 'plural'. The danger is the possible loss 
of analytic power. 
12Y 'Pluralism and the Polity', p. 68. 
13) Race and Ethnicity, p. 16. 
14) See 'Pluralism and the Polity', p. 68; South Africa, A 
Study in Conflict, p. 270. 
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Two arguments in support of the analytical utility of pluralism 
are presented. First, as was shown above, societies characte-
rized as pluralistic are differentiated from those t~at are 
functionally differentiated and from those with segmentary 
kinship units. 
Second, a distinction is made between social and cultural 
pluralism. Cultural pluralism refers to the existence, in 
one society, of two or more ethnic groups. Thus, there exist 
important cultural differences and lines of cleavage in such 
a society. Social pluralism, on the other hand, refers 
to the duplication, in different corporate groups within the 
society, of culturally alike lS}sets of institutions. Cultural 
pluralism, then, since it implies a number of ethnic groups 
defined on the basis of ethnicity, cannot exist without a 
duplication of institutions in these corporate groups. The 
converse, van den Berghe claims, however, does not follow: 
Cultural pluralism between ethnic groups c·annot exist 
without institutional duplication and hence without 
social pluralism; that is, any form of cultural plura-
lism has a structural facet which can be treated as 
.social pluralism. But when, in addition to ethnicity, 
race is introduced as a criterion of group membership, 
a new dimension is added to social pluralism. Race is 
not the structural counterpart of ethnic heterogeneity, 
but is an independent criterion according to which a 
society is segmented. Since race is a more rigid basis 
of cleavage than ethnicity, social pluralism can 
subsist longer and, indeed, even in the nearly total 
15) See Race and Racism, p. 35, where van den Berghe continues 
by stating that corporate groups, under conditions of social 
pluralism, 'are differentiated on a basis other than culture'. 
Here, then, social pluralism refers to institutional 
duplication in the absence of cultural diversity. Elsewhere, 
as will be shown, the term is used ambiguous-ly. 
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absence of cultural pluralism whereas the converse 
is not true ..••• · 16) 
It is clear, then, that most often, as in the cases of Switzerland, 
Canada; Nigeria and South Africa, social pluralism is accompanied 
by cultural pluralism. In South Africa, for instance, the social 
pluralism is reflected in separate formal educational institu-
tions for different corporate groups; the cultural pluralism in 
different value systems and ethnic groups. When corporate 
groups are defined racially (i.e. in terms of putative physical 
differences), however, social pluralism can be present with 
minimal corresponding cultural pluralism: Though Coloureds and 
Whites share the same culture in South Africa, 'racial' 
classification creates separate corporate groups. 
This approach differs from M.G. Smith's on two counts: First, 
Smith argues that cultural pluralism can exist without con-
comitant social pluralism. Second, Smith's distinction 
between social and structural pluralism is collapsed by van 
den Berghe into one category: social pluralism. A dis-
cussion of these differences will further clarify van den Berghe's 
distinction and his overall conception of pluralism. 
For M.G. Smith, cultural pluralism points to institutional 
differences in different categories of people living in one 
society; social pluralism points to coincidence of these 
institutional differences with corporate units in the society; 
and structural pluralism points to the differential incorporation 
of these units into the polity of the society. Further, 
16) Race and Racism, p. 135. In this passage, social pluralism 
is viewed as the structural counterpart of cultural plura-
. ,lism, an interpretation different from that given above. 
Van den Berghe is aware of this ambiguity: 'At one level, 
structural or social pluralism can be regarded simply as 
the other side of cultural pluralism ... But on another 
level, social and cultural pluralism are partially inde-
pendent variables. Thus, while the two forms of pluralism 
tend to go together, groups may remain structurally plu-
ralistic even though contact has greatly reduced cultural 
pluralism'. 'Pluralism and the Polity', p. 69. To avoid 
confusion, social pluralism will here be understood to refer 
to the duplication, in different corporate groups, of sets 
of institutions irrespective of the degree of ethnic 
diversity in the society. 
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he feels that cultural pluralism is a necessary condition for 
the emergence of social and structural pluralism whilst the 
converse is not necessarily true. 17 > 
The best way to disentangle the rather annoying contradictions 
entwined in these differences of approach is to seek the 
priorities each theorist gives to his conception of pluralism. 
M.G. Smith, as has previously been shown, begins with insti-
tutional diversity or, even, institutional incompatibility. 
In a society, different groups exist which have sets of 
different institutions, such as monogamy in one and poligamy 
in the other. Corporate group boundaries and a mode of 
differential incorporation arise out of this basic difference 
in sets of institutions in different cultures in the society. 
For van den Berghe, the emphasis is upon a number of corporate 
.groups in the society.(which may or may not be culturally similar) 
·and upon the duplication of sets of institutions in these groups. 
These _sets of institutions may, clearly, be quite compatible 
with one another. 
To van den Berghe, then, ethnicity and hence cultural pluralism 
are not necessary for the existence of pluralism in a society. 
The institutionalized racial definition may suffice even in the 
absence of cultural differences between 'races'. On the other 
hand, a society manifesting a high degree of pluralism need 
not necessarily contain one corporate group monopolizing 
effective political power. In other words, differential 
incorporation is not a necessary condition for a high degree 
of pluralism (as it is necessary to Smith for the emergence 
of a plural society). Thus, van den Berghe writes of societies 
with 'democratic pluralism' lS)such as Switzerland where the 
two basic conditions of pluralism are met and where the usual 
invidious concomitants of this pluralism, race and caste, are 
17) See chapter Four. 
18) 'The Benign Quota: Panacea or Pandora's Box', p. 40. 
' ·~· .... _ ...,. -~_,.-----
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not present. 
In such cases of democratic pluralism, cultural pluralism or 
different subcultures, at least, seem necessary for the 
maintenance of a degree of pluralism for the institutional 
duplication would otherwise not serve any purpose and, presumably, 
disappear. In cases of social pluralism without any accompany-
ing cultural pluralism, that is, where institutional duplica-
tion is maintained in different culturally alike corporate 
units in order to y;>reserve invidious group inequalities, 
there appears what van den Berghe calls 'a complicating 
factor of secondary.cultural pluralism'. 19 ) In fact, the 
inequality, social distance and separation of institutions 
between groups must lead, to some extent, to subcultural 
and possibly ethnic differences growing between these groups. 
Thus, the appearance of 'Black Power' in the U.S.A. and, of 
late, in South Africa can be interpreted, partially at least, 
in. this light~ 2 0) 
In sum·, then, though treated as a variable, pluralism as 
conceived of by van den Berghe is analytically useful insofar 
as it differentiates plural societies from two other types 
of society; insofar as it relates the concepts ethnicity, 
race and caste to one another holistically, within the context 
of a society; and insofar as it typifies -certain democratic 
countries as 'plural'. Finally it should be clear that 
the concept has been deve_loped for comparative macro-analysis. 
One other aspect of van den Berghe's approach needs discussion: 
his insistence that plural societies and race relations must be 
studied historically21 )and his suggested scheme to .do this, the 
development from paternalistic to competitive systems of race 
relations. Before this discussion, two points need to be made. 
19) Race and Racism, p. 135. This phen'omenon is called cultural 
I drift 1 • 
20) In South Africa, this interpretation would apply to Coloureds 
especially. Its explanatory power decreases to the extent 
that ethnic differences exist prior to the emergence of such 
a consciousness. 
21) See Race and Racism, p. 149; Race and Ethnicity, p.llff. 
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First, van den Berghe insists that the mentioned development 
is by no means a necessary evolution though '(h)istorically, 
at least in Western countries since the first period of 
overseas expansion in the fifteenth century, the general 
tendency has been away from the paternalistic type and toward 
t 't' • d' I 
22 > S d h' h h b d compe i ive preJU ice • econ , is sc eme as een criticize 
because it 'looks very like the Old Deep South at one end of the 
scale and the modern North of the United States at the other•. 23 ) 
This, in itself, is not valid negative criticism for the onus 
still lies with the critic to show why a scheme based on America 
is not applicable elsewhere. As Mason shows, however, the 
scheme seems to be restricted to societies that were once agri-
cultural slave societies (as were all four countries in van 
den Berghe's comparative study, Race and Racism). With these 
two points in mind, the proposed scheme will be discussed. 24 ) 
The differentiation between paternalistic and competitive types 
of race relations must be seen as a dichotomy in ideal typical 
terms. This dichotomy coincides in important ways with 
Toennies' Gemeinschaft/Gesellschaft dichotomy and with Weber's 
traditional and rational-legal types of authority. 
Thus the paternalistic type is characterized, structurally, by 
a rigid caste (or estate) system supported by a common 
value system; minimal mobility between castes-and a developing 
but small-scale agricultural economy. Agricultural slave 
societies.in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries may 
serve as examples. 
The competitive type, on the other hand, is characterized, 
structurally, by large scale industrial economy; a break-down 
in the rigidity of the caste system due to the use of universa-
listic values in this economy; and a stratification system 
22) 'Paternalistic versus Competitive Race Relations', p. 36. 
~23) Patterns of Dominance, P. Mason, p. 61. 
24) Other criticisms of the scheme have been made, inter alia, 
by J. Rex: See Race Relations in Sociological Theory and 
Race; Colonialism and the City. 
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ambiguously based upon both race and class criteria. Con-
flict based on differing values arise_s from this ambiguity. 
As shown, modern urban North America may serve as an example. 
The two types of race relations are accompanied by corres-
ponding ideologies and other attitudinal aspects of the racial 
situation. The paternalistic type, for example, condones 
miscegenation; maintains elaborate forms of etiquette 
between castes and, generally, is based upon a common value-
system which legitimizes the hierarchized positions of the 
different castes in the society. The competitive type, 
however, condemns miscegenation, does away with elaborate 
forms of etiquette and reflects a spectrum of ideologies 
in which coercion and compliance rather than value consensus 
contribute toward the orderly functioning of the society. 25 ) 
Societies falling within either of these race relations 
types will manifest a high degree of pluralism. 26 ) There is 
not, however, an attempt to incorporate a historical dimension 
into the conception of piuralism itself. The degree of plu-
ralism and the type o.f race relations vary independently. 
To show this, a review of four 'levels 127 )or dimensions of 
·pluralism will be made. 
At group level, a number of factors in a situation of high 
pluralism may vary: the number of corporate groups; the 
racial or ethnic defining characteristic of these groups, 
whether these groups are castes or not; and the relative 
size of these groups. 
25) For a further discussion of this ideal type, see 'Paternalis-
_ tic versus Competitive Race Relations', passim and Race and 
Racism, pp. 25ff. 
26) Both types contain castes, in fact, and castes imply 
pluralism. 
27) Race- and Racism, pp. 140ff and 'Pluralism and the Polity', 
pp. 70ff. Though van den Berghe does claim that the 
paternalitic type, more than its polar opposite, manifests 
cultural pluralism, an argument will now be presented which, 
hopefully, will show that the two conceptual schemes are 
quite independent of each other. Race and Racism, p. 144. 
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At institutional level, a high degree of pluralism can obtain 
if institutional duplication is present. The number and type 
of institutions as well as their cultural compatibility in 
different groups can vary independently of one another. 
At value level, pluralism is characterized by a narrow range 
of societal consensus.· The compatibility of different value 
systems which may exist in the plural society can vary. 
At individual level, pluralism implies rigid corporate group 
membership. However, 'passing', mobility out of these 
groups and shuttling from one to the other are possible 
variables within the context of pluralism. 
It should. now be quite clear, in both the above four-level 
model_ of pluralism, and in the ideal-typical dichotomy of 
race relations, that the sets of variables which define 
pluralism, competitive race relations and paternalistic 
race relations, can vary independently. In other words, 
pluralism can be present to a high degree on some levels 
and to a low degree on others; and societies can be found 
which manifest a 'mixed' type of race relations. 28 ) 
It follows, then, that by merely noting that th~ variables in 
the race relations models are not conceptually interdependent 
with those in the pluralism model, that the models are indepen-
de~t of .each other. In conclusion, here, then, it would 
seem that though van den Berghe pleads for a historical 
dimension in his studies of pluralism, all that his model 
offers is advice to present ad hoc historical overviews before 
turning to an analysis of pluralism in a particular society.· 
28) For the former observation, see Race and Racism, p. 140; 
for the latter, see P. Mason, op. cit. p. 61. 
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PLURALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF ORDER 
Unlike the other pluralists who have been discussed this far, 
van den Berghe does not emphasize the fact that a plural 
society is, in the first place, a political entity. Rather, 
by approaching pluralism as a variable, he emphasizes the 
corporate groups which a society contains, the scope and degree 
of institutional duplication present in these groups, and a 
series.of charact~ristics allied to these variables. Thus, 
plural societies are classified into those that are democratic 
and acceptable - where corporate differences are ethnic in 
origin - and those that are structured by the presence of races 
and/or castes and are considered invidious. Even though these 
two classes of societies are subsumed under the pluralism 
label,_ societal order in them is explained by way of quite 
different arguments. 
As has been shown, societies manifesting democratic pluralism 
contain neither castes or races; do not manifest a mode of 
differential incorporation of groups into the polity; and 
are pluralistic insofar as they contain ethnic groups within 
their borders. Switzerland, characterized by 'coexistence 
of distinct but historically related ethnic groups', 29 >may 
serve as an example. 
When the question as to why order is maintained is posed, however, 
Switzerland's pluralism is not prominent in the answer: 
Order in a democratic plural society is, in van den Berghe's 
words, directly proportional to (a) 'the degree of consensus 
. about basic values'; (b) 'the degree of consensus about the 
procedural norms of government'; (c) 'the degree to which 
the main lines of cleayage in the society are orthogonal to one 
29) Race and Racism, p. 150. Emphasis in the original. 
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another'. In addition, this order is inversely proportional 
to (a) 'the degree of cultural pluralism'.; and (b) 'the 
discrepancy in the levels of technological and scientific 
development of the constituent groups'. 3o> 
Usually, however, '(t)yranny over and economic exploitation of 
the majority by an ethnic minority is the more common and more 
enduring form of the plural society. Conflict and competition 
between groups are endemic, and coercion and economic 
interdependence rather than consensus are the bases of such 
social integration as exists•. 31 ) Further the existence of 
races and castes in many plural societies implies that invidious 
plural societies are much more common than those of the 
democratic variety. 
Order, then, in a democrati_c plural society, is maintained by 
allowing elites from ~ifferent corporate groups into the centre 
of the society; by using the social integration present (i.e. 
the value consensus) to maintain this distribution of political 
and other types .of power amongst members of all ethnic groups 
present; and by countering the emergence of racism or a 
caste-structure in the society. All in all, it would seem 
that such societies must attempt to reach a balance between 
e.thnic differences between groups, on the one hand, and 
solidarities and cleayages which cut across these ethnic group_ 
structures, on the .other. 
Order in societies cparacterized by invidious pluralism is 
analyzed, insofar as it exists in any permanent form, in terms of 
three factors: political coercion, economic interdependence and 
·compliance. 
Conflict, in invidious plural societies, tends to be structured 
along corporate gr~up lines of cleavage. Political power tends 
- 30) 
31) 
See 'Pluralism and the Polity, pp. 76, 77. 
Race and Ethnicity, p. 14. 
. r 
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to be the monopoly of one of these groups. To maintain order, 
then, coercion - negative situational sanctions - is applied 
by those persons positioned in the centre of the society. 
These persons tend to be members of the ·dominant caste or 
'race'. The group in the centre, then, wields political power 
over the periphery (the other corporate groups, castes, 
'races'); and cultural power over its fellow group members 
(since it is a corporate group containing its own set of 
institutions). Coercion alone, however, when applied 
repeatedly, loses its effectiveness rapidly. 
sanctions are required .. to maintain order • 
Other types of 
A plural society contains one common economy. In this 
institutional complex, then, members from different corporate 
·groups interact, albeit in a 'segmental, utilitarian, non-
affective and functionally specific 132 )way. Members in the 
society, then, have a stake in the reward structure of the 
economy. Insofar as persons in the centre - members of the 
dominant group - manipulate this stake in the reward structure, 
they are effectively using economic power and positive situational 
sanctions. The periphery, then, will have its desire for 
materi~l satisfaction partially realizedJ 
To this point, van den Berghe agrees with the explanation 
commonly presented by pluralists in this context: Since those 
in the centre have no social or cultural power over the 
periphery, they are forced, when it becomes necessary, to.use 
situational sanctions over those in the periphery. 
factor, however, is now introduced: compliance. 
A new 
Compliance is conceived of a~ 'consensus at the level of 
instrumental norms coupled with dissension concerning fundamental 
values•. 33 >van den Berghe goes on to say that this low-level 
consensus may result from coercion, economic interdependence or, 
32) 'Pluralism and the Polity'·' p. 6 8. 
33) Race anp Ethnicity, p. 84. 
r,._ r:si-:--· -··· 
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even, free. will. In the terminology of the model generated 
in chapter Two, compliance can be interpreted as social power -
control over the means of status attribution or control over 
desired·positions in the society - which can be used to increase 
rewards, to change the structure of the society or to realize 
values quite different from those of the dominant group. 
These ·three instruments for maintaining societal ord,er.: coercion, 
economic power and compliance, vary in the effectiveness of their 
application in d~fferent types.of society. Where cultural 
differences ar~ great and perhaps exacerbated by racial over-
tones, and where there exist great differences in technological 
. . 34) . 
development between groups, the society tends to be unstable 
and coercion will probably be the most effective sanction. 
Where ethnic differences are tempered by an approximately equal 
participation in the economy, and where race and caste 
structures are absent, compliance rooted in the common stake 
members of all groups have in.the economic reward structure, 
may increase. Plural societies, of course, exist at points 
between these extremes, and explanations for order in them 
will vary accordingly. 
CONCLUSION 
Van den Berghe has placed his conception of pluralism within 
·the consensus/c9nflict schools debate. 35) He feels that this 
conception is more oriented toward the conflict school than 
toward the other. Nevertheless, he conceives of pluralism 
as possibly bridging this well-known theoretical chasm. In this 
conclusion, it will be shown that he does use elements of both 
schools but that he does not succeed in bringing about that 
ever elusive synthesis. 
34) Van den Berghe has written: 'One of the great ironies of 
underdevelopment is that, the less developed a country is, 
the greater its internal inequalities (which) become strongly 
correlated with ethnicity in most cases since the ethnic 
groups are so strongly localized'. 'Ethnicity: The African 
Experience'', pp. 515, 515. 
35) See 'Toward a Sociology of Africa' and 'Dialectic and 
Functionalism'. 
-128-
Order in a democratic plural society, depends upon consensus 
regarding certain values and certain norms; upon not too 
different cultural traditions in the society; and upon cross-
cutting solidarities and criss-cross~ng conflicts between 
groups. The centre of the society must be occupied by members 
of different corporate groups. 
It is clear that this explanation uses, to a great degree, the 
consensual argument: societal order is based upon common values, 
.. and cultural power derives from these common values. The 
centre which is not representative exclusively of any one 
corporate group, uses this power to maintain order. Intentional 
sanctions are paramount. On the other hand, aspects of the 
classical c~:mflict explanation are also used: If the lines 
of cleavage are criss-crossing, especially across ethnic group 
boundaries, then both conflict and solidarity between changing 
interest groups will contribute toward order in the society. 
In other words, shifting alignments contribute toward overall 
peaceful functioning of institutions. Conflict, ubiquitous 
though it may be, can play a positive role under such circumstan-
ces. 
Order in an invidious plural society, ?epends in the first 
.place upon coercion. This is not enough, however, and economic 
interdependence and compliance are also needed·. The explana-
tion,_ here approximates the conflict approach quite closely: 
consensus is absent.~6 ) Conflict between 'corporate groups 
is always potentially present. The centre which is monopolized 
by one group alone, will use situational sanctions to keep those 
in the periphery in line. These sanctions will be most effec-
tive when those in the periphery share satisfactorily in the 
reward structure of the society. Under these circumstances, 
positive situational sanctions will be effective and will generate 
36) By consensus is meant agreement on values that contribute 
to order and peaceable interaction. Van den Berghe does 
make the point that there may be certain values on which 
agreement can lead to dissension rather than order: 
cynicism, mistrust, and egoism, for example. See Power and 
Privilege at an African-University~ p. 252. 
.. 
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a certain amount of social power which can be used by those 
in the centre. In other words, certain positions will be 
valued by many persons in the periphery and thus compliance 
can be regarded as ~ factor promoting societal order • 
In the case of democratic plural societies, social integration -
a substantial degree of value consensus - is regarded as a 
.necessary condition for order. The ethnic c1ifferences present, 
·which must be related so as to be compatible with this value 
consensus, as in the case_ of Switzerland, are not relevant to 
the maintenance of this order. 
In the case of invidious plural societies, system integration -
the goodness of fit between the four institutional complexes 
in a society - is regarded as a necessary condition for order: 
In fact, without this goodness of fit, the rewards allocated 
to those in the periphery to compensate for lack of political 
power and desired positions in the centre, will no longer satisfy 
.these persons and coercive sanctions will have to be repeatedly 
used. In other words, order in such societies· is fragile 
indeed and dependent upon the smooth functioning of the polity 
' 37) 
.and economy, and the continuing development of the latter. 
Otherwise, group conflict which is always latent in such race 
and caste societies will become overt. 
It is 6lear that order in these latter invidious societies is 
explained in terms of the regulation of group conflict, as both 
Marx and Dahrendorf explain societal order. The nature of these 
antagonistic groups, however, varies from theorist to theorist. 
Conflict theorists posit a basic duality in all societies. 
37) This ·argument seems to underlie van den Berghe's verdict that 
South Africa, 'divided against itself awaits its impending 
doom'. In-fact, contradictions rooted in reactionary racist 
ideologies on the one hand and the demand-structure of a 
modern economy, on the other, will br.ing about tensions which 
will destroy what little compliance still exists. Coercion 
will be used repeatedly as a last resort until a violent 
upheaval will eventually engulf the society. See Race and 
Racism, Ch.V.; South Africa: A Study in Conflict. 
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Van den Berghe, however, points to the existence of races and 
castes in invidious plural societies to 9efine the basic lines 
of cleavage, confrontation and conflict. It would seem then, 
that conflict in these societies will follow race and caste 
lines rather than lines of class and power-distribut1on (or 
'authority'-distribution, as Dahrendorf would have it). 
This approach, however, begs a very important question: Class, 
status and political power are all concepts which, in any 
society, are intrinsically differentially distributed. 
Different groups in the society will have differential access 
to scarce and valued objects in that society. Membership 
in a corporate group or in a 'race', on the other hand, must 
be considered, intrinsically, as a neutral factor within any 
stratification system. The reasons why races, ethnic groups 
or even castes, for that matt~r, are hierarchized, must be 
sought elsewhere - eventually in terms of class, status and 
power . Van den Berghe re~ognizes this when he writes: 
•.. problems of race and ethnicity are not inherent in 
cultural, much less in racial diversity but reflect, for 
the most part, resentment at various forms of insti-
tutionalized inequalities ..... 38) 
When one looks at his analysis of the stratification systems 
in South Africa and Nigeria, at the very least, however, this 
.reduction of racial conflict to tension between strata i.n the 
stratification system is not substantiated. In fact, van den 
Berghe finds that the class system in the centre of the two 
societies is relatively open. Thus for whites in South Africa, 
and Nigerian elites, access to central positions is allocated 
according to achievement - and ethnic criteria. In addition, 
little class consciousness has developed amongst South African 
blacks, partly due to the fact that a class system needs to be 
rooted in a kinship system. This is not the case of the black 
worker in industrial South Africa who is forced to lead a life 
38) 'The Benign Quota: Panacea or Pandora's Box', p. 40. 
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f . d . t. 39) o impermanance an migra ion. Lines of division and 
confrontation remain racial, ethnic and caste rather than 
class by origin. 
In any society, the.corporate groups present and the duplicated 
sets of institutions within them, define pluralism: This 
conception is not important in the explanations of order in 
plural societies. In circumstances of democratic pluralism, 
what is important is the existence of value-consensus and 
.criss-crossing, shifting lines of division; in circumstances 
of invidious pluralism, coercion and common participation 
in the economy. 
Arguments of both the consensual and conflict schools are used 
in these explanations. Pluralism, however, does not represent 
a convergence of these schools. In itself, it is not relevant 
to explanations of societal order. To become so~ this approach 
must produce a theory linking race, ethnicity and caste to 
stratification, and stratification, in turn, to order. This, 
van den Berghe's conception 6f pluralism does not furnish, 
neither analytically nor historically. His conception, 
therefore, as the foundation of a new sociology 6f Africa, 
succeeds in highlighting difficulties rooted in the dialectical 
and functionalist approaches, but does not succeed in integrating 
them into a new approach. 
39) Por South Africa, see South Africa: A Study in Conflict .and 
'Race, Class and Ethnicity in South Africa'. For Nigeria, 




DIVERSE APPLICATIONS OF THE PLURAL SOCIETY 
The aim of this chapter is, first, to show that the plural society 
conception has been and is still.being used in a number of diffe-
rent academic disciplines and a variety of academic communities 
and, second, to focus on some of these in order to analyze their 
conceptions in the same way as has been done to the present. 
Attention will be paid, br~efly, then, to certain works in the 
social sciences in South Africa, France, the United States, Britain 
and Holland. It must be emphasized that this treatment will be 
in no sense exhaustive nor {with the possible exception of South 
Africa) repr_esenta ti ve. Rather, the object of this first section 
is to furnish examples of how the conception of the plural society 
is used; how wide-spread this use is; how lacking in logical 
consistence the term is;. and, finally, that the 'plural society' 
approach binds together a motley group of social scientists in a 
negative rather than positive way. In fact, these analysts 
share a rejection of other more classical approaches to societal 
analysis rather than a consensus about the content of the concep-
. tion, pluralism. 
Ever since Furnivall first conceived of pluralism, the structure of 
society in South Africa has been of central interest to pluralists. 
It is not surprising, then, to find that the conception is still 
used in analyses of tpis society. In historical studies, too, 
the term is increasingly being used. The works of Leonard 
. 1) 
Thompson may serve as a good example. 
Within South Africa, the term has often been used as a signaling 
device pointing to societal context within which many social 
scientific studies have taken place. 2 ) An introductory sociology 
1). For example, see Poli tics in the Republic of South Africa, 'His to-· 
rical Perspectives of Pluralism in Africa', and various chapters 
in the recent two volumes, Oxford History of South Africa. 
2) For example, see Urbanization and the Plural Society, G. Kinloch 
et al. ; 'City or Rural "Homeland"' , L. Schlemmer. 
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·text for ·students in South Africa. placed the conception in the 
centre of its analysis but erred in that the author attempted 
to overlook very real differences in approach within the 'plural' 
tradition.
3
) The impression created that the plural society 
conception is well-defined and logically consistent, is hopefully 
refuted by this pres~nt work. An Afrikaans periodical praised 
the potential comparative power of the conception. 4 ) More 
recently, an analysis of possible alternative political structures 
which are feasible in South Africa at present, includes a serious 
analysis of the present South African societal structure. This 
analysis uses a Kuperian plural approach. 5 ) In none of these 
works, however, are the theoretical problems which have been 
discussed here so far, analyzed. The 'plural society' model 
is usually accepted as a fully described and consistent 
conceptual tool. Its role in these works, moreover, (with 
the exception of the Spro-Cas publication) is little more than 
peripheral. 
A French social anthroplogist, G. Balandier, who has done 
extensive work in Francophone Africa, has developed an approach 
which coincides with aspects of the pluralist approach. 
Balandier calls.his the 'colonial situation'. 6 )ais definition 
of this approach emphasizes the following factors: a foreign 
. . # . • 
minority dominant group in the society; cultural heterogeneity; 





Woord en Daad, May 1971, p. 9. This article, in fact, welcomes 
the appearance of a periodical entitled Plural sbcieties in which, 
.thus far, articles of surprisingly variable quality have appeared. 
Sorith Africa's Political Alternatives, P. Randall (ed.), Spro-Cas. 
The authors differentiate between an open pluralistic society, 
1 in the sense of a wide diffusion of power throughout society', 
and a divided plural society, 'not merely in the sense of the 
segmented nature of a racially or ethnically diverse society, 
but also in the structure of its exploitative domination ~y the 
white minority'. The Report then attempts to delineate paths 
along which South African society can develop from the latter 
to the former type. See op. cit., p. 84. 
See 'The Colonial Situation: A Theoretical Approach', G. 
Balandier and a later statement in Sociologie A~tuelle de 
l'Afrigue Noire, G. Balandier, Chapitre I. 
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a dual economy; and the likelihood of group.antagonisms 
and group conflict.
7
) This approach is clearly similar to 
Furnivall's original plural society model. Both are explicitly 
confined to colonial contexts. Quite independently, a French 
political scienti?t, J-L. Quermonne, uses a formalistic approach 
to differentiate between societies which contain a number of 
separate communities cnmulti-communautaire") and those which 
contain one main community. This treatment, though similar 
in form to the basic plural society model, relies on formal 
political and legal lines of division {such as differences between 
a unitary and federal state; and between international and 
national law) and does not attempt to go further than an 
itemizing of probable problems such societies may expect. 8 ) 
Thus the .Phenomenon of multi-ethn~.c societies (colonial and 
other) is considered important and attempts are made to relate 
such societies to their historical contexts and their formal 
political systems by way of approaches similar to that of the 
plural society. 
Leo Despres is a social anthropologist who has applied a plural 
society model to nationalist politics and questions of development 
in British Guiana. (Guyana) Though obtaining many of his 
ideas from M.G. Smith, he differs at certain important points 
with the latter's approach. As Despres puts it: 
"the definition of a plural society must take into account 
two related sets of facts: (1) the extent to which speci-
fied groups are culturally differentiated in terms of 
specific institutional activities and (2) the level at 
which institutional activities serve to maintain cultural 
differentiation as the basis for sociocultural integration ... " 
If a society contains clearly differentiated cultural (ethnic) 
9
> 
7) 'The Colonial Situation: A Theoretical Approach', pp. 55, 56. 
8) 'Le Probleme de la Cohabitation dans les Societes Multi-
Communautaires', Jean-Louis Quermonne. The term 'pluralist' 
is .:·used in its American (deTocquevillian) sense in this 
article. The concept of 'imbrication', coincidence, is given 
central importance in the analysis, however. As has been 
seen in the plural society approach, coinciding lines of 
cleavage are a crucial feature in such 'plur~l' societies. 
9) L. Despres, ~ultural Pluralism and Nationalist Politics in 
British Guiana, p. 22. -
-- . ··- - ~-" ~." 
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groups with different institutional activities which are identified 
with these groups at national level, then that society is a plural 
society. Despres rejects M.G. Smith's earlier model in which 
institutions are classifie~ into those that are basic, alternative 
and exclusive. All institutions function to 'serve' the 
culture within· which they occur. Instead, Despres differentiates 
between local and broker institutions; the former 'which serve 
to structure activities and express cultural values within the 
context of local communities'; the latter 'which function 
to link local activities to the wider spheres of societal 
activity •110 } 
Despres, then, positions institutions in the very centre of his 
analysis of plural societies, but uses a 'reticulated model', 
a variant of systems theory1 to obtain an overall view of the 
society as a unit. Local institutions define the core of 
ea.ch separate cultural group in the society whilst broker 
institutions11}define behaviour between such groups and between 
members of these groups. In this ~~y, the focus of the 
analysis is kept upon cohesion within cultural units, interaction 
between such units, and the overall society as a system. One 
impo:i;tant conclusion which Despres draw.s from this approach 
is that all protest movements in such plural societies must 
become, in the long run, political protest movements (even if, 
initially, they are not politically oriented). He writes: 
"The integration of plural societies is based on a system 
of relationships between culturally differentiated units 
of unequal status and power. The core structure of thjs 
system is essentially political. Intersectional relationships 
' not only ~eflect the power structure of the political order 
under which they are subsumed, but they also serve to express 
the maintenance or change of that political order ... " 12) 
10) op. cit., p. 23. In addition, see 'Anthropological Theo~y, 
Cultural Pluralism, and the Study of Plural Societies', 
Leo Despres·. 
11) Broker institutions are similar in conception to Kuper's 
intercalary institutions. See Chapter Five. 
12) 'Protest and Change in Plural Societies', Leo Despres, p. 29. 
Despres, therefore, underwrites Smith's conception bf 
differential incorporation. 
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John Rex is a South African-born English sociologist who became 
interested in the plural society approach in the mid-fifties. 1 3) 
As in the case of Balandier, Rex called upon pluralist theory to 
ameliorate analyses of colonial societies. His interest in 
the approach, moreover, though remaining critical throughout, 
has not waned. 14 ) 
The positive aspects of the pluralist approach are (a) the 
relation which is posited between market systems on the one hand, 
and 'culture and.community' lS)on the other. This is the 
Furnivallian approach. Later, M.G.Smith pa~,dmore attention 
to the cultural sectors in the society and this focus, Rex 
argues, is helpful (b) insofar as it posits a certain looseness 
between ethnic or cultural sectors in the society. Both 
functionalist and Marxist theory emphasizes individuals' 
interdependence in the society's economy and polity. 16 )Rex 
writes: 
"According to this (plural society) tradition, what we 
are concerned with in the study of race relations and 
of the plural society are neither hierarchically 
arranged castes, nor classes in conflict, nor a system 
of roles arranged hierarchically according to their 
evaluation in terms of some set of ideal values. What 
we are concerned with are segments which cut across 
the strata, producing vertical rather than horizontal 
di visions within the society" 17) 
The theory, however,is most fitted for colonial societies which 
as yet have not reached an advanced stage of industrialization. 
For this reason, Rex argues, the classica~ functionalist and 
Marxist stratification theories do not apply. In fact, Rex's 
central criticism·of the plural society approach is that it 
does not allow for the development, in such industrializing 
13) 'The Plural society in Sociological Theory' was published 
in 1959. 
14) See Rex's Race Relations in Sociological Theory; 'South African 
Society in Comparative Perspective' i. and 'The Plural Society -
. The South African ca~e I • . 
15) 'The Plural Society in Sociological Theo~y', p. 116. 
16) 'South African Society in Comparative Perspective', p. 260. 
17) Race Relations in Sociological Theory, p. 19. 
• 
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societies, of new institutions which derive from none of the 
original cultures in the society. These new institutions, 
which Malinowski called third-column, Kuper called intercalary, 
and Despres called broker, form the core of the new political 
economy of the developing society. Without concepts to analyze 
these new developments, Rex argues, a theory will be little 
more than useless in any society which has reached a certain 
level of industrialization. Referring to South Africa, he 
writes: 
" •. if the term (plural society) is meant to imply a 
society in which there is no involvement of all the 
different groups in a single political economy, or if 
it is taken to imply an absence of economically based 
class conflict, then South Africa certainly does not 
present us with a case of a plural society"... 18) 
Rex, then,· feels that the plural society approach does of fer some 
new insights which classical theory does not provide. Pluralist 
theory itself, however, tends to reduce stratification models, 
race relations and class conflict to inter-ethnic and inter-cultural 
exchanges. Very complex situations are hereby crudely simplified 
and the positive aspects of the plural approach are lost. As 
an independent and holist approach on its own, plural society 
theory is not deemed successful by Rex. 
Christopher Bagley, another English sociologist, is interested in 
plural society theory particularly insofar as it relates to 
racialism and the existence of democratic institutions in societies 
both of the developed and developing types. Plural societies, 
Bagley defines as "those which contain two or more cultural 
. groups who are more or less separate from one another in terms 
of ideolo_gy, norms, folkways, and institutions. Such groups 
,may also be l~nguistically, ethnically, and geographically 
.. 19) 
distinct from one another. 
18}. 'The Plural Society - the South African Case', p. 412. 
19) The Dutch Plural Society, C.Bagley, p. 227. 
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Ih such situations, Bagley.continues, the power distribution 
in the society becomes critical for the presence of these 
'blocs' in the society creates a situation conducive for 
racialism, where 'one bloc.clearly dominates another•. 20) 
In comparative perspective, employ~ng a number of variables which 
measure both 'pluralism' and 'racialism', Bagley uses statis-
tical techniques to generate a two-dimensional space in 
which a number of societies are plotted by means of the two 
indices, pluralism and racialism. 21 ) 
Further, Bagley is particularly interested in the effect which 
the formal political institutions may have upon plural societies. 
He argues that proportional representation, 'Dutch style' is more 
conducive for democratic government tha? 'English style' 
parliamentary democracy. This argument is supported by Lijphart's 
study of pluralism and democracy in the Netherlands. 22 ) 
Bagley uses the plural society conception to differentiate 
between ethnic diversity and (invidious) racialism and caste 
structures. In addition, he uses it to suggest ways in which 
developing countries may avoid some of the usual concomitants 
of a plural structure, such as differential incorporation of 
'blocs' into the common societal polity. Bagley's argument 
about the problem of order in such societies, h9wever, though 
seemingly attractive, is quite unsatisfactory and, in certain 
aspects, contradictory: 
"In my view the problem of relating theories of pluralism 
and those of the Parsonian model of normative consensus 
in society is one which can easily be solved. Societies, 
by virtue of being societies, possess a high degree 
of normative integration. But it is a mistake to equate 
societies with national boundaries. Such boundaries, 
especially in colonial countries, are often arbitrary and 
have no connections with the realities of social interaction. 
20) 'Pluralism, Development, and Social Conflict in Africa', 
c. Bagley, p. 26. 
21) op. cit. In addition, see: 'Racialism and Pluralism: 
a dimensional analysis of 48 countries', C. Bagley. 
22) The Politics of Accorrunodation: Pluralism and Democracy in 
the Netherlands, A. Lijphart. 
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A plural society is not a society as such, but a 
collection of two or more integrated societies bound 
together by rather arbitrary national boundaries, and 
perhaps by trading interests, or by economic competition 
or economic exploitation of one group by another ... " 23) 
This argument assumes that the common economy and polity in the 
'territory' have a minimal effect upon the 'realities of social 
interaction' which are to be ·found, presumably, within the 
s~parate 'societies' within the larger.entity. Except in the 
earlier stages of some colonies and with few other examples, 
this situation just did not obtain. Finally, the argument 
seems to change direction when, a few pages later, Bagley 
writes: 
"The key concept in analysing and comparing plural societies 
is that of power. A crucial cause of instability and con-
flict in such societies centres round the apportionment 
of control over resources, and the decision-making process 
at parliamentary level .•. " 24) 
Certainiy here, the 'realities' are found in interaction between 
blocs. 
The plural society approach, as defined by Furnivall; evoked 
.considerable interest in British social anthropology circles. 
Furnivall, in fact, was in contact with and favoured a Fabian 
group which was influential in Labour Party circles after the 
Second World War. 25 ) British anthropology in Africa, 
consequently, has been affected by Furnivall's model. 
Meyer Fortes, as a first example( feels that Furnivall's ideas 
are still of importance (in analyzing contemporary government 
policy in South Afric:a, for example) • On the other hand, 
he feels that pluralism as conceived of in ti1e sixties is of too 
general application to prove very useful. It is especially 
23)' The Dutch Plural Society, pp. 234, 235. 
24) op. cit., p. 237. Emphasis in the original. 
25) As were many British anthropologists, of course. See 
. 'The Plural Society in Africa', M. Fortes, p. 5. 
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in Furnivall's emphasis on the economic forces unleashed in a 
plural society, that the approach maintains its utility: 
"The concept (plural society) has .• come to be applied 
to any society that is politically unitary through being 
under a single, supreme political authority •.. , but is 
internally made up of ethnica~ly or culturally diverse 
groups who maintain distinguishably separate ways of 
life. From this comprehensive point of view, there 
are very few contemporary nations ••• , that do not 
exhibit some degree of pluralism ••. 
It is only when racial or cultural pluralism is isomorphic 
with unrestricted economic competition and with the absence 
of social consensus, when it is the basis, therefore, of 
conflicting interests and purposes in relation to moral 
values and to the political order, that Furnivall's 
concept strictly applies ...•• 26) 
When applied to colonial and ex-colonial Africa, however, this 
approach _is deemed too simplistic by other social anthropologists. 
! 
J. Clyde Mitchell argues, in a vein similar to that of Rex's, 
that an -individual when involved in the common economy of a 
plural society is not as isolated or 'atomised' as Furnivall 
led social scientists to believe.· In fact, a whole series 
of new institutions are created so that such 'detribalized' 
individuals may cope wi.th their new urban surroundings. Instead 
of Furnivall's approach, Mitchell suggests a net-work approach 
which, though it does not posit a fully integrated social 
system, does move the focus away from coercion and economic 
interest to relationships of cooperation and interaction: 
"We could perhaps visualize societies as complex reticulations 
of social relationships in which people are linked and 
cross-linked_by numerous ties and bonds, some operating 
now .. to hold people together this way, and some operating 
now to hold people together in a different way. Societies 
conceive(l thus have no boundaries for the network of 
relationships may ramify endlessly. The overall reticula-
tion, however, is not uniformly distributed; here and there 
we may discern areas of relatively dense networks -
''plexuses' or 'clusters' of relationships - while in other 
areas few so6ial bonds unite people" •.•. 27) 
2 6) op. cit. , p. 8. 
27) 'Tribalism and the Plural Society', J.C. Mitchell, p. 30. 
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This approach is clearly designed to be of assistance to the 
anthropologist in the field. The methodological assumptions 
underpinning it are known as 'individualistic' and the units 
of analysis can clearly not be 'macro': a society in concrete 
terms does not coincide with any area of such a network. 
Furthermore, this network model stresses the growth of solidarity 
and cooperation in a social field r~~her than conflict. Clusters 
(or 'plexuses') of relationships, on the other hand, point to 
groups and communities in the society (which may be ethnic, 
I 
racial or more "functional" in origin). This guarantees that 
the model is not wholly consensual in approach. It is here 
that Furnivall's valuable insights can be translated into terms 
within Mitchell's model: "Where there are sparse bonds there is 
naturally a lack of consensus and consequently indifference 
or possibly dissent 11 • 28 ) Such lines of 'sparse' bonding may 
be conceived of as cleavage-lines, possibly coinciding with 
one another, and may, too, be pow~r-differentials in the 
larger society, 
Gluckman, as a'third example of British social anthropologists, 
further develops Mitchell's approach in his work. In the first 
place~ he feels that a naive use of the plural society model, 
:. even at the highest level of abstraction, consists of. reification 
. of ethnic and racial sectors, and of overemphas-is of the role 
coercion plays in the society. Rather, he feels that an 
equilibrium model should be employed within which· consensus, 
"agreement on values and goals" and cohesion should be differen-
28) loc. cit. 
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tiated from each other. 29 ) The first, consensus, points to ideas 
which the actors in the social field have about their actions 
whilst the latter, cohesion, is an abstraction the analysts 
make of the relationships between actors. 
This latter conception which, clearly, is closely related to the 
idea of a reticulated social network, aids Gluckman to dis-
tinguish between 'plural societies' - "certain territorial 
states •. when they were dominated by foreign settlers of quite 
different culture, who possessed more powerful industrial 
and military technologies 113 0) - on the one hand, and more 
homogeneously developed, more urbanized societies, on the other. 
In fact, Gluckman uses Durkheim's terminology explicitly and 
argues that increasing development, the increasing division 
of labour brings about a spreading organic solidarity, a more 
wide-spread cohesion which, in turn, prohibits lines of cleavage 
from coinciding. Polarization is avoided. As he puts it 
succinctly in an analysis of the structure of South African 
society: 
even if ultimately the whites maintain power by their 
superior force, there is a considerable degree of cohesion 
in the sy~tem from the development of economic and other 
·forms of interdependence within regions, within special 
29) 'Tribalism, Ruralism and Urbanism in South and Central Africa', 
M. Gluckman, p. 132. Since "cohesion" is the key concept, 
it is fittinq to quote Gluckman's definition in full: "struc-
tural cohesion (defines) the extent to which the structure of 
a particular social field is maintained in something like con-
tinuous pattern. This pattern may be maintained by a variety 
of factors, such as outright fore~, and/or interdependence, 
and/or agreement of all the people involved on ultimate 
goals and their readiness to sacrifice for those goals, and/or 
the cross-linking of individuals within the total field in 
terms of a variety of associations and values which prevent 
most persons from becoming wholeheartedly loyal to one bond 
and hostile to all other bonds". loc. cit. It is further 
important to note that "structure" is conceived of as "any 
ordered arrangement of parts within a postulated whole"(op.cit., 
p. 128). The parts, then, are presumably 'bonds' between 
actors. Cohesion, thus, points to networks of overlapping 
and cross-cutting bonds at concrete low levels of analysis. 
These networks must be permanent in some sense. 
30) op. cit. ,p. 137. Gluckman calls this "colonial pluralism". 
op. cit., p. 135. 
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institutions like factories and farms, and within various 
sets of small-scale relationships; and this interdependence 
within parts is communicated to the whole within which some 
overall cohesion also exists. This is so despite the 
continual development of the dominant cleavage between whites 
and coloured" •••..• 31) 
To study this cohesion, Gluckman· argues that the anthropologist 
must isolate roles and positions at certain critical points in 
the social field: "whe~e there are major discontinuities in 
the total hierarchy"; "where disturbances and struggles provide ' 
social situations which exhibit the arrangements of alignments, 
. and which show trends of developments." 32 ) By focusing on 
such 'inter-hierarchical' roles and positions - the missionary, 
administrator, trader and labour recruter - Gluckman shows how 
both cooperation and conflict can strengthen structural cohesion. 
In fact, people's changing allegiances in different situations 
to such persons, and the traditional bases of institutionalized 
conflict both contribute to this cohesion. And, in turn, 
to the maintenance of social order. 
In sum, ·then, Gluckman feels that structural differentiation and 
institutional integration - 'organic solidarity' - are the best 
basis for the maintenance of order (harsh and undesirable as 
that order may be) • If this development does not keep pace 
with attempts at obtaining consensus and mobilization in 
societies which were typified as colonial plural. societies, 
Gluckman forsees unrest and disorder: 
•• so long as utilitarian, organic interdependence between 
the segments of the nation is weak, many of the characteris-
tics of the plural society will remain, despite the dis-
appearance of the hegemony of colonial settlers backed by 
metropolitan authority. For the dominant characteristic 
of these societies is a mass of peasantry, possibly with their 
31) op. cit., p. 128. 
32) 'Interhierarchical Roles: Professional and Party Ethics 
in Tribal Areas in South and Central Africa', M. Gluckman, p.71 
and 'Anthropological Problems arising from the African 
Industrial Revolution', M. Gluckman, p. 80. For other 
literature consulted, see bibliography. 
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traditional culture more violently disturbed than in the 
past, dominated by the small industrial sector containing 
large proportions of unemployed and underpaid, peasants 
and many unemployable literati. Secondary associations ~ 
will be undeveloped in the insistence on high consensus ••• 3 ~> 
As is shown in the last sentence, attempts at obtaining high 
consensus on the one hand, and attempts at creating structural 
cohesion on the other, are to an extent mutually exclusive 
activities in plural societies. And cohesion rather than 
consensus is the true basis for societal order. 
Since Furnivall, interest has been shown in plural society theory 
by a number of Dutch social scientists. A publication which 
critically reviews the conception has already been mentioned. 34 ) 
Here, attention will be given to one author and, in fact, one 
particular work. Though not in the main-stream of plural 
35) theory, Hoetink's work does concentrate on relevant aspects. 
Hoetink is interested in people's attitude toward colour and race 
in the Caribbean and Southern U.S.A. He observes that in 
countries dominated by peoples originating in N~rth West Europe, 
there is a tendency to dichotomize people into white. and 
black (i.e. non-white) categories, whilst in countries dominated 
by people originating from Southern Europe, there tends to be a 
continuum rather than a dual classification and hence a series 
of categories ranging from white through grades.of coloured to 
black. He attempts to explain these differences by differentiating 
between inter-group contact in the public domain and in the private 
(intimate and sexual) domain. He further introduces two new 
concepts: "somatic norm image" and "somatic distance". 
to be understood from the point of view of group members. 
Both are 
33) 'Tribalism, Ruralism and Urbanism in South and Central 
Africa', p. 163. 
34) o·e Plurale Sameleving, A.N.D. Den Hollander et al. 
35) De Gespleten Sameleving in Het Caribisch Gebied, H. Hoetink. 
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The.somatic norm image refers to that image of a person which 
most members of a racial category would consider ideal or most 
desirable in terms of physical traits. Somatic distance refers 
to the degree of physical ·difference which is perceived to 
exist between categories or groups. The following summary 
of Hoetink's argument seems fair: 
The particular somatic norm image of the South European 
. plantation powers, Spain and Portugal, was acquired 
through contact with the Moors. These Luse-Iberian 
peoples literally became darker through intermixture 
with their conquerors (who - it would appear - lacked 
~ny norm image difficulties). The Luse-Iberians 
perceptions of 'the right way to look' thus were shifted 
toward the darker end of the scale. In the New World, 
their descendants were able to accept more readily 
(than could peoples of North-West European origin) 
others darker than they, particularly those only a 
little darker than they. This is a general principal 
underlying behavior, as postulated by Hoetink, not 
reducible to institutional factors, economics, etc. 
The Luse-Iberians acted differently because they 
perceived differently; their sel~-perceptions were, 
accordingly, also different, since their norms of 
appropriate appearance were at the root of their 36 ) different perceptions, and of their different behavior .. 
What is here at issue is which factors are essential for a full 
explanation of the occurrence and persistence of cleavage-
lines in plural societies. Hoetink does not share Smith's 
- emphasis on differences between cultural sectors nor the emphases 
pthers give to differences in access to power, to life-chances 
or to other scarce resources. Rather, he argues that, amongst 
other factors, the subjective definition of the situation 
which is in part exp~icable in terms of previous contact (or 
,lack of contact) with darker (or lighter) peoples, is essential 
~or a full explanation of what might be called the institutionali-
~a tion and persistence of racialism. 
36) 'Groups. Group Boundaries and the Perception of 'Race', 
S.W .. Mintz, p. 448. Emphasis in the origi~al. 
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SOCIETAL ORDER 
The social anthropologists discussed (Balandier, Fortes, Gluckman, 
Mitchell, Despres) as well as John Rex point to the emergence of 
'third-column' or 'broker' institutions in plural societies. 
In addition, most res.trict the conception, 'plural society' to 
societies which are or were (European) co°lonies. With the 
exception of Rex all use, broadly speaking, a Durkheimian 
consensual approach.· In short, then,.social order is explained 
in terms of (a) the monopoly of political power and coercion by 
the colonial power which fills all positions in the centre; 
and (b) the development of utilitarian ties and other bonds 
of 'cohesion' which criss~cross cultural groups. This latter 
point indicates the growth of social power in which persuasion -
intentional sanctions - are used to gain compliance. On the 
other hand, it is clear that this persuasion cannot claim to 
rest upon common values in the society: cultural power does 
not exist at the societal level. In short, then, in the 
common economic sphere, and especially in an urban context,· 
common interests arise which give those in the centre a chance 
fo manipulate scarce and valued status-positions. 
Rex's argument.is essentially similar to that of Kuper. 37 > 
The skewing factor in plural societies is the predominance 
of race and ethnicity over the three classical stratification 
variables: class, status and party. On the other hand, 
the racial and ethnic factor must not be reified into an 
explanation itself. Both ethnic and racial cleavage-lines as 
well as the political economy must be included in the societal 
analysis. 
·In the approach used by the above-mentioned anthropologists, 
moreover, it should be stressed that the network approach, the 
_9uest for bonds between actors in the social field, is a necessary 
~ . aspect of the approach of the anthropologi_st-in-the-field. He 
may well refuse to generalize from this data to statements 
_,, "; 
.aimed at the societal level. 
37) See Chapter Four. 
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Other theorists mentioned show that different sets of questions 
can be posed in an attempt to explicate societal order: Is 
there a relationship between the formal type of political 
system used in a plural society and social order in that 
society (Quermonne, Bagley; Spro-Cas)? In how far do group 
conceptions in the society contribute to the creation or dis-
solution of lines of cleavage (Hoetink)? It is not ~ossible 
to generalize here about answers to these questions. What is 
qf import, however is that it becomes clear that there are many 
divergent approaches to the one part of the basic question 
posed in this thesis: How is societal order maintained in a 
plural society? 
In conclusion then, as shown by Gluckman, system integration 
which is allied with cohesion, is of greater importance to 
maintaining order than social integration (or consensus). 
Those in the centre, then, seek to wield cultural power over 
those in their own cultural group,. political power over those 
in the_periphery, and social power over all. The main additional 
insight _furnished by this chapter is the existence of 'third-
column', 'intercalary', 'broker' institutions and inter-
hierarchical roles, Kuper has already mentioned these and van 
deri Berghe's conception of compliance is essentially similar. 
It is finally in terms of these institutions linking individuals 
to one another at different times and· in different places within 
and between different sectors of the society, that a common 
commitment to the so.ciety can be posited. It need not be 
,.at the level of values and it need not, consequently, be called 
value-consensus or effective cultural power, but it does point 
to the fact that those involved in the economic sector of the 
society do have some common interests. Societal order, insofar 
ft it exists, is grounded upon coercion, economic interdependence 
hnd social power growing out of this interdependence. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
. THE NEW PLURALIST THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE 
The plural society approach was developed from Furnivall's works. 
His original conception, as has been ·shown earlier, was rooted in 
studies of western colonialism and laissez-faire capitalism. This 
is the pedigree of the plural society. One consequence of this 
pedigree is that some assumptions of his pluralist approach are 
still accepted by contemporary pluralists. 
It is in part as a result of these studies that the plural society -
a political entity by definition - has consistently been thought 
of as containing a well-defined centre and a residual periphery. 
The caricature, here, is that of the colonial white government 
and the native subjects. On the other hand, the plural society -
again, by definition - contains a number of ethnic and racial 
groups which subdivide the periphery into separate sectors 
and may cut across the centre-periphery distinction. 1 ) 
More specifically, pluralism, to Furnivall (and Fortes, Gluckman 
and Rex), refers to societies under colonial rule; societies 
which have a laissez-faire economic policy; and societies " 
which are economically relatively undeveloped. These are the 
factors which interact with the culturally plural character of 
the society to create a set of definable centre-periphery 
relations. 
To Kuper and van den Berghe (and Bagley), pluralism refers to 
societies in which one ethnic or racial group effectively 
monopolizes the state2); societies in which ethnic and racial 
lines of cleavage tend to coincide with divisions in the 
stratification system; and societies in which social change 
and development will be characterized by deep and recurrent 
1) In this sense, then, a pluralist approach attempts to "discern 
the articulation between culture and the structural conditions 
to which it is an adaption". 'Sociology and the Study of Race -
Contemporary Perspecti~es for Southern Africa', M.W. Murphree, 
p. 16. . 
2) Though van den Berghe arid Bagley have analyzed, respectively, 
Switzerland and the Netherlands as plural societies, the main 
impetus of their analyses assumes an ethnic or racial monopoly 
in the political sector. 
, ' 
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racial and ethnic conflict. As conceptualized by Kuper and van 
den Berghe, the pluralist approach poses the same questions in 
relation to all societies which contain a variety of ethnic and 
racial groups. If one focuses on the coincidence or lack of 
fit between ethnic, racial, class, power and status lines 
of cleavage, they argue, it is not really necessary to classifv 
societies strictly as either plural or non-plural. As a result, 
both tend to use explanations which apply to all societies 
and which derive from variants of classical and contemporary 
sociological theory. 
To M. G. Smith (:and Despres) , the plural society refers to societies 
in which one corporate group effectively monopolizes the state; 
societies where corporate · units are almost totally closed to 
other members of the society; a.nd societies which manifest no 
over~all value con5ensus. As conceptualized by M.G. Smith, 
the plural society approach attempts to generalize Furnivall's 
conception and to construct a new social-scientific theory in 
which plural societies enjoy a special position. Smith, however, 
does not relate ethnic and racial diversity to the dynamics 
_of stratification in this theory. It belongs, therefore, 
more to the sphere of cultural anthropology than to that of 
sociology. 
These differences in approach and definition are by no means 
mutually exclusive or incompatible with one another. On the 
contrary, they show many areas of overlap and can, in fact, 
be regarded on most points as differences in emphasis rather 
than differences in principle. 
The new pluralist perspective constructed in this chapter, 
will be developed around these points and around the preliminary 
conceptual scheme generate in chapter Two. The assumptions and 
hypotheses of that scheme will also be used in this develppment. 
In review, then, the foundation for this perspective will be 
the existence of social order in a plural society. This order will 
re explained, in terms of action, within a systemic framework of 
society and its four sectors. Structural differentiation is 
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assumed to be taking place in these sectors and the society, 
consequently, will develop a common economy and a common 
polity. Order will be maintained; at least, through system 
integration though some measure of both coercion and consensus 
will be present. The existence of ethnic and racial diversity, 
moreover, is expected to affect these structural developments 
substantially:· Cleavage lines in the stratification system 
are expected to coincide, roughly, with ethnic and racial 
cleavage lines and, of.most import,. the boundary between centre 
and periphery will coincide with such ascriptive lines of 
cleavage. 
Social order, therefore, will be explained in terms of relations 
between the centre and the periphery. Such relations are 
power relations and mediate developments in the four sectors 
of the society. In particular, the fact that positions 
in the centre tend to be monopolized by one ethnic group 
implies that little cultural or social power can be effectively 
wielded over members in the society at large. Intentional 
sanctions will not be effective over ·these members.' Value 
con·:.sens us, as conceived of by normative functionalists, is 
not expected to be present in a plural society .. 
It is necessary, at this point, to differentiate between a value 
system (contained in the cultural sector) and an ideology. Kuper, 
as has been shown, stressed the role of ideologies in plural 
societies. He conceived of them as being both indicator~ 
of racial violence as well as causal components in the process 
of structural change in plural societies. A value system 
refers to a set of interdependent (ultimate ) aims and concep-
tions of how a society ought to be. This system must be 
differentiated from both individual and group interests and 
should rather be regarded. as embedded in the culture (and 
socialization system) of a particular group. 
An ideology, on the other hand, refers simply to any system of 
ideas, opinions and beliefs which are held by a group of people. 
[_ 
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_Though this system may be dependent upon membership in a social 
class, as Marx claimed, this does not necessarily follow. 
The possible links between ideologies and a value-system can be 
illustrated as follows: 
Ideologies have two leading roles in the development of 
political conflicts .. On the one hand they co-ordinate and. 
systematize individual oppositions, and thus set them 
within the context of a larger conflict. On the other, 
ideologies give.such disputes the appearance of a con-
flict of values, and this in turn causes deeper and more 
absolute commitments. 3) 
Ideologies, thus, can be viewed as a link between the culture 
of a group and the changing structures in a society. They are 
always, in some measure, value-systems but also represent 
adaptions to new structural exigencies. As Kuper has pointed 
out, they may serve both as indicators of structural change 
and as explanatory categories for such changes. 
In general, the new perspective developed in this· chapter will 
attempt to bring the original ethnic and cultural diversity within 
the plural society into relation with the processes of structural 
change which tqok place within it after its inception. To do 
this most effectively, the perspective will be discussed in 
I 
three stages: first, the origin of a plural society;- _second, 
the maintenance of order in a developing plural society; and, 
third, the directions of change in a plural society. 
(a) The Origin of a Plural Society 
Pluralists agree that a plural society, at its inception, consists 
of a number of different population groups having differing ethnic 
and cultural backgrounds, all of which are incorporated into 
a common polity. In the first place, then, a plural society 
. is a political entity: political power and coercion are used 
to form it and maintain it as a society. 
j) The Idea of Politics, M. Duverger, pp. 76, 77. 
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In accordance with -Furni val 1 ' s approach, a_ p:]Lura 1 society, at _ its 
inception, will here be restricted to those societies mich were 
colonized by western powers.. These co'.loniring -,power~ fo:r:med 
such plural societies for reasons of the flag and trade;'"' Tn 
fact, these societies were created to expaDdl ·iiihe empire and the 
empire 1 s trade. The centre _of this -new soc:ii.<B:t_y- was llDIGpOli zed 
b~ a colonial .foreign elite. This ~lite e~.ised coem:±on 
a.nd inducement - negative and positive situatbional sanctfuns -
over the members of the periphery who corisi.s:'t:ecd _of a nti!l'lffie'r 
o-f (usually indigenous) traditional societies.. In tQis:; way, 
this colonial elite wielded political and eCJmnomic powe-i over 
the natives of th~ soci~ty. 
In the centre itself, the political and ecom0.Ilfrc goals -of:' the 
elite - the ,flag and trade - did not clash... :FurtherJl!ilt:e'.,, since .. 
t~is elite was culturally homogeneous,, little more than e.uJ:tural 
and s.ocial power_, and, therefqre, -iritentionall .:osanctions,,, were: 
needed to ensure _the smooth development -of tile centre. 
In the periphery, a simple push;...pull model 6-am :'be constt.ucted. 
Natives were 'pushed 1 by the coercive machinery of 'the riew 
colonial state to partake .in economic activi.tlies in the new 
economy. (The- introduction of western laWr a mtonetaxy economy, 
and personal taxes, -a:re example~). 'They weme ;a:lso 'plll!Ied' 
by the material advantages they saw in a wage ·~e:conomy aml" private 
enterprise. - There remained, in the periphe..:q,,, <moreoveE1.- _important 
traditional centres of cultural and social. ~er.. The repeated 
application of indirect rule may serve ·as am i~:artlple. These 
centres, then, partitioned the· periphery .in~ ~".,sectors• in each 
-of which intentional sanctions remained effect:"d.w_e. 
The type of conflict which can be expected att 'Chis stage: of 
development in a plural S<;>ciety; can be. call.ad_ 5inter-seetor conflict. 
Since intentional sanctions are still eff~ctiwe "Within each ethnic 
·and racial group, confrontation will probab1-y £011:.ow seetor lines 
of di vision and traditional institutions will !be used b:J1 mobilize 
and justify violent confrontations. 
opposing groups, then, wi11 coincide closely-"Ml.th ;the Clominant 
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western 'white' culture, on the one hand, and the traditional 
native value-system, on the other.. The fact that the former 
group has an almost complete monopoly of modern means of coercion 
assures that the outcome will be to the advantage of those in 
. 4) 
the centre. 
In short, then, in its early stages, a plural society consisted 
of a number of sectors within each of which intentional 
sanctions were applied effectively. To bind these sectors 
together, one sector applied effective coercion over all citi-
zens. In addition, effective positive situational sanctions 
operated in the common market-places of the society. 
An additional insight at this stage of the development of a 
plural society, was originally made by Furnivall: Race and 
ethnicity, while losing the importance they had had in tra-
ditional society, gradually became indicators of different work-
categories in the new common economy. Lines of division in the 
developing stratification system tended to merge with racial 
and ethnic lines of differentiation. 
It is important to note that the core of the problem of order in 
plural societies, viz. the absence of social integration or 
effective intentional sanctions, is already apparent in the above 
discussion. Furthermore, the core of the solution to this 
problem, viz. effective system integration, is also apparent. 
In fact, system integration is obtained hy the compact foreign 
centre which carries out its 0\'1n and its western power's 
will compatibly and which monopolizes the most effective coer-
cive means in the society. 
A plural society, consequently, originating in such a colonial 
context, will be characterized by (M.G. Smith's) cultural, social 
and structural pluralism. There will be ethnic differences 
which coincide with corporate categories. In addition, one 
4) The Bambatha and Bondelzwarts rebellions in South Africa ca:n 
serve as two examples of this type of conflict. See: :Reluctant 
Rebellion, s. Marks; The Last Tribal War, R. Freislich. 
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dominant corporate group will monopolize positions in the centre 
and will incorporate other corporate categories ~ifferentially 
into the common polity. 
This mode of differential incorporation, hv which the foreign elite 
monopolizes positions of political power in the centre, and allo-
cates subordinate positions to leaders of the ,other racial and 
ethnic groups in the 
ment of the society. 
are either allocated 
society, is critical to the further develop-
'.rhese subordinate positions, in fact, 
within the framework of the traditional 
structures of the other sectors - as in the case of indirect 
:rule - or as permanently subordinate positions within the new 
imported political institutions of the colonizing power. 
These well-defined power-political lines of cleavage (which 
coincide with the ascriptive racial and ethnic lines of division) 
tend to be maintained as structural changes take place in other 
sectors: Thu$ even though changes take place in the economic, 
social and cultural sectors, the mode of differential incor-
poration does not change in its basic line of cleavage. 
Such societies can be viewed as invidious plural societies. Van den 
Berghe's democratic plural societies will not develop in these 
early stages. 
(b) Conditions under which Order is ·maintained in a Plural Society 
The conditions under which order is maintained in a plural society 
are discovered by analyzing the relations between the centre 
and the periphery in this society. The first set of relations 
are those which refer to the polity. In fact, the centre, 
which is monopolized by the dominant group in the society, is 
used to incorporate other groups, differentially, into the polity. 
These other groups, ethnic or racial in composition,· then, are 
granted partial and unequal access to the sphere o~ political 
power. Racial, ethnic and power-political .. lines of cleavage 
coincide and, most importantly, form the division between the 
centre and the periphery. This political dimension is basic 
and affects, as will be shown, all relations of conflict, 
/compliance and change in the society. Furthermore, this mode of 
• - .. l"". 
c 
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differential incorporation is ·fully intended and is constantly 
promoted by the members of the dominant group in the centre. 
Members of all groups in the periphery are, in this sense, 
subjects. ' 
The second set of relations are those that refer to the economy. 
People become involved in the common economy, initially, to 
meet demands placed upon them as subjects and to try to improve 
their (and their family's) lot materially. Over time, this 
involvement brings about the disintegration of these people's 
·traditional cultural centres (within their-ethnic or racial 
groups) by forcing these people into the towns and. cities of the 
plural society and by rendering traditional values, norms and 
customs useless in these new and demanding situations. Furnivall 
wrote, consequently, of 'atomized' individuals and 'incomplete' 
social lives. This point, however, has been convincingly 
criticized by a number of pluralists who argue that these people, 
involved in a common economy in a new urban milieu, will soon 
develop new institutions which are rooted in neither the imported 
dominant culture nor in the traditional culture, but in this new 
milieu. These 'third-column' institutions will be discussed later. 
A further aspect of this involvement in the common economy is im-
portant. Partly as the intended policy of those in the centre, 
and partly as the unintended consequence of the demands of a 
developing economy, members of a plural society are gradually 
allocated economic roles in terms of their membership in their 
respective ethnic and racial groups. (Whites, for example, 
occupy senior and highly rewarded positions; Coloureds and 
Indians middle positions; and Blacks lower, labourers' positions 
in South Africa). It is important to note that pluralists argue 
that this system of differential involvement of groups in the 
economy is not a fully intended result of the centre's policy 
(except insofar as it is an indirect consequence of differential 
incorporation). First, the tension, here, for those in the 
centre is between setting compatible.goals in the (racist) polity 
and in the (developing) economy. Second, there is only a rough 
coincidence between the racial, ethnic .and political hierarctJ,y, 
on the one hand, and the economic hierarchy, 
I 
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on the other. 
In the case of tension existing between goals set in the political 
and economic centres, priority will be given to the maintenance of 
system integration. It will be the explicit intention, then, 
of those in the c;entre to resolve such tensions by using the 
intentional sanctions available. These sanctions can effectively 
be used over members of the dominant ethnic group. Commitments 
to legal processes, common values, and respect for differing 
interests will be some areas upon which these intentional sanctions 
will be based. As a consequence, differences in the centre will 
be resolved in terms of common membership in this arena (and, 
therefore, by and large, in terms of common membership in the do-
minant ethnic group) rather than in terms of more narrowly 
defined explicit economic or other interests. In order that 
privileged positions, peaceful co-operation hetween different 
interest groups in the centre, and effective situational sanctions 
over the periphery may be maintained, those in the centre will 
give priority to the protection and strengthening of the political 
_centre, even where this necessitates concessions being made in the 
economic sphere. System integration remains and is seen as 
being the critical factor. 
In the second case, where ethnicity, race, and access to power 
coincide but roughly with access to economic power, resulting 
tensions define one of the most likely sources of conflict in 
the society. ·There will be, in fact, certain members of the 
dominant group who will not fill well-rewarded positLons in the 
economy, and certain members of the subordinate groups who will 
-
fill such positions. This situation is one which is highly 
conducive for racial and ethnic conflict. Since race and 
ethnicity coincide with access to political power, moreover, 
such conflicts immediately become political in nature. 
The other most likely source of conflict is to be found in 
dissatisfaction which may arise, among members of the periphery, 
in the area of economic rewards. Such dissatisfaction will be 
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channeled, in the early stages of a plural society, either through 
traditional institutions or through imported institutions within 
which natives fill subordinate positions. In both cases, 
confrontation and conflict will take place within the mode of 
differential incorporation in the society. This conflict, 
too, then, will be political in nature and will follow the 
ascriptive lines of cleavage defined by access to these types 
of institutions. The emergence of new 'third column' institu-
tions may, on the other hand, change this situation. This will 
be dealt with later. 
To regulate such conflict, the dominant group uses coercive 
sanctions (grounded upon their monopoly of the centre) to ensure 
confc;:>rmi ty in th.e periphe:ry; and uses intentional sanctions to 
ensure conformity within their dominant group (which is, of 
course, ethnically and racially homogeneous). It is in relation 
to this last point that the value system of the dominant group 
becomes important. In fact, so as to avoid conflict within 
this group and the ensuing clashing of collective goals set 
by members of this group, its internal class system is usual~y 
relatively 'open' and universalistic, achievement-oriented criteria 
are usually used to allocate positions in the centre to members 
of this group. These criteria are usually linked with the 
value system of the original colonizing power. 
The ideology broadcast from the centre will reflect the discrepancy 
in treatment of members of the dominant group and others in the 
periphery. Kuper, in fact, feels that the racist component of 
this dominant ideology is a measure of the racial (and political) 
conflict potential in the society. In like measure, the 
ideologies of elite groups in the periphery can be used as a 
measure of (a) the extent to which each subordinate ethnic or 
racial group still possesses a degree of solidarity and effec-
tive in_tentional sanctions over its members, on the one hand; 
and (b) the extent to which a new solidarity based on common . 
membership in the periphery has developed, on the other. These 
elite groups in the periphery can he seen as potential new 
centres of the society and are, by necessity, regarded as competing 
political forces by the dominant group. 
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The spread of a viable ideology for members of the periphery is 
not just dependent upon common membership in the periphery. 
It is also dependent upon the growth of common institutions 
for these mem:Qers. Such institutions, which have earlier 
been typified as 'third-column', usually originate in an 
urban, economic milieu since it is under these circumstances 
that members of the different subordinate groups of a plural 
society have the most chance of meeting and interacting. 
It is important, pluralists argue, to ascertain what links 
exist between these new institutions and traditional cultural 
centres in the periphery, on the one hand; and between these 
institutions and the dominant group and its culture, on the 
other. In fact, these institutions point to what has been 
called social power: the control over the means of status 
attribution, backed by persuasion as a sanction. If these 
new institutions are linked with traditional cultural centres, 
:then elites in these traditional centres may be able to wield 
such social power for their own ends. On the other hand, 
if the links between these institutions and the dominant culture 
(or ideology) are strong, the dominant group may use its positions 
in the centre to persuade, rather than coerce, members of the 
periphery to conform to the pursuit of certain goals. '!'his 
is what Van den B~rghe called compliance. Mayer's distinction 
between the 'Red' and 'School' Xhosa points to two such 
institutions. 5 ) 
Again, it is worth pointing out that the wielding of social power 
does not necessarily imply the existence of shared values. 
Rather it points to valued status positions (usually in the common 
economy) and (possibly short-term) common interests which arise 
from them. 
Since the new institutions emerging from the urban milieu can he 
conceived of as the emergence of a new culture for some of the 
members of the society, they may be seen as re-defining the lines 
5) See Tribesmen or Towns~en, P. Mayer. 
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which conflict will probably follow. In cases where these 
institutions are linked with the dominant group and its culture, 
potential conflict can be resolved by means of intentional 
sanctions. In cases where these institutions are linked with 
the traditional cultures, conflict will probably follow the 
line of cleavage dividing the centre from the periphery. 
An important question, here, refers to the extent to which 
these new institutions can resolve differences between the dif-
ferent traditional cultures adequately within this new urban 
milieu. This question, clearly, is related to the possibility 
of the growth of wide-spread solidarity among members of the 
periphery. 
Conflict, therefore, whether it is based on status inconsistencies 
or economic dissatisfaction, will tend to follow the lines of 
division defined by the centre and the periphery, and possibly 
lines of ethnic division within the periphery. Mobilization, 
solidarity, and the setting of goals by opposing parties in the 
conflict, then, will be defined in terms of common membership 
in ethnic and racial groups, and the broader sphere of common 
positions in the political power hierarchy. All conflict, 
whether economic or cultural in origin, becomes political 
conflict in a plural society . 
• 
In sum, then, members of a plural society do not share a value-
system. Order is maintained in such a society insofar as thos~ 
in the centre succeed in wielding effective political power over 
the periphery; effective cultural and social power over those 
in the dominant group; and economic power over all members of the 
society. Since the repeated application of coercive sanctions 
leads, eventually, to a break-down of order, the effective 
wielding of political power should be accompanied by the 
application of social power over as wide a group in the peri-
phery as possible, if order is to he maintained. Persuasion 
rather than coercion is the best type of sanction to use in 
situations of potential conflict. 
From the point of view of members of the periphery, persuasion will 
only be effective in those areas of interest common to the centre 
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and periphery. Such areas are usually rooted in the economy. 
The critical feature, then, of order from the point of view 
of the periphery, is economic rewards: positive situational 
sanctions (as those in the centre conceive of it). Countervailing 
centres in the periphery and competitive ideologies can be expec-
ted if these sanctions fail. Under these circumstances, the 
fragile sanctions of coercion must be used. 
It would seem then that system integration is more important 
than social integration for the maintenance of social order. 
In fact, the smooth interdependent functioning of the polity 
and economy seem more important than the creation of consensus 
amongst all members. Compliance, however, does point to the 
latter. System and social integration, thus, are linked. 
What remains of import, however, is that without system 
integration - and, therefore, without what Gluckman called 
wide-spread cohesion - order is difficult to preserve. 
{c) Directions of Change in a Plural Society 
It is assumed here that structural differentiation is an ongoing 
process in plural societies. Other than this, there seems to 
be consensus among those pluralists whose works have been 
~iscussed, that the direction of social change in plural societies 
is indeterminate. It is nevertheless possible to use some 
pluralist analyses (Kuper's in particular) to obtain the following 
hypotheses. 
It would seem that plural societies can develop in three directions. 
"First, there may be a break-down of order - a revolution, or war, 
~or example - after which a new and possibly radically different 
dispensation may be instituted. Since the a?alysis, here, is 
on endogenous change, the revolutionary possibility alone will 
be discussed. 
As.has been shown, countervailing powers may arise in traditional 
cultural centres in the periphery. The likelihood is that this 
will occur when the economic rewards allocated members of the 
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periphery do not satisfy them. Furthermore, these countervailing 
powers will be strengthened by support that can be obtained 
through those new 'third-column' institutions growing out of the 
common economy. In addition, the point has repeatedly been made 
that this confrontation will be a political one, and, therefore, 
a racial and ethnic one, rather than a class one. This is so 
since conflict tends to follow the dominant lines of cleavage 
in the society. In this rega~d, Lockwood writes: II 
revolutionary goals are unlikely to emerge from the antagonisms 
of groups in plural societies unless ethnic and racial divi-
sions happen to coincide with lines of economic ..• relationships 
(For this reason) ethnic and racial conflict in plriral society 
is not inherently revolutionary ... " fi) 
Conflict, here, then, arises from the inadequacy of positive 
situational sanctions (embedded in the economy). As a result 
the links between new 'third column' institutions and the 
dominant group will weaken; those between these institutions 
and the traditional cultures will strengthen; and the cleavage 
between-the centre and periphery will be reinforced. This 
.in turn leads to a diminishing of effective social power -
compliance - between the centre and periphery, and, since 
economic power is also diminishing, negative situational 
' sanctions become the sole means of order-maintenance. System 
integration will eventually break down when repeated application 
of coercion no longer remains effective. 
The role of the centre, in this case, would seem to be one of 
applying these coercive sanctions repeatedly. This will 
probably lead to a closing of the ranks in the dominant ethnic 
group and, eventually, to an open power confrontation between 
this group and the groups in the periphery. These latter groups, 
furthermore, will be developing a conunon ideology which opposes 
that of the (ethnic) centre. In this case, thus, the complete 
6) 'Race, Class and the Plural Society', D. Lockwood, pp. 64, 68. 
"Revolutionary", here, is to be understood in its Marxist 
class sense. Lockwood does not exclude the possibility of 
a violent overthrow of the existing order in a plural society. 
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disappearance of any compliance leads to a racial and ethnic 
confrontation. 
The second possible direction is that of continuing (invidious) 
pluralism involving the application of situational sanctions 
over the periphery. The key variable, here, seems to be a 
burgeoning economy, satisfying the material wants of the members 
of the periphery and bolstering up the coercive machinery of 
the centre. It seems possible, in fact, to maintain racial 
pluralism in a society which manifests steady economic development. 
The conflict potential residing in this direction of structural 
change, is rooted in status inconsistencies arising from overlaps 
in the two dominant hierarchies of an invidious plural society: 
that based upon the mode of differential incorporation, on the one 
hand; and the economic system of stratification, on the other. 
The former, which manifests ascriptive racial and ethnic cleavage-l lines will not coincide exactly with the latter, which conforms 
to the demands of a modernizing economy. 
This creates two types of problems for those in the centre.· 
economic interest groups will attempt to solve this nascent 
conflict by applying rational means which will clash with the 
mode of differential incorporation in the (racist) political 
First. 
sector. By using intentional .sanctions, the centre will attempt 
to counteract this tendency by using an exclusivist ethnic 
ideology to maintain consensus over the form of differential 
incorporation in the society as a whole. Second, the centre 
will apply coercion over those in the periphery who attempt to 
develop oppositional ideologies relating to the politica~ sector. 
In this fashion, effective intentional sanctions over the members 
of the dominant ethnic group, and effective situational sanctions 
over those in the periphery, can be exercised. 
It is thus critical for those in the centre to assure that 'third 
column' institutions remain linked with the dominant group in the 
economic sphere so as to obtain social power and promote economic 
expansion. O~ the other hand, it is important that compliance 
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relations neither become too effective between ethnic groups 
in the political sector, nor spread to form a common ideology 
among the members of the periphery. By way of an effective 
exclusivist ideology broadcast for those in the dominant 
ethnic group, and through effective coercive sanctions applied 
to groups in the periphery, this may be achieved. 
This argument emphasizes once again that the maintenance of system 
-integration is the critical factor in maintaining order in a 
plural society. If consensus can be obtained in the centre, 
and satisfaction in the periphery, order can be maintained. 
The third possible direction is that toward a 'democratic' plural 
society. Here, ethnic diversity (what M.G. Smith called cultural 
pluralism) may be maintained, but differential incorporation 
(structural pluralism) must gradually be replaced by equal access 
to centre-positions. For this to occur, the creation of cross-
cutting cleavage lines must be promoted. In particular, the 
coincidence of race and ethnicity with, first, access to power 
and, second, with class membership, must be broken. Kuper calls 
these processes of individuation. It is feasible to expect 
such individuating processes to be promoted by 'third-column' 
institutions which are linked with the centre, and with the 
dominant group and culture. In fact, it seems feasible 
to hypothesize that the scope of effective social power will 
vary ,directly with the effectiveness of such individuating 
processes. There is a danger, however, involved in breaking 
this deep cleavage-line between the centre and the periphery. 
Solidarity is required amongst those units (organizations, groups, 
individuals) in the centre to ensure that the setting and 
pursuing of goals in dif£erent sectors of the society do not 
clash. In other words, system integration must be maintained • 
. Individuation by promoting criss-crossing lines of cleavage, 
may dissolve the solidarity amongst those in the centre and, 
hence; lessen the degree of system integration present. For 
these processes to succeed, then, requires an extention of the 
values of universalism and achievement to other groups in society. 
These values are presumably practiced within the dominant group 
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in the allocation of positions in the centre. If those in the 
centre can practice these same values and apply them to members 
of other groups in the society, then the positions in the centre 
may be filled by members of a numher of ethnic and racial groups 
in the society, and all persons in these positions may neverthe-
less share the same values. 7 ) 
It is, of course, imperative that economic stability and development 
be maintained in this situation. Furthermore, it is clear that 
the dominant ideology must promote a broadening of the centre, 
and that oppositional ideologies in the periphery do not become 
incompatible with the dominant ideology. In sum, then, this 
direction of change necessitates wide-spread inducements 
(rather than coercion) to maintain peaceful centre-periphery 
relations, and an ideology and a system of values common 
to a group larger than the dominant ethnic group, to form the 
base from which recruitment into the centre will lose its 
ascriptive character. In this way, system integration can be 
maintained whilst social integration amongst potential members 
of the centre of the society can be broadened. A 'democratic' 
plural society in which separate subcultures may persist, can 
develop under these conditions. 
In.sum, then, the three directions of social change are: 
(1) a break-down of centre-periphery relations leading to a short-
circuiting of the situation to one of a racial and ethnic 
confrontation; 
(2). a persistence of the dominant centre-periphery line of cleavage 
with inducements forming the most important link between the 
two; 
(3) a gradual blurring of this dominant cleavage-line by an 
involvement of members of a number of ethnic and racial groups 
in the centre. 
7) For an interesting argument relating to this direction, see 
South Africa's Political Alternatives, P. Randall (ed.) 
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CONCLUSION 
At no point in this chapter has the plural society been rigo;{rously 
defined. Rather a society characterized by pluralism, is defined 
as one with a heritage of western colonial status, and one which 
manifests a set of particular relations between its centre and 
periphery. This chapter attempts to describe the different 
relations which obtain between the degree of pluralism and the 
presence of social order in such societies. Since social order -
·defined in an holistic and structural framework - has been the main 
perspective, more attention has been paid to the maintenance of 
order and, therefore, to evolutionary change than to sudden, 
violent, or revolutionary change. 
The main difference in approach between this pluralist perspective 
and those of normative functionalism and coercion theory, resides 
in the priority which has been giv~n, here, to the political 
sector of a plural society. The mode of differential in-
corporation and the ubiquity of political conflict have both 
been repeatedly stressed. Priority has been given to neither 
the cultural nor the economic sector. Since political cleavage--
lines coincide with racial and ethnic lines of differentiation, 
moreover, this ~ifference in priority in pluralist theory 
represents the major divergence from classical and contemporary 
sociological theory. 
The assumptions and hypotheses presented earlier in this study 
have been used in the preceding pages. In particular, the 
hypotheses have been restated in a better-defined framework. 
The new perspective so developed, ~dentifies the major problems 
facing plura~ societies and offers a framework within which 





LIST OF REFERENCES 
ARENDT, H.: The Human Condition, Chicago: Univ. of Chicago 
Press, 1958. 
ARON, Raymond: Main Currents in Sociological- Thought I, 
London: Pelican Books, 1968. 
ATKINSON, Dick: Orthodox Consensus and Radical Alternative, 
London: Heinemann Educational Books Ltd., 1971. 
BAGLEY, c.: 'Racialism and Pluralism; a dimensional analysis 
of 48 countries', in RACE, 13, 1972, pp. 347-354. 
BAGLEY, C.: 'Pluralism, Development, and Social Conflict 
in Africa', Plural Societies, Summer 1972, pp. 13-32. 
BAGLEY, C.: The Dutch Plural Society, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1973. 
BALANDIER, G.: Sociologie Actuelle de l'Afrigue Noire, Paris: 
Presses Universitaires de France, 1963. 
BALANDIER, G.: 'The Colonial Situation: A Theoretical 
Approach' in Social Change: The Colonial Situation, E. Wallerstein 
(ed.), London & New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1966, pp. 34-61. 
BLALOCK, H.M. (Jr.): Toward a Theory of Minority-group Relations, 
New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1967. 
BARTH, Fredrik (ed.): Ethnic Groups and Boundaries London: 
George Allen & Unwin, 1970. 
BRAITHWAITE, L.: Social Stratification and Cultural Pluralism', 
in Social and Cultural Pluralism in the Caribbean, V. Rubin (ed.), 
Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 83, 1960, pp. 816-831. 
BUCKLEY, Walter: Sociology and Modern Systems Theory, New Jersey: 
Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall. Inc., 19 6 7. 
COHEN, Percy S.: Modern S~ ~al Theory, London: Heinemann 
Educational Books Ltd., lr68. 
COX, O.C.: 'The Ques<-~on of Pluralism' in RACE, XII, no. 4, 
April 1971, pp. 38S-400. 
CROSS, M.: Book Review of Race and Racism, Social and Economic 
Studies, 18, 3, 1969, pp. 302,303. 
CROS~_ M.: 'On Conflict, Race Relations, and the Theory of the 
Plural Society' in ~, XII, no. 4, April 1971, pp. 477-494. 
CTfRRY, R.L. (Jr.) & WADE, L.L.: A Theory of Political Exchange, 
/Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1968. 
) 
- l 6 7 -
DAHL, R.: Pluralist Democracy in the United States, Chicago: 
Rand McNally & Co., 1967. 
DAHL, R.: 'Power' in International Encyclopedia of the Social 
Sciences, D.L. Sills (ed.}, Crowell Collier and Macmillan, Inc., 
1968. 
DAHRENDORF, R.: 'Towards a Theory of Social Conflict', The 
Journal of Conflict Resolution, XI, 1958, no. 2, pp. 170-183. 
DAHRENDORF, R.: Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society, 
Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1959. 
DEN HOLLANDER, A.N.D. (et al.): De Plurale Sameleving. The 
Netherlands: J.A. Boom & Zoon, 1966. 
DESPRES, L.: Cultural Pluralism and Nationalist Politics in 
British Guiana, Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1967. 
DESPRES, L.: 'Anthropological Theory, Cultural Pluralism, 
and the Study of Complex societies', Current Anthropology, 
9, 1, Feb. 1968, pp. 3-26. 
DESPRES, L.: 'Protest and Change in Plural Societies', 
·Occasional Papers Series, Montreal: McGill University, 1969. 
DUVERGER, M.: The Idea of Politics, London: Methuen & Co., Ltd., 
1966. 
EISENSTADT, S.N.: 'Prestige, Participation and Strata Formation', 
in Social Stratification, J.A. Jackson (ed.), Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1968, .PP· 62-103. 
EISENSTADT, S.N.: Political Sociology, Eisenstadt, S.N. (ed.), 
New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1971. 
EISENSTADT, S.N.: 'Continuities and Changes in Systems of 
Stratification', in Sta.bility_and Social Change, Barber, B. & 
Inkeles, A. (eds.), Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1971, pp. 61-81. 
ELLIS, D.P~: 'The Hobbesian Problem of Order: A Critical 
Appraisal of the Normative Solution', American Sociological 
Review, 36, 1971, no. 4, pp. 692-703. 
FEUER, L. (ed.}: Marx and Engels: Basic Writings on Politics 
and Philisophy, Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Co., 
Ltd., 1959. 
FORTES, M.: 'An Anthropologist's Point of View', in Rita Hinden 
(ed.), Fabian Colonial Essa~·, London: Allen and Unwin, 1945, 
pp. 215-234. 
FORTES, M.: The Plural Society in Africa, The Alfred and Winifred 
Hoernle Lecture, 1968, Johannesburg: SAIRR, 1970. 
- 168 -
FREISLICH, R.: The Last Tribal War, Cape Town: Struik, 1964. 
FURNIVALL, J.S.: 'Organisation of Consumption', The Economic 
Journal, Vol. 20, 1910, pp. 23-30. 
FURNIVALL, 
Cambridge: 
J .S.: Netherlands India: A Study of Plural Economy,. 
The University Press, 1939. 
PURNIVALL, J.S.: 'Some problems of Tropical Economy,' in Rita 
Hinden (ed.), Fabian Colonial Essays, London: Allen and Unwin, 
1945, pp. 161-184. 
FURNIVALL, J.S.: ·The Tropical Far East, ·oxford Pamphlets on 
World Affairs, no. 71, London: Oxford University Press, 1945. 
FURNIVALL, J.S.: 'Political Education in the Tropical Far 
East', The Political Quarterly, Vol. XVII, 1946, pp. 123-
133. 
FURNIVALL, J.S.: 'Capitalism in Indonesia', Pacific Affairs, 
Vol. XX, no. 1, 1947, pp. 66-69. 
FURNIVALL, J.S.: Colonial Policy and Practice, London: 
Cambridge Univ. Press, 1948. 
GAMSON, William: Power and Discontent, Homewood, Illinois: 
The Dorsey Press, 1968. 
GIDDENS, Anthony: '"Power" in the recent writings of Talcott 
Parsons', Sociology, Vol. 2, 1968, pp. 257-270. 
GIDDENS, Anthony: Capitalism and Modern Social Theory, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971. 
GLUCKMAN,. Max: 'Analysis of a Social _Situation in Modern Zululand', 
Bantu Studies, Vol. 14, 1940, 1-30. 
GLUCKMAN, Max: 'The Kingdom of the Zulu of South Africa' 
in African Political Systems, Evans-Pritchard & Fortes, M. (eds~), 
London: International Institute_ of _African Languages and Culture, 
. 19 40. 
GLUCKMAN, Max: 'Malinowski's 'Functional' Analysis of Social 
Change', Africa, Vol. XVII, no. 2, 1947~ 103-121. 
GLUCKMAN, Max: 'Anthropological Problems arising from the 
Africa Industrial Revolution' in Social Change in _!"lodern Africa, 
A. Southall (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961, pp.67-82 .. 
GLUCKMAN, Max: 'Inter-hierarchical Roles: Professional and Party 
Ethics in the Tribal Areas in South and Central Africa', in 
Local-level Politics, M.J. Swartz (ed.), Chicago: Aldine 
Publishing Co., 1968. 
GLUCKMAN, Max: 'The Tribal Areas in South and Central Africa', 
in Pluralism in Africa, Kuper & Smith (ed.) Berkeley: Univ. of 
Calif. Press, 1969. 
- 169 -
GLUCKMAN, Max: 'Tribalism, Ruralism and Urbanism in South and 
Central Africa', in Colonialism in Africa 1870-1960, VoL 3, 
v. Turner {ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971. 
GOULDNER, Alvin W.: The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology, 
London: Heinemann Educational Books Ltd., 1970. 
HIGGINS, B.H.: EconomicDevelopment: Principles, Problems 
and Practices, London:· Constable, 1959. 
HOETINK, H.: De Gespleten Sameleving in het Caribisch 
Gebied Assen, Netherlands: Royal Van Gorcum Ltd., 1961. 
HOROWITZ, D.L.: 'Multiracial Politics in the New States: 
~Toward a Theory of Conflict', in Issues in Comparative Politics, 
R.J. Jackson & M.B. Stein (eds.), New York: St. Martin's Press, 
1971, pp. 164-180. 
JESSOP, Bob: Social Order, Reform and Revolution, London: 
and Basingstoke: The Macmillan Press, 1972. 
JORDAN , z . A. ( ed . ) : 
Revolution, London: 
Karl Marx: Economy, Class and Social 
Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1971. 
KINLOCH, G.: Urbanization and the Plural Society, G.C. Kinloch, 
M.E. Close & B. Wright, Durban: Logans Academic Press, 1970. 
KINLOCH, G.: The Sociological Study of South Africa: An Intro-
duction, Johannesburg: Macmillan, 1972. 
KORNHAUSER, W.: The Politics of Mass Society, London: Routledge 
& Kegan Paul, 1960. 
KUPER, Leo: Passive Resistance in South Afri~ New Haven: 
Yale Univ. Press, 1957. 
KUPER, Leo: An African Bourgeoisie, New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 
1965. 
KUPER, Leo: 'Religion and Urbanization in Africa', in International 
Yearbook for the Sociology of Religion, Vol. l,Westdeutscher 
Verlag Koln und Opladen, 1965, pp. 213-230. 
KUPER, Leo: 'Sociology: Some Aspects of Urban Plural Societies', 
in The African World, R.A. Lystad {ed.), London & Dunmow: Pall 
Mall Press, 1965, pp. 107-130. 
KUPER, Leo: 'Structural Discontinuities in African Towns: 
Some Aspects of Racial Pluralism', in The. City in Modern Africa,_ 
H. Miner (ed.), London: Pall Mall Press, 1967, pp. 127-150. 
KUPER, Leo: 'The Political Situation of Non~Whites in South 
Africa', in Southern Africa and the United States, W.A. Hance (ed.). 
KUPER, Leo: 'Plural Societies: Perspectives and problems' pp. 
7-26, in Pluralism in Afric~; op. cit. 
• ' 
- 170 -
KUPER, Leo: 'Some Aspects of Violent and Non-violent Political 
Change in Plural Societies. a. Conflict and the Plural Society: 
Ideologies of Violence among Subordinate Groups; b. Poli.ti cal 
Change in White Settler Societies: The Possibility of Peaceful 
Democratization', .PP· 153-168 and pp. 169-194 ,in Pluralism in Africa. 
KUPER, Leo: 'Ethnic and Racial Pluralism: Some Aspects of 
Polarization and Depluralization', pp. 459-487, in Pluralism 
in Africa, Kuper, L. & Smith, M.G. (eds.), California: Univ. 
of Calif. Press, 1969. 
KUPER, Leo: 'Continuities and Discontinuities in Race Relations: 
Evolutionary or Revolutionary Change', Cahiers d'Etudes Africaines, 
Vol. 10, 1970, pp. 361-383. 
KUPER, Leo: Non-violence Revisited', in Protest and Power in 
Black Africa, A. Mazrui & R. Rotberg (eds.), New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1970, pp. 788-804. 
KUPER, Leo: 'Race Structure in the Class Consciousness' in 
Civilizations, XX, 1970, pp. 88-103. 
KUPER, Leo: 'Class and Colour in South Africa - 1850-1950. 
Some Problems in Marxism and Pluralism', RACE, 13, 1, 1971, 
pp. 495-500. 
KUPER, Leo: 'Theories of Revolution and Race Relations', 
Comparative Studies in Society and History, 13, 1, 1971, pp. 
88-108. 
KUPER, Leo: 'Political Change in Plural Societies: problems 
in Racial Pluralism', International Social Science Journal, 
XXI I I I 4 I .19 71 I pp . 5 9 4- 6 0 7 . 
KUPER, Leo: 'African Nationalism in South Africa, 1910-
1964', in The Oxford History of South Africa, Vol. II, 
Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1971, pp. 365-423. 
KUPER, Leo: 'Race, Class and Power: Some Comments on Revolutionary 
Change', Comparative Studies in Society and History, 14, 4, 1972, 
pp. 400-421. 
KUPER, L. & SMITH, M.G. (eds.): Pluralism in Africa, California: 
University of California Press, 1969. ---LANE, R.E.: Political Ideology, New York: The Free Press, 1962. 
LEFEBVRE, Henri: The Sociology of Marx, London: Random House, 
1968. 
LEHMAN, E.W.: 'Toward a ~acrosociology of Power', American 
~iological Review, 34, 1969, no. 4, pp. 453-465. 
LERNER, D.: 'Some comments on Center-periphery Relations', in 
Comparing Nations, Merrit, R.L. & Rokkan, S. (eds.), New Haven 




LEVY,· Marion (Jr.): The Structure of Society, Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1952. 
LIJPHART, A.: The Politics of Accom.~odation: Pluralism and 
Democracy in the Netherlands, Berkeley, California: University 
of Ca~ifornia Press, 1968 • 
LIPSET, S.M. & .·ROKKAN, S. (·eds.): Party Systems and Voter 
Alignment, New York: The Free Press, 1967. 
LOCKWOOD, David: 'Some Remarks on "The Social Sys tern" ' , 
The British Journal of Sociology, 7, 1956, no. 2, pp. 134-
146. 
LOCKWOOD, David: 'Social Integration and System Integration' 
in Explorations in Social Change, Zollschan, G. & Hirsch, w. 
(eds.), London: Routledge & ~egan Paul Ltd., 1964, pp. 244-257. 
LOCKWOOD, David: 'Race, Conflict and the Plural Society', 
in Race and Racialism, s. Zubaida (ed.), London: Tavistock 
Publications, 1970, pp. 57-72. 
McKENZIE, H.I.: 'The Plural Society Debate: Some Comments 
on a Recent Contribution', Social and Economic Studies, 
15, 1, 1966, pp. 53-60. 
MALINOWSKI, B.: A Scientific Theory of Culture and Other 
Essays, Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1944. 
MANN, M.: 'The Social Cohesion of Liberal Democracy', 
American Sociological Review, 35,. 1970, no. 3, pp. 423-439. 
MARCUSE, H.: One Dimensional Man, Boston: Beacon Press, 1964. 
MARKS, S.: Reluctant Rebellion, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970. 
MASON, Philip: Patterns of Dominance,_ Oxford: Oxford Univ. 
Press, 1971. 
MILLS, C.W.: The Sociological Imagination, New York: Oxford 
University Press, Inc., 1959. 
MINTZ, S.W.: 1 Groups, Group Boundaries and the Perception 
of "Race"' in Comparative Studies in Society and History, 
13 , 4 , 19 71, pp • 4 3 7- 4 5 0 . 
MITCHELL, J.C.: Tribalism and the Plural Society, Inaugural 
Lecture, Univ. College of Nyasaland and Rhodesia, Salisbury, 
Oxford University Press, 1959.· 
MITCHELL, w.c.: Sociolo<J:ical Analysis and Politics, (Englewood Cliffs, 
N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967). · 
MOODIE, T.D.: 'Towards a Dynamic Conception of Social Order', 
in ~, Sociology Southern Africa, 1973, (Papers from the 
First Congress of the Association for Sociologists in Southern 
Africa), Durban: University of Natal, 1973, pp. 325-338. 
• • 
- 172 -
MOORE, W.E.: Social Change: Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-
Hall, 1963. 
MORRIS, H~S.: 'Indians in East Africa: A Study in a Plural 
Society', British Journal of Sociology, 7, no. 3, Oct. 1956; 
pp. 194-211. 
MORRIS, H.S.: 'The Plural Society', Man, 57, no. 8, Aug. 1957, 
pp. 124-5. 
MORRIS, H.S.: 'Some aspects of the Concept Plural Society', Man, 
n~s.,l, no. 2, June 1966, pp. 169-184. 
MORRIS, H.S.: The Indians in Uganda, London: Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson, 196 8. 
MURPHREE, M.W.: 'Sociology and the Study of Race - Contem-
porary Perspectives for Southern Africa•; Unpublished Paper 
presented at the ASSA Congress, 19 7 4. · (Association· for 
Sociologists in Southern Africa), Durban:_ July 1974. 
NADEL, S.F.: The Foundatiora of Social Anthropology, London: 
Cohen and West, 1951. 
NETTL, J.P.: Political Mobilization, London:' Faber and Faber 
Ltd., 1967 • 
NETTL, J.P.: International Systems and the Modernization 
of Societies, Nettl, J.P. & Robertson, R., London: Faber and 
Faber Ltd., 1968. 
PARSONS, Talcott: Toward a General Theory of Action, New York 
and Evanston: Harper Torchbook, 1962. 
PARSONS, Talcott: 'On the Concept of Political Power', Proceedings 
of the American Philoso hical Society, Vol. 107, 1963, no.3. 
Reprinted i~ Politics and Social StructureL see below). 
P.ARSONS, Talcott: Societies: Evolutionary and Compara.ti ve . 
Perspectives, Englewood Cliffs 1 N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966. 
PARSONS, Talcott: The Structure of Social Action, _New York: 
The Free Press, 1968. 
( 
PARSONS, Talcott: 'Order as a Sociological Concept', in The 
Concept of Order, Kuntz, P.G. ied.), Seattle: University 
of Washington Press, 1968, pp. 373-384. 
PARSONS; Talcott: Poli tics and Social Structure,_ New York: 
The Free Press, 1969. 
PARSONS, Talcott: 'Some Problems of General Theory in Sociolo-
gy' in Theoretical Sociology, McKinney, J.C. & Tiryakian, E.A. 
(eds.), New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1970, pp. 27-68. 
-• 
- 173 -
PARSONS, Talcott: The System of Mode~n Societies, Englewood 
Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1971. 
QUERMONNE, J-L: 'Le Probleme de la Cohabitation dans les 
Societes Multi-Conununautaires', in Revue Francaise de Science 
Politigue, XI, 1961, pp. 29-58. 
RADCLIFFE-BROWN, 
Society, London: 
A.R.: Structure and Function in Primitive 
Cohen and West, 1952. 
RANDALL, Peter (ed.): South Africa's Political Alternatives, 
Sprocas Publication, no. 10, Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 
1973. 
REX, John: 'The Plural Society in Sociological Theory', 
British Journal of SociologY.L Vol. 10, 1959, pp. 114-124. 
REX, John: Key Problems of Sociological Theory, London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1961. 
REX, John: Race Relations in Sociological Theory, London: 
.Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1970. 
REX, John: 'The Plural Society: The South African Case', 
in RACE, XII, no. 4, April 1971, pp. 401-413. 
REX, John: 'South African Society in Comparative Per spec ti ve', 
in Race, Colonialism and the City, John Rex, London: Routledge 
& Kegan Paul, 1973, pp. 257-268. 
ROKKAN, S. & VALEN, H.: 'The Mobilization of the Periphery', 
Acta Sociologica, 6, 1962, nos. 1-2, pp. 111-158. 
ROTTENBERG, S.: 'Discussion on the Paper' in Social and Cultural 
Pluralism in the Caribbean, V. Rubin (ed.), Annals of the New 
York Academy of Sciences, 83, 1960, pp. 831-836. 
RUBIN, V. (ed.): Social and Cultural Pluralism in the Carihpean, 
Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 83, 1960. 
RUNCIMAN, W.G.: Social Science and Political Theory, .Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1967. 
SCHLEMMER, L.: 'City or Rural 11 Iiomeland 11 : A Study of Patterns 
of Identification among Africans in South Africa's Divided 
Society', Social Forces, 51, 2, Dec. 1972, pp. 154-164. 
SCHWANENBERG, E.: 'The Two Problems of Order in Parsons' Theo:cy', 
Social Forces, 49, 1971, no. 4, pp. 569-581. 
SCOTT~ J.F.: 'The Changing Foundations of the Parsonian Action 
Scheme', American Sociological Review, Vol. 28, 1963, pp. 716-735. 
SHILS, Edward: 'Centre and Periphery''· in The Logic of Perso_nal 
Knowledge, M. Polanyi (ed.), London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
1961, pp. 117-130. 
I 174 
SHILS, Edward: 'From Periphery to Center: The Changing Place 
of Intellectuals in American Society', in Stability and Social 
Change. Barber, B. & Inkeles, A. (eds.), Boston: Little, 
Brown and Co., 1971, pp. 211-243. 
SMELSER, N.: Social Change and the Industrial Revolution, 
London: Routledge, 1959. 




N.: Essays in Sociological Explanation, Englewood 
Prentice-Hall, 1968. 
SMITH, M~G.: The Plural Society in the British West Indies, 
Berkeley and Los Angeles: Univ. of California Press, 1965. 
SMITH, M.G.: 'A Structural Approach to Comparative Politics', 
in Varieties of Political Theory, D. Easton (ed.) Englewood 
Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1966, pp. 113-128. 
SMITH, M.G.: 'Institutional and Political Conditions of 
Pluralism', in Pluralism in Africa, Ch. 2. 
SMITH, M.G.: 'Pluralism in Precolonial African Societies', 
in Pluralism in Africa, Ch. 4. 
SMITH, M.G.: 'Some Developments in the Analytic Framework 
of Pluralism', in Pluralism in Africa, Ch. 13. 
SMITH, M.G.: Pluralism in Africa, M.G~ Smith & L. Kuper 
(eds.) Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California 
Press, 1969. 
SMITH, R.T.: Review of Social and Cultural Pluralism 
in the Caribbean, American Anthropologist, 63, 1961, pp. 
155-157. 
THOMPSON, Leonard: Politics in the Republic of South Africa, 
Boston: Little Brown & Co., 1966. 
THOMPSON, Leonard: 'Historical Perspectives of Pluralism', 
in Pluralism in Africa, Kuper and Smith (eds.} 
THOMPSON, Leonard: Oxford History of South Africa, ·vols. I & II, 
M. Wilson & L. Thompson (eds.), London: Oxford University Press, 
1971. 
VANDENBERGHE, P.: 'Apartheid, Fascism and the Golden Age', 
in Race and Ethnicity, 1962, pp._ ·244-257. 
VANDENBERGHE, P.: 'Dialectic and Functionalism: Toward a 
Theoretical Synthesis', American Sociological Review, 28, 1963, 
no. 5, pp. 695-705. 
I 
I - 175 -
VANDENBERGHE, P.: 'Toward a Sociology of Africa', in Race and 
~thnicity, 1.964, pp. 79-93. 
VAN DEN BERGHE, P.: Caneville, Middletown, .Conn.: Wesleyan Univ. 
Press, 1964. 
VAN DEN BERGHE., P.: South Africa, A Study in Conflict, Berkeley: 
Univ. of Berkeley Press, 1967. 
VANDENBERGHE, P.: Race and Racism, New York: John Wiley & Sons, 
. 1967. 
VANDENBERGHE, P.: 'Pluralism and the Polity', in Pluralism 
in Africa, pp. 67-81. 
VANDENBERGHE, P.: Race and Ethnicity, New York: Basic Books, 
1970. 
VANDENBERGHE, P.: 'Race, Class and Ethnicity in South Africa', 
in Social Stratification in Africa, A. Tuden and L. Plotnikov 
(eds.), New York: The Free Press, 1970, pp. 345-371. 
VANDENBERGHE, P.: 'Pluralism and Conflict Situations in 
Africa: A Reply to B. Magubane', African Social Research, 
9, June 1970, pp. 681-689. 
VANDENBERGHE, P.: 'The Benign Quota: 
Box', The American Sociologist, 1971, 6, 
Panacea or Pandora's 
(Suppl. Issue) , pp. 4 0-4 3. 
VANDENBERGHE, P.: 'Ethnicity: The African Experience', 
Int. Soc. Science Jrnl., XXIII, 4, 1971, pp. 507-519. 
VANDENBERGHE, P.: 'Pluralism at a Nigerian University', A 
Case Study', RACE, XII, 4, 1971, pp. 429-441. 
VAN DEN BERGHE, P.: Power and Privilege at an African Uni ver-
sity, London·: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1973. 
WILSON, G. & M.: The Analysis of Social Change~ Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1945. 
WORSLEY, P. ·(ed.): Introducing Sociology_L.Harmondsworth, 
Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1970. 
WRONG, .D.: 1 Some Problems in Defining Social Power', The American 
Journal of Sociology, Vol. 73, no. 6, 1968, pp. 673-681. 
' WRONG, D.: Max Weber, Englewood Cliffs, N .. J .• : Prentice-Hall, 1970. 
ZOLLSCHAN, G.K. et al.: 'Working Papers in the Theory of Insti-
tutionalization', in _E:~tion~ in Social Chang~- Zollschan, G.K. 
and Hirsch, W. (eds.), London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1964, 
pp. 89-207. 
ZUBAIDA; Sarni {ed.): Race and Racialism, London: Tavistock 
Publications, 1970. 
